China in the Backyard:Chinese Assertiveness and United States’ Hegemony in Latin America between 2001 and 2015  by Urdinez, Francisco
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








China in the Backyard









KING´S COLLEGE LONDON 
 




Author: Francisco Urdinez 
 
Title: China in the Backyard: Chinese Assertive-
ness and United States’ Hegemony in Latin 


















China in the Backyard: Chinese Assertiveness 
and United States’ Hegemony in Latin America 
between 2001 and 2015 
 
 
Thesis presented to the Graduate Program in International Relations of the 
Institute of International Relations of the University of São Paulo, to obtain 
the double title of Doctor of Sciences along with King's College of London. 
 
Advisor: Prof. Dr. Amâncio Jorge de Oliveira (USP) 
Co-counselor: Prof. Dr. Jan Knoerich (KCL) 
 
 








I authorize the reproduction and total or partial disclosure of this 
work, by any conventional or electronic means, for study and re-
search purposes, provided the source is mentioned. 
 
 
The Maughan Library  
















      Urdinez, Francisco           
             China in the Backyard: Chinese Assertiveness and United 
States’ Hegemony in Latin America between 2001 and 2015 / Fran-
cisco Urdinez --      
     
      
        Thesis (doutorate). King’s College London, Brazil Institute. 
      
        1. International Relations – China 2. Latin America 3. 






URDINEZ, F. China in the Backyard: Chinese Assertiveness and 
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2015. 2017. 224 f. Tese (Doutorado) - Instituto de Relações Inter-
nacionais, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2017. 
 
This thesis seeks to analyse the relationship between China's assertive-
ness and US hegemony in Latin America in the period 2001-2015. 
The analysis was done by mixing quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods, and has as a central hypothesis that the American hegemony 
(which is assumed in retraction) negatively affected China's assertive-
ness in the region. The thesis consists of seven chapters, ranging from 
general conclusions to particular conclusions. The hypothesis proves 
empirically, but variations are also found between countries and varia-
tions by economic activity. I conclude that China approached Latin 
America through a strategy of accommodative assertiveness, and 
Latin American countries responded to that approach aiming at di-
versifying their relationships. 
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nia dos Estados Unidos na América Latina entre 2001 e 2015. 2017. 
224 f. Tese (Doutorado) - Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Uni-
versidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2017. 
 
 
Esta tese busca analisar a relação entre a asenção da China e a hege-
monia norteamericana na America Latina no periodo de 2001-2015. 
A analise foi feita misturando metodos quantitativos e qualitativos, e 
tem como hipotese central que a hegemonia norteamericana (que se 
asume em retração) afetou negativamente a asenção da China. A tese 
está composta por sete capitulos, indo de conclusões gerais a conclu-
sões particulares. A hipótese se prova empiricamente, mas também se 
encontram variações entre paises e variações por atividade econo-
mica. Concluo que a China se aproximou da América Latina por 
meio de uma estratégia de assertividade acomodativa e os países la-
tino-americanos responderam a essa abordagem visando diversificar 
suas relações.    
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Chapter 1 – Introduction: Chinese assertive-
ness and American hegemony in Latin Amer-




This PhD thesis is not about US-China relations, nor US-Latin 
American relations, but about China-Latin American relations 
during a time in which these boomed, a time which coincided 
with a process of  sustained hegemonic retraction of  the United 
States in the region. However, tangentially, it can be read as a US-
China or a US-Latin America thesis. The objective of  this thesis 
is to explore if  American hegemony affected the Chinese rise in 
Latin America causally. The thesis gives great agency to the Latin 
American countries, who use the rise of  China as an opportunity 
to maneuver. The object of  study of  this thesis is the rise of  
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China and the concomitant reaction of  the Latin American coun-
tries to this growth, which I assume is conditioned by historical 
ties with the regional (and world) hegemon. For this reason, alt-
hough one could say that the discussion is about the rise and fall 
of  the great powers, and the balance of  power in realist terms, 
this thesis is, in fact, framed within International Political Econ-
omy (IPE), which is nourished by notions of realism only 
through assumptions about the structure of  the international sys-
tem. 
The relevance of  the issue to be addressed is high because, since 
the rise of  the Soviet Union, no country has kept US hegemony 
in check as much as China. However, while the power of the for-
mer was fundamentally military, the power of  the latter is funda-
mentally economic. That is why concepts derived from IPE are 
so necessary for the study of  the rise of  China. Furthermore, the 
period of  study (2001-2015) was an early stage of  the Chinese 
rise, and confrontation with United States was not yet obvious but 
taking shape.  
 
The dependent variable: Chinese assertiveness  
In the last 15 years the epicenter of  the world economy has 
moved from the North Atlantic to East Asia with an unprece-
dented intensity (see figure 1) and with it, also the center of  global 
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power. One might ask, then, what are the distinguishing charac-
teristics of  the twenty-first century, in terms of power distribu-
tion, which we have already lived in for more than a decade and 




FIGURE 1: World’s economic gravity center.  
Note: The economic center of  gravity is calculated by weighting locations 
by GDP in three dimensions and projected to the point on the nearest 
land surface. The projection to 2025 was calculated by the McKinsey 
Global Institute. Source: Bolt and Van Zanden (2014). 
 
In his most recent book, Asia's Cauldron, Robert Kaplan (2014) 
defines the “century of Asia” as an era in which China will be the 
only country capable of  disputing the global hegemony of  the 
United States. In this sense, China is projected as the only world 
power capable of reviving a bipolar system, a power distribution 
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that has not existed since the end of  the Cold War (Buzan, 2010; 
Shambaugh, 2012). In contrast, despite the rapid growth of 
emerging powers and the enthusiasm that was generated years 
ago in the face of the possibility of an eventual multipolar equi-
librium, today we can see that this diagnosis was based on conjec-
tural vicissitudes and obviated structural realities (Pant, 2013). As 
an example, at the time of  the creation of the BRIC concept, 
coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill, some 
scholars embraced the idea that this rise was modifying the struc-
ture of  the international system (Cooper and Flemes, 2013). 
However, more than 10 years after the creation of the acronym, 
the only member of  the bloc with the material capabilities to play 
the role of  global power remains China. Moreover, if  we consider 
the material capacities of  these five countries, as realism under-
stands them, the only one that has significantly increased its ca-





FIGURE 2: Evolution of the CINC indicator for large economies. 
Note: The CINC Score is a composite index that contains annual values 
for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy 
consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure, which proxies 
for total world power. Source: Correlates of War (2014). Based on Singer 
et al. (1972). 
 
Even if  we compare the material capacities of  both countries, we 
will see that China surpassed the United States in early 2000 (see 
figure 3). Yet, it is clearly necessary to disaggregate by dimensions 
of  the index to grasp which material capabilities are driving this 
growth. As we can see in the appendix to this chapter, the varia-
bles that have grown exponentially since the late 1980s are those 
that reflect China's economic growth, the concomitant urbaniza-





FIGURE 3: Evolution of the CINC indicator. 
Source: Correlates of  War (2014).  
 
The figure below shows the evolution of  the gross products of  
both countries. Since the end of  the Cold War, the gap in the size 
of  the two economies has been reduced by a dual process, first a 
slight decrease on the part of the United States and, most im-
portantly, the solid growth of  the Chinese economy, such that 
adding both economies nowadays represents more than 50% of 





FIGURE 4: Chinese and American share of the World GDP.  
Source: World Bank Data (2016). 
 
While the CINC indicator is widely accepted in the literature as a 
proxy for national capabilities, it is odd that China has already out-
grown the United States knowing that it is so inferior, militarily 
speaking, and that it has avoided direct confrontations with 
United States even in its own are of  influence, namely, the South 
China Sea. 
Another way of looking at the relationship of material capacities 
between China and the United States is the used by Johnston 
(2003), who analyzes three versions of  a material capabilities indi-
cator, developed in China, called Comprehensive National Power 
(CNP). This figures are probably more accurate than those shown 
by the popular CINC. The figure below projects Chinese capabil-
ities as percentages of  the United States, and although they never 
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exceed 100%, the three versions of the indicator coincide in pre-
dicting a reduction in the gap over time. While CINC is used by 
the western academy, the CNP is more influential in the Chinese 
academy. The central difference between both is that this last one 
besides taking into account variables of  hard power incorporates 




FIGURE 5: Comprehensive National Power.  
Note: The AMS version of CNP is made by Academy of Military Sci-
ence, the CASS corresponds to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
and CICIR corresponds to the China Institute of  Contemporary Inter-
national Relations. 




It is Johnston himself  who, in my opinion, has best analyzed the 
existence of  a Chinese strategy of foreign policy in relation to the 
growth of  its material capabilities. This Harvard professor who 
has studied in depth the values and idiosyncrasy of China's for-
eign policy in historical perspective, published two books central 
for understanding the historical context of  the so-called Chinese 
rise (1998, 2008). In Is China a Status Quo Power?, Johnston (2003) 
addresses the question of how proactive China is in challenging 
formal and informal rules of  major institutions, to answer if  it 
truly is a challenging actor of  the international order.  
Drawing on Gilpin's discussion of  what constitutes the “rules of  
the game”, he argues that China does not challenge the system 
since (a) its participation rates in International Institutions has 
grown; (b) the degree of  compliance with international norms 
has increased; (c) and it behaves as a country accepting of  the 
rules of  the game. When discussing the next dimension, historical 
evidence of  whether China challenges United States or not, he 
raises two questions: First, whether China's leadership has a well-
thought-out, shared preference for establishing hegemony in the 
region (South East Asia in his case), for pushing U.S. military 
power out and, secondy, whether China is indeed proactively bal-
ancing against U.S. military power and trying to undermine its al-
liances. While he argues that the “evidence is problematic”, the 
27 
 
next chapters of  this thesis contributes to these two questions 
proving empirical evidence that China affected not the military 
power of  the United States but certainly its economic and political 
power in Latin America.  
Furthermore, Johnston argues that China can benefit from eco-
nomic relations with the United States and from the relative global 
stability that U.S. hegemony affords by way of  unipolarity (2003: 
32). I find evidence to think otherwise for the second part of  this 
statement. Certainly China does benefit from a good relation with 
United States, but does not necessarily accept willingly the unipo-
lar order. His discussion on whether or nor Chinese diplomats 
and politicians embrace the concept of  a multipolar order is out-
side the scope of  this introduction. 
The literature that defines my dependent variable is rich, although 
vague in its conceptualization. There are, I think, two overlapping 
categorizations of the same phenomenon by groups of  re-
nowned authors. On the one hand, Buzan & Cox (2013), scholars 
at the London School of Economics, talk about rise and to de-
scribe it propose a 4 × 2 matrix as below (see table 1). On the one 
hand this rise can be peaceful or hostile, and in turn, these can be 
cold or warm. Cold or negative peaceful rise (no great power war, 
but an environment of  threat and suspicion); and warm or posi-
tive peaceful rise (a friendly environment with a low sense of 
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threat) refers to the existence or not of  conflict. Peaceful or hos-
tile depends on warlike rise (meeting the realist expectations of 
the rising power precipitating a great power war). By peaceful rise 
“we might thus say that the minimum condition for peaceful rise 
is that a growing power is able to make both absolute and relative 
gains in both its material and its status positions, in relation to the 
other great powers in the international system without precipitat-
ing major hostilities between itself  and other great powers. Peace-
ful rise involves a two-way process in which the rising power ac-
commodates itself  to the rules and structures of  international so-
ciety, while at the same time other great powers accommodate 
some changes in those rules and structures by way of adjusting to 
the new disposition of power and status” (2013: 4). 
 
TABLE 1: comparison of  Chinese rise to other superpowers 
  Rise  Not rise 
 peaceful hostile 
 cold China Pre-war Germany 
warm USA British Empire 
 
In the quadrant between peaceful and cold Buzan & Cox (2013) 
locate China and compare it mainly with the rise of  the United 
States to whom, without much conviction, they put in a peaceful 
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and warm position arguing that the costs of  confronting the sys-
tem were obviated by free riding due to the emergence of  the first 
and second World War in Europe. In the other quadrants they 
locate Germany and England. There are several renowned au-
thors whose works fit well into this categorization, although they 
do not always use the same concepts to describe Chinese ascent. 
For example, Yue (2008) denies that it is worth talking about such 
a rise, so it would be located in the column not rise. This stance, 
radical, denies the phenomenon that this whole thesis wants to 
explain, and so I do not agree with his vision.  
Chen (2008) develops an entire book to discuss a power transition 
theory and concludes that China is unlikely to instigate a confron-
tation with the United States, and that while military conflict over 
the Taiwan Strait is possible, this is more likely to be due to China’s 
inability to prevent United States involvement than its willingness 
to provoke the United States. If  Chen had to locate China in a 
quadrant, he would do the same as Buzan and Cox in the upper 
left of  the table. Qingguo (2008) argues that a peacefully rising 
China has to learn to live with the sole superpower in the post-
Cold War World. In his words, if  the United States does not treat 
China as an enemy and if  the two countries can effectively man-
age the Taiwan problem, China is likely to continue its efforts to 
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accommodate and cooperate with the United States (2005: 395). 
His perception corresponds to the lower left quadrant. 
On the other hand, Chen, Pu and Johnston (2014) define China's 
diplomacy as assertive. This term can be defined as “a form of  di-
plomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor 
that are clearly higher than before” (2014: 176). While it is difficult 
to equate rise (referring to an ascending move in the international 
system) with assertiveness (referring to a political attitude) both 
are used to describe the same phenomenon. It might be that be-
cause China is rising behaves more assertive, for instance, but such 
a statement need to be testes empirically. The quadrant of  asser-
tiveness is also a 4 × 2 in which we have constructive and destruc-
tive on the one hand and defensive and offensive on the other. In 
truth Johnston criticizes the use of this concept, but recognizes 
that it is a meme in the American media and academy which de-
serves much attention; he would be located in the non-assertive-
ness column for neglecting this category. Chen and Pu would lo-
cate China in the upper left quadrant, that is, a defensive and con-
structive assertive attitude. They criticize Johnston in that his view 
of  assertiveness “omits the possibility that assertiveness also has 
a positive connotation.”(2014: 176)  Based on this understanding, 
they define assertiveness in international relations as “a confident 
and direct way to defend one country’s rights or claims” (2014: 
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177). They divide China’s assertiveness into ‘offensive construc-
tive’ (a ‘confident and direct way’ of taking a leadership role in 
institutions to defend expanding interests); ‘offensive destructive’ 
(a ‘confident and direct way’ of opposing rules and institutions to 
de- fend expanding interests); ’defensive constructive‘ (a ’confi-
dent and direct way‘ of taking a leadership role in institutions to 
defend existing interests); and ’defensive destructive’ (a ‘confident 
and direct way’ of opposing rules and institutions to defend ex-
isting interests). The problem with this construct is that “to be 
valid the concept of  assertiveness has to be falsifiable, and given their 
definition of  assertive (a ’confident and direct way ‘of de- fending 
interests), one should expect, in principle, to be able to observe 
‘non-confident and indirect ways’ of defending interests as well” 
(2014: 181). This thesis opts for using Johnston’s definition of  as-
sertiveness because costs can be easily quantifiable. On the other 
hand, since the rise of  China is assumed to be given, it is hard to 
work under the possibility of  the counterfactual of  what would 
have happened in the region without the Chinese rise.  
Authors that discuss policy recommendations for China to avoid 
conflict in South East Asia (particularly due to the One China 
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Policy1) can be categorized using the assertive-non-assertive ma-
trix. Christensen (2006) discusses how to move from a destructive 
assertiveness to a constructive one by means of  normative rec-
ommendations in which the focus is on providing public goods 
to the neighbors via a win-win cooperation: “Beijing wants to 
make it more difficult and painful for regional actors to choose 
the United States over China in any future standoff. So, by main-
taining a strong presence in the region, the United States has done 
more than provide collective goods in security and economic af-
fairs; it may have provided a major catalyst for Beijing to help pro-
vide such collective goods as well.” (2006: 126) 
Other recognized authors who make normative policy recom-
mendations to contain Chinese ascent also fit in the assertiveness 
matrix. We could locate Mearsheimer (2010) in the upper right 
quadrant, who argues that “Australians should be worried about 
China’s rise because it is likely to lead to an intense security com-
petition between China and the United States, with considerable 
potential for war. Moreover, most of  China’s neighbors, to in-
clude India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, Vietnam—
and Australia—will join with the United States to contain China’s 
power. To put it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully” (2010: 382). 
                                                          
1 As a policy, this means that countries seeking diplomatic relations with the People's Re-
public of China (PRC) must break official relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
and vice versa. 
33 
 
Other authors, less pessimistic, propose policies to go from a con-
structive defensive scenario to an offensive constructive scenario 
(Glaser, 2015, Harris, 2015). 
 
TABLE 2: dimensions of  assertiveness in International Relations 
 
 
Assertive behaviour Non-Assertiveness 
 constructive destructive 
 defensive   
offensive   
 
This thesis has as its dependent variable the rise of  Chinese and 
not its assertiveness, therefore, the dependent variables in the fol-
lowing chapters are economic: commercial relations, investments 
and bank credits. After all, figures 1, 2 and 3 show that China has 
grown, principally, economically. Since the variables chosen un 
this thesis are economic, the idea of  ‘rise’ can be coupled with the 
one of  economic statecraft, from the IPE literature, that defines 
it as “the use of  economic means in the service of  both economic 
and foreign policy ends” (Baldwin, 1985; Drezner, 1999). The 
data show that since the late 1990s there has been an exponential 
growth in both China's foreign direct investment in the world, 
China's participation in world trade and international aid, and 
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lending to regions previously neglected by China (Africa and 
America Latin America) to finance infrastructure projects. 
Figure 6 shows that while China has been a recipient of  invest-
ment since the early 1990s, only in 2001 did Chinese companies 
begin to invest heavily in the world. 
 
FIGURE 6: Boom of Chinese Investment Boom’.  
Note: US billion dollars at current prices and current exchange rates. 
Source: UNCTAD (2016). 
 
Figure 7 shows that the Chinese participation in world trade has 
grown since 2001, surpassing the United States, which was the 












FIGURE 7: Chinese Trade as a Share of  American Trade.  
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2016). 
 
Figure 8 shows that despite by the end of the 1980s China began 
to provide foreign direct aid, the amounts increased exponentially 
in 2005. 
 
FIGURE 8: ‘Boom’ of Chinese Foreign Aid.  
Note: US billion dollars at current prices and current exchange rates. 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2016). 
 
Finally, figure 9 shows that it was also from the year 2001 that 
Chinese banks began to provide loans in Latin America and Af-
rica. 
 
FIGURE 9: Evolution of Chinese Bank Loans.  
Note: US billion dollars at current prices and current exchange rates. 
Source: InterAmerican Dialogue and China Africa Research Initiative 
(John Hopkins) (2016). 
 
For all of the above, three conclusions can be drawn: firstly, Chi-
na's material capabilities have grown and the gap with the United 
States has narrowed. Secondly, there is still theoretical disagree-
ment on how to call this phenomenon, and even more about the 
political implications this phenomenon has for the United States. 
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Finally, studies of  an empirical nature, as defined in this case in 
Latin America, help bring the debate forward. 
 
The independent variable: American hegemonic influence  
 
Since we have defined our dependent variable as the Chinese as-
sertiveness, operationalized by activities of  economic statecraft 
(trade, investments, credits), we now define the independent vari-
able.  
The literature on hegemony in international relations in general 
— and on American hegemony in particular —is very broad. 
However, it presents the methodological challenge of  its opera-
tionalization. Since it is an extremely abstract variable, its empirical 
measurement requires a methodological effort. In his recent 
book, Latin America Confronts the United States, Tom Long (2015) 
offers an interesting analysis through case studies of  the agency 
of  the Latin American countries towards American hegemony. 
He goes through some of the most remembered facts of  the ex-
ercise of  hegemony in the region, among which we could high-
light the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary, the Platt 
Amendment, the coups of  Guatemala 1954 and Chile 1973, the 
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interventions at the Bay of  Pigs, Santo Domingo, and Operation 
"Just Cause" in Panama. 
In his book he identifies three schools of study of American he-
gemony in Latin America. The first grouping, to borrow Russell 
Crandall’s term, is the “establishment” school.  Robert A. Pastor 
described the “security thesis” as the central tenet of  this school. 
The security thesis shares much with a realist vision of  the world, 
as Gregory Weeks has noted. First advanced by Samuel Flagg Be-
mis, this thesis argues that the overriding goal of U.S. policy in 
Latin America has been to prevent any extra-hemispheric power 
from establishing a base within the hemisphere from which it 
could threaten the continental United States. (2015: 4-6) 
The second school is what he calls the “revisionist synthesis” so-
lidified during the 1980s and early 1990s. This school goes well 
beyond the acknowledgment of  imperfections or aberrations in 
U.S. policy to reject its fundamental precepts. “This synthesis 
draws upon the work of  scholars like Walter LaFeber, who saw a 
union of U.S. business and government interests in a quest to eco-
nomically dominate Latin America. LaFeber argued that U.S. ge-
ography allowed it to be isolationist, but “internal developments, 
as interpreted by American policymakers, led the United States to 
imperial behaviors” (2015: 6). 
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These two schools condense the great majority of  the scientific 
production and suffer the defect of  not recognizing the agency 
of  the Latin American countries. That is why Long proposes 
what he calls an “Internationalist Approach”, which assumes that 
Latin American countries are not passive actors but have agency 
to react to the hegemonic actions of  United States. My thesis 
could be framed in this school as the relations between China and 
the countries of Latin America are studied on how they have re-
acted to our independent variable. The next chapter advances an 
empirical specification of the concept of  hegemony, for which I 
create a composite index. However, it is good to anticipate that by 
US hegemony in this thesis, I mean Robert Keohane's definition 
of  hegemony as, “control over capital, markets, and raw materi-
als” (Keohane, 1984: 139). Having determined our dependent 
and independent variable, I will proceed to delimit the time and 
space in which I have observed the relation of  these two. 
 
The historical and geographical context: the War on Terror and the Obama 
Doctrine in Latin America 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the American hegemony in the 
region has gone through two stages. The first of these from the 
fall itself  to September 11, 2001, a period marked by the paradigm 
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of the New World Order (Hurrell, 1992), influenced by the ne-
oliberal thinking of  the Washington Consensus, with a return of 
the United States to the Latin American region, and a systemic 
configuration of  unipolarity, which lead Huntington to name 
United States as the “lonely superpower” (1999). The second pe-
riod runs from September 11, 2001, which began the War on Ter-
ror, followed by the Obama Doctrine that lasted until November 
9, 2016, as a referential date in which Donald Trump was elected. 
 
 
FIGURE 10: The two main phases since the fall of  the Berlin Wall.  
Note: This thesis draw conclusions for period ‘B’. 
 
Although it is necessary to contextualize both processes, A and B 
(Figure 10), my thesis draws conclusions only for period B. In his 
recent book, Latin America in International Politics: Challenging US He-
gemony, Tulchin (2016), one of the most renowned latinamerican-
ist to date, performs a detailed analysis of  the characteristics of  
American hegemony throughout this period. The characteristics 
of  the US influence in Latin America, and of the power configu-





TABLE 3: characteristics of  the period of  study 
 
The terrorist attacks in 2001 and “the mad rush of  the George W. 
Bush administration to militarize unilateralism threw the hemi-
spheric community into disorder in ways that were reminiscent 
of  the Cold War. The war on terror destroyed the euphoria the 
end of  the Cold War had generated. It also made the end of  US 
hegemony more problematic. That meant that as the experience 
of  agency in the world community became more familiar, it ap-
peared inevitable that opposition to US hegemony would become 
adversarial” (Tulchin, 2016: 129). The United States focused on 
the Middle East, the emergence of  ISIS in northern Africa, and 
containing Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, and left Latin Amer-
ica as a second-class priority. For instance, the usefulness of  the 
Organization of  American States (OAS) had eroded decades be-
fore. In this sense Tulchin says: “For a few years, the OAS became 
an effective element in hemispheric governance and looked as if  
it would become the chosen instrument of  Latin American 
 




New World Order Hegemonic order Lonely superpower 
War on terror Retreat Lonely superpower 
Obama Doctrine Posthegemony Proto-bipolarism 
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agency in collective action. After 9/11, the United States lost in-
terest, the budget was gutted, and the new regionalism initiatives 
from Latin America served to erode the influence of  the OAS.” 
To this is added a turn to the left, which was called the Pink Tide, 
very critical of the Washington Consensus, the Free Trade Area 
of  the Americas (FTAA) and favored by a period of high com-
modity prices that allowed Latin American countries to pursue an 
agenda of  strong state investment (Panizza, 2009; Mazzuca, 2013; 
Campello, 2015; Mares & Kacowicz, 2016). 
When Obama assumed the presidency, his administration deline-
ated a posthegemonic policy which aimed at developing equal-to-
equal relationships rather than the historical paternalistic ap-
proach, which came to be known as the Obama doctrine (Drez-
ner, 2011). After the lessons of the 1990s, it was clear that despite 
“unequaled military and economic power, the use of  that over-
whelming power, what the military called supreme dominance, 
could not guarantee specific political outcomes or protect US in-
terests” (Tulchin, 2016: 159). 
The dilemma posed by the Obama Doctrine in hemispheric af-
fairs during this period was that “despite the diplomatic rhetoric, 
most US policymakers believe that the asymmetry of power in 
the hemisphere means that the United States is bound to lead and 
the nations of the hemisphere should follow with good grace. 
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Latin American policymakers, in contrast, will go to extraordinary 
lengths to avoid following that lead and avoid US hegemonic con-
trol, even if  that appears to go against their own interests” 
(Tulchin, 2016: 160). Furthermore, now China was emerging as 
an alternative source of  loans, investments and the main buyer of  
commodities filling a void left by the US in the region. The re-
gional systemic configuration tends, at the time this thesis is being 
written, towards a proto-bipolarism. The criteria I follow to define 
this period is by following Schweller (1993) in his classic paper on 
material capabilities during WWII in which he established the rule 
that to be considered a pole a country must deter greater than half  
the resources of  the strongest pole. This condition is met when 
considering the CINC indicator, and barely also the AMS and 
CASS versions of  the CNP. The trends for the next decades is 
that China will shorten the power gap with United States and the 
system could start to show clear patterns of  bipolarism (Waltz, 
1964; Waltz 1993). 
 
 
Methods and thesis structure 
 
This thesis is based on the concern that the majority of the liter-
ature on the relations between China and Latin America has 
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avoided considering: American hegemony as a fundamental vari-
able to understand how China has been linked with countries, and 
with which countries. The countries of  Latin America are not iso-
lated from their continental context, on the contrary, they are 
strongly affected throughout their history by links with the United 
States. Also, the study of  U.S.-Latin American relations focuses 
largely on foreign policy analysis, is mainly descriptive, relies over-
whelmingly on qualitative methods, and is fairly detached from 
the main research trends in international relations (Bertucci 2013: 
119). 
The methodological approach of  this thesis is strongly influenced 
by Seawright (2016) who calls his approach an integrative multi-
method research. Integrative designs are multi-method designs in 
which two or more methods are carefully combined to support a 
single, unified causal inference. Rather than assuming than each 
method served to answering certain types of questions, Seawright 
believes that different methods serve to look at the object of  
study from different angles. Only using panel regressions, or only 
using case studies is less robust than using both techniques. With 
such a design, one method will produce the final inference, and 
the other is used to design, test, refine, or bolster the analysis pro-
ducing that inference (2016: 19). I have used quantitative and qual-
itative techniques to address the issue as deeply as possible since 
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the causal claim that American hegemony negatively affects the 
Chinese assertivness in Latin America is the ultimate goal of  the 
thesis. 
The thesis is structured as follows: The next chapter uses panel 
regression models to draw conclusions generalizable to the entire 
Latin American region. This is the main chapter of the thesis, 
which provides the general snapshot under which is constructed 
the rest of the thesis. The third chapter explores, from China's 
side, the assumption that it is the Chinese government's action 
that causes China to avoid confronting the United States. To this 
end, it focuses on domestic mechanisms, studying the effect of  
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Com-
mission of  the State Council (SASAC) and the state's participa-
tion in multinational companies. The fourth chapter turns to 
Latin America, and attempts to explore the central hypothesis of 
the thesis (that American hegemony affects negatively the Chi-
nese assertiveness in Latin America) looking not at the countries 
as unit of  analysis, but at individuals. This chapter shows that, in 
addition to having a political intention on the part of China, Latin 
American citizens are also sensitive to an idea of competition be-
tween the United States and China. The unit of analysis of the 
next two chapters are individuals, not regular citizens but political 
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decision makers. The fifth chapter explores the destabilizing im-
pact that the Chinese assertiveness could have on the institutional 
strength of Mercosur. This issue touches tangentially on US he-
gemony since the United States failed to break the Mercosur bloc 
by proposing an FTA with Uruguay years ago, but recent events 
suggest that China may be able to. Chapter six studies how the 
political discourse is structured towards Chinese investments, in 
the specific case of  the space observation station installed in Ar-
gentina in 2015, and finds that concerns towards historical bonds 
with US were central to the discourses. 
 
Appendix of  Chapter 1: Components of  the CINC Index 
 
FIGURE 11: First dimension of CINC index: Iron and steel production. 




FIGURE 12:  Second dimension of the CINC index: Military expenditure. 
Source: Correlates of  War (2014).   
 
 
FIGURE 13: Third dimension of  the CINC index: Military personnel. 




FIGURE 14: Fourth dimension of  the CINC index: Energy consumption.  
Source: Correlates of  War (2014).   
 
 
FIGURE 15: Fifth dimension of the CINC index: Total population. 




FIGURE 16: Sixth dimension of the CINC index: Urban population.  










Chapter 2 – Did the American Hegemony 





The ‘grand strategy’ debate regarding the implications of  China’s 
rise is divided into two camps. On one hand, hegemonic stability 
(Gilpin, 1983) and power transition (Organski, 1958)3 theories, 
together with offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2001)4, agree that 
as the Chinese economy continues to grow, geopolitical competi-
tion will increase between Beijing and Washington reaching be-
yond Asia. On the other hand, balance of  power theorists, power 
diffusion adherents, and defensive realist scholars (Schweller & 
                                                          
2 This chapter is based on the published article: Urdinez, F., Mouron, F., Schenoni, L. & 
de Oliveira, A. (2016). Latin American Politics and Society. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/laps.12000 
3 For a particular focus on China see Tammen & Kugler (2006) and Lim (2015). For a 
critique of this theory see Chan (2007).  
4 For a particular focus on China see Mearsheimer (2010).  
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Pu, 2011; Mastanduno, 2009) believe that a stable bi- or multi-
polar world is possible if  China decides to respect “the rules of 
the game” whilst “[avoiding] challenge[s to] other powers in their 
hemispheres” (Odgaard, 2013). Most non-realist scholars who 
avoid problematizing geopolitical competition share the latter ar-
gument5. 
Latin America is a critical region for analyzing this power transi-
tion (Paz, 2012). Due to Washington’s overwhelming superiority 
in the military and economic realms, the region has been consid-
ered the backbone of  American hemispheric hegemony ever 
since WWII (Mearsheimer, 2001). However, Latin America’s po-
litical and economic alignment with the United States –which had 
reached unprecedented levels in the aftermath of  the Cold War – 
would be fundamentally revised in the 21st century, partly due to 
China. While the 9/11 attacks drew United States attention to the 
Middle East and Central Asia downgrading the foreign policy pri-
ority of Latin America (Hakim, 2006), the region experienced a 
leftist turn amongst its leaders, many of  whom became embold-
ened by the Chinese-led commodity boom while vociferously op-
posing traditional rules of  hemispheric governance (Castañeda, 
2006; Ferchen, 2011; Malamud & Schenoni 2015).  
                                                          
5 For an English School understanding see Buzan & Cox (2013). For a Liberal Institu-
tionalist insight see Ikenberry (2009).  
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This chapter explores whether Chinese economic expansion into 
Latin America was mediated by political considerations regarding 
United States influence. Specifically, it inquires whether United 
States linkages (see Levitsky and Way, 2010) with specific coun-
tries affected trade flows, FDI inflows, and bank loans coming 
from China. Previous research has analysed whether the Chinese 
development model proposes an alternative to the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Ferchen 2013)6 and to what extent trade relations be-
tween China and Latin America have led to foreign policy con-
vergence between the two (Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013).  
I find that there is an inversely proportional relationship between 
the investments made by Chinese SOEs, bank loans, and manu-
facturing exports, and United States influence in the region. I sup-
port the hypotheses by using control groups. These groups show 
that the pattern does not apply to investments made by Chinese 
private enterprises, Western bank loans, or Chinese commodity 
imports. These results help to disentangle whether China is stra-
tegically engaging these countries – an external push – or specific 
                                                          
6 Ferchen (2013) discusses if China represents an alternative to the Washington Consen-
sus through a ‘Beijing Consensus’ or ‘China Model’. Although we do not intend to com-
pare the effects of Chinese trade on local development models, our results suggest that 
more state-led Chinese FDI and bank loans imply a political trade-off between Washing-
ton and Beijing. However, this does not mean that the United States and China are anti-
thetical. The Chinese alternative, as we will further explore in the econometric models, 
implies a mix of market-oriented and political-oriented forces that affect differently 
trade, investments and credit depending on Washington’s influence.  
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countries in Latin America disenfranchised by the United States 
are searching for Beijing – an internal pull. The findings give cre-
dence to the idea that it is Beijing who is filling the “vacuum” left 
by diminishing links between the United States and countries in 
its sphere of  influence. 
This chapter is structured as follows: I first review the tenets and 
predictions of  hegemonic stability theory (HST), specifically in 
regards to trade and finance, and derive three specific causal 
mechanisms – contestation, accommodation and diversification 
– that may underpin the correlation between the growing Chinese 
presence in Latin America and the shrink of American hegemony 
in the same region. Then, I test the chapter’s hypotheses using a 
sample of 21 Latin American countries from 2003 to 2014. Be-
fore detailing the baseline mode, I explain how was created the 
index of  American hegemonic influence using principal compo-
nents analysis. Finally, I contextualize the results and discuss the 
policy implications derived from the study’s findings. 
 
Literature review and hypothesis definition 
 
It is indisputable that Chinese-Latin American relations reached 
an unprecedented level at the onset of the 21st century (Bingwen 
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et al., 2011). By 2014, China was already the region’s second larg-
est trade partner (Trademap, 2015) and second largest investor, 
only behind the European Union (ECLAC, 2015). Furthermore, 
several Latin American countries established strategic partner-
ships with Beijing via bilateral cooperation agreements. The 
China-driven commodity boom became a long-term boon (see 
Ferchen, 2011) as relations went far beyond trade to include fi-
nancial and political components. Beijing is now involved in the 
most ambitious projects of infrastructure in the region: (a) three 
nuclear plants and the improvement of  trains in Argentina7; (b) a 
transcontinental train between Brazil and Peru8; (c) one of  the 
largest oil refineries in the region in Ecuador9; (d) the Toromocho 
project administered by the Chinalco mining in Peru10; (e) a pro-
ject to create a transoceanic canal in Nicaragua11, and (f) a LAC-
                                                          
7 The nuclear plants were agreed upon on during the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in 
Washington DC, for the amount of 15 billion dollars. The improvement of 3,000 kilo-
meters of Belgrano Cargas railway, which runs through 14 provinces and connects with 
Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay, totals 1.2 billion dollars. The latter was one of the most cel-
ebrated achievements during Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s mandate. 
8 In November 2014 a first tripartite memorandum among Peru, Brazil and China was 
signed and estimated the cost of the work would be 10 billion dollars and that its con-
struction would require six years of intense work.  
9 The construction of the Pacific Refinery in Ecuador, estimated to cost 10.5 billion dol-
lars, is funded primarily SOE Sinomach. 
10 The project as a whole employs more than 15,000 Peruvians and pays royalties im-
portant rents in the national government. In total Chinalco has invested some 7 billion 
dollars: two billion dollars between 2008 and 2011 and 4.8 billion more in 2013 million 
investment that Peru has consolidated as the third largest copper producer, behind Chile 
and China; Toromocho and in particular the second world's largest copper project. 
11 Among all the mentioned projects, this is the most obscure and less economically via-
ble. However, Taiwan is worried the project could cost it its diplomatic relations with 
the Latin American country. 
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China Infrastructure Fund in partnership with the Interamerican 
Development Bank (IDB)12. 
If  one takes Robert Keohane’s definition of  hegemony as, “con-
trol over capital, markets, and raw materials” (Keohane, 1984: 
139), there can be little doubt that these developments undermine 
United States economic hegemony in Latin America, both in the 
trade and financial realms. The main question is whether these 
dynamics reflect an underlying political competition between 
China and the United States, as HST would expect, or they are 
just the consequence of  independent economic developments. 
Regarding trade, HST argues that waning hegemonies intensify 
competition for the control of natural resources, which material-
izes in new trade alliances (Krasner, 1976; Gilpin, 1981). Recent 
research on Chinese trade relations with Latin America has led to 
three stylized conclusions. First, trade has expanded rapidly after 
2002. Second, growth in demand has turned China into a promi-
nent destination for the region’s exports.  Third, such trade in-
volves a limited set of  natural resources and is tied to an increase 
in Chinese exports of  manufactures (Ferchen, 2011). Although it 
                                                          
12 Approved in 2012 and in force since July 2015, for the sum of two billion dollars. As 
noted in the agreement, one of the three pillars of the project is intended to attract for-




is not yet clear whether this trade is politically driven, the pattern 
conforms to HST’s expectations. 
In the financial realm, HST has specific expectations related to 
bank credits and FDI. In contexts of  hegemonic competition 
“the motivation for direct investment [and loans] (…) is primarily 
the acquisition of  markets and managerial control (…) [creating] 
economic and political relations that are permanent and signifi-
cant” (Gilpin, 1976: 184). In line with HST, Chinese FDI strategy 
has been described as focusing on securing natural resources, 
gaining preferential access to available output, and extending con-
trol over extractive industries (García-Herrero & Santabárbara, 
2007; Ng & Tuan, 2001; Kotschwar, 2014). However, the inter-
national political economy of Chinese FDI and bank loans re-
mains still to be explored. 
The missing piece of  the puzzle is politics, and in particular, how 
Washington and Beijing interact in specific geographies. HST im-
plicates that in hegemonic transitions, patterns of trade and fi-
nance will be determined by the competition between the 
hegemon and the challenger in a given system. This would be the 
case if  Chinese trade, outward FDI flows and bank loans behaved 
not according to a commercial logic but responding to political 
considerations regarding the influence of  the United States in 
specific Latin American countries. Consequently, this chapter asks 
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if  China has occupied the vacuum left behind by the declining 
American hegemony or, alternatively, the patterns of  trade and 
investment followed a mere economic logic. As we see it, if  the 
Chinese economic assertiveness in Latin America has been con-
ditioned by the United States’ hegemonic posturing in its “back-
yard” this would provide further support for HST. The following 
is the first hypothesis that this chapter set to test: 
Hipothesis 1: Chinese penetration into Latin American countries 
was stronger in areas where the United States exerted less hege-
monic influence, ceteris paribus.   
 Three stories could explain such relation: (a) Chinese contesta-
tion, (b) Chinese accommodation and (c) Latin American diversi-
fication.  
It could be the case that China is actively contesting the United 
States hegemony by enacting some form of economic statecraft 
– i.e. “the use of economic means in the service of  both eco-
nomic and foreign policy ends” (Baldwin, 1985; Drezner, 1999). 
This strategy could be based on the understanding that “friends 
that share at least some of its values and principles in international 
politics would help China to promote its vision of  global order” 
(Strüver, 2014: 3), and those friends are to be taken from the 
American claws by intensifying economic bonds. Alleviating the 
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region’s dependence vis-à-vis Washington can therefore be a way 
of  forging alliances with Latin American states that can prove use-
ful allies in the multilateral realm (see Layne, 2008; Roett & Paz, 
2008; Paz, 2012). As previous research has suggested (Flores-
Macias and Kreps 2013), these changes in foreign policy could be 
attained by the empowerment of  pro-Chinese domestic constit-
uencies that results from increasing trade and investment (Kirsh-
ner, 2008). That China is purposively making friends abroad is no 
longer taboo. Beijing has recognized several countries as “Strate-
gic Partners,” paying State visits and signing cooperation agree-
ments in areas such as science, investments and finance 
(Dominguez, 2006). The question is if  these types of political re-
lations are random or are intended to loosen these countries’ ties 
with the United States  
Alternatively, it could be the case that China is accommodating 
rather passively to the changing strategic environment in Latin 
America. From this vantage point, Beijing could be blending its 
economic and political goals by expanding purposely at the pe-
ripheries of United States’ areas of influence, trying not to disturb 
Washington. Recently, some authors started to pay attention to 
the political underpinnings of Chinese investments, highlighting 
the special influence governmental agencies hold over the deci-
sion-making of  Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Luo 
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et al., 2010; Sauvant & Chen, 2014; Nolan, 2014). In a patent ex-
ample of  accomodation, the Chinese Ministry of  Commerce 
(MOFCOM) asked Chinese embassies and consulates in host 
countries to review investments and determine if  they were in the 
MOFCOM “blacklist” or if  the proposed investment would af-
fect the interests of  a third country (Sauvant & Chen 2014: 147). 
It is based on this literature that I believe that a country’s relation 
with the United States may have deterred specific Chinese invest-
ment in Latin America. Unlike the contestation mechanism, ac-
commodation does not necessarily involve any change in the for-
eign policy of  Latin American countries, but still, it pictures Bei-
jing as a political agent, discretely moving where the American he-
gemony is weaker, trying not to wake up the hemispheric giant.  
Finally, it is possible to envision a third mechanism by virtue of  
which countries marginalized by the United States can pursue di-
versification and turn to China as an alternative trading partner. 
This argument gives agency to Latin American countries and ac-
counts for the ideological affinities between China and leftist gov-
ernments in the recent past. In fact, these governments also op-
posed the FTAA and have been at odds with Washington in sev-
eral respects. Mazzuca (2013) has suggested that a “rentier-popu-
list coalition” – amalgamating the government and state bureau-
crats with the unemployed and informal workers – blossomed in 
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these countries. This coalition had specific incentives to abandon 
the ties with Western investors and institutions and turn to China 
as a new partner. In a nutshell, his argument is that commodity 
exports to China provided an enormous source of  taxable in-
come that these governments could appropriate. This rent would 
then be used to pay the costs of abandoning the rigid rules of  the 
Washington Consensus and build a political coalition based on 
public expenditure. 
In principle, all three mechanisms – contestation, accommoda-
tion and diversification – could explain the relation denoted in the 
first hypothesis. However, the third mechanism provides distinct 
observational implications, as it gives agency to Latin American 
countries and neglects any involvement of the Chinese govern-
ment in the process. Furthermore, it suggests that United States 
influence should be negatively correlated with commodity ex-
ports to China – a sector that is overwhelmingly determined by 
prices and where the state has a very limited role. To test for the 
importance of  the Chinese government in this story, I include a 
second hypothesis: 
Hipothesis 2: The relation stated in Hipothesis 1 is true for entities 
closely related to the Chinese government – SOEs FDI, Chinese 
bank loans, and manufacturing exports –– but does not hold for 
commodity exports to China or private agents.  
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Therefore, the second hypothesis is set to test whether the filling 
of  the vacuum left by the United States (Hypothesis 1) – a pri-
marily political dynamic – is driven by actors influential to Beijing’s 
decision-making process (see Jakobson & Knox 2010: 24) or 
Latin American countries benefited by the commodity boom and 
intending diversification. In other words, if  the second hypothesis 
is confirmed, then there will be empirical evidence to affirm that 
the Chinese state has some degree of  agency in the process either 
by pursuing accommodation or contestation.  
Although I have discussed these three mechanisms in detail, I am 
aware of  the limitations that a cross-national time-series design 
entails for testing particular causal processes. No doubt the three 
causal mechanisms I lay out in this section deserve to be further 
explored, and the chapters with case studies will be especially suit-









How to measure economic statecraft? 
 
To test the hypotheses, I constructed a dataset for 21 Latin Amer-
ican countries from 2003 to 2014 13. I empirically measured the 
dependent variable, Chinese assertiveness, with three different 
strategies: (a) Chinese FDI; (b) Chinese bank loans; and (c) Chi-
nese manufacturing exports to Latin America. These three de-
pendent variables are measured in per capita terms so that we can 
observe the average impact in each country depending of  its size.   
I divided Chinese FDI into investments made by SOEs and pri-
vately-owned enterprises (POEs) expecting that the political bias 
would be clearer among SOEs. Assuming that loans from Chi-
nese banks due in fact reflect a geo-economic strategy given the 
strong state intervention in the decision-making process (Yazar, 
2015; Collins & Gottwald, 2014), I compare them to loans 
granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD) and credits from the International Development 
Association (IDA). Finally, building on the discussion on revealed 
comparative advantages, I test if  Chinese manufacturing exports 
were conditioned by proximity to the United States and compare 
                                                          
13 The countries included in the sample were determined by data availability. 
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them to Chinese commodity imports. Table 4 contains the de-
scription and sources for the three dimensions of  my dependent 
variable.  
 
TABLE 4: Dependent Variable Measure and their Controls 
Name Description Sector Source 
FDISOEs 
Outward Chinese FDI made by 







Outward Chinese FDI made by pri-
vately owned enterprises per capita 
(US dollars). 
LOANSCHINA 
Annual Chinese bank loans per cap-







Annual International Bank for Re-
construction and Development 
(IBRD) loans and International De-
velopment Association (IDA) cred-




Chinese manufacturing exports per 
capita (US dollars). 
Trade 
International 
Trade Centre - 
Trade Map MCOMM 
Chinese commodity imports per 




As discussed above, each of the causal mechanism behind the hy-
potheses has specific empirical implications regarding the dimen-
sions in Table 4.  If  one found that Latin American countries were 
(a) equally receptive to Chinese SOE and POE investment inde-
pendent of  the level of  American hegemony in the Latin Ameri-
can country (b) Chinese loans were not sensitive to American he-
gemony and that (c) Chinese exports were influenced by the 
American hegemony as much as the exports to China, wecould 
argue that the degree of  penetration by Beijing was mainly deter-
mined by the will of  host countries to deepen relations with 
China. This would be a situation where the first hypothesis holds 
in the trade dimension, but the second hypothesis is rejected, in 
line with the diversification argument described in the previous 
subsection. 
On the other hand, if  we observed that (a) SOEs were more re-
active to the American hegemony than POEs, (b) Chinese loans 
were sensitive to American hegemony and (c) Chinese exports to 
Latin America, but not Latin American exports to China, were 
sensitive to American hegemony, we would have evidence of  the 
Chinese government following a foreign policy strategy of  “filling 
the void” left by the U.S in its natural area of  influence. Although 
we would still be unable to say whether Beijing is pursuing a strat-
egy of  contestation or accommodation, I could assert with more 
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certainty that it was Chinese economic statecraft what was driving 
these political patterns of  interaction. 
To further reinforce the argument that Chinese economic en-
gagement in Latin America is not purely commercially but also 
politically driven, and to differentiate between a strategy of con-
testation or accommodation, I explore the effects that having dip-
lomatic relations with Taiwan (to observe the effect of  the One 
China Policy), and establishing Strategic Partnerships with China 
have on Beijing’s economic penetration. The findings suggest that 
these political considerations were far from being mere ‘cheap 
talk’ and significantly influenced Chinese economic statecraft 
through a proactive contestatory engagement. 
 
Investments 
Data on Chinese FDI was retrieved from the Chinese Global In-
vestment Tracker maintained by the Heritage Foundation (Scis-
sors, 2011). This is the only publicly available Chinese investment 
database that allows other scholars to replicate the information. 
One of  the database’s advantages is that it includes information 
on both failed and successful Chinese investments, which makes 
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the information more reliable.14 This tool excludes tax havens, 
such as Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman 
Islands, and only considers final destinations rather than transit 
points of  OFDI15. Perhaps the main advantage, however, that ex-
plains our source choice over alternative tools is that investments 
can be easily sorted by firms, which allowed me to filter by SOEs 
and POEs. The method to sort them was by reviewing the public 
reports of each of them. This was a complex and time-demand-
ing process, but one that provides a new contribution to a litera-
ture that tests only aggregated values of  FDI in the region16. In 
the next chapter, I explore a more robust method to measure 
State control over the firm. 
Bank loans 
A second means of  Chinese assertiveness in Latin America came 
via the increasing importance of  Beijing’s bank loans in the re-
gion. Since 2005, China provided more than $100 billion in loan 
                                                          
14 By successful, we mean investments that were announced and completed. Failed invest-
ments were announced but not completed and were common in the years tudied, so spe-
cial care has to be taken with them. 
15 This exclusion has a significant impact on the results because more than seventy per 
cent of  China’s OFDI reported by MOFCOM is received by tax havens.  
16 While we determined Scissor’s database to be more suitable  MOFCOM and Thomson 
Reuters (which is not publicly accessible), it is also important to mention that this source 
has as a main disadvantage in that it is built using news reports and not from official in-
formation directly from Chinese companies. It is true that media reports are known to 
be problematic, however, that issue is carefully controlled for in the Heritage China 
Global Investment Tracker since for a project to be registered as successful in the data-
base it has to have strong signs of progress. 
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commitments. If  we recall Figure 9 from Chapter 1, these 
amounts grew considerably in Africa, too.  Its banks (particularly 
the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import 
Bank) became important sources of  financing for a significant set 
of  countries, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. 
Chinese investment allowed these countries to skirt their penali-
zation in global capital markets and Western international finan-
cial institutions, such as the IMF and WB (Gallagher et al., 2012: 
5).  
While the literature is lacking about the political drivers of Chi-
nese bank loans, there is empirical evidence to suggest a positive 
relationship between traditional Western lending institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank and the receiver’s alignment with 
the United States (Dreher et al., 2009; Kilby, 2009). Taken to-
gether with the hypotheses, I assumed that Chinese loans fol-
lowed a similar political trajectory, acting as counterweights to 
Western institutions in the region.  
That is, it was easier for Chinese banks to lend money to leftist 
countries outside of  the good graces of  Western agencies and in 
need of  fresh money to finance infrastructure projects. This 
would not have been possible if  commodities were not at histor-
ical highs. Campello argues that when commodity prices are high 
and leftist governments are in power “abundant export revenues 
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boost economic growth, dollar inflows, and public revenue, re-
leasing governments’ demand for foreign funds at the same time 
that favorable fiscal prospects make sovereign bonds more attrac-
tive to creditors. Leftist governments’ greatest autonomy from 
market discipline occurs when high commodity prices coincide 
with low interest rates, which reduce investors’ risk aversion and 
increase their propensity to divert capital to emerging economies” 
(2015: 17). I retrieved loan data from 2005 to 2014 on Chinese 
bank activity in Latin America from a database coordinated by the 
Inter-American Dialogue17. The data spans 76 loans to 14 differ-
ent countries. 
 
Trade with China 
The vast literature on Latin American trade with China acknowl-
edges the fear from domestic industrialists about Chinese manu-
facturing exports to the region’s countries, and I indeed look at 
Chinese manufacturing exports to the region in this chapter (Ar-
mony & Strauss, 2012; Jenkins et al., 2008; Mesquita Moreira, 
2007). During this period, Chinese manufactures were subject to 
numerous antidumping investigations. Industrial chambers and 
political parties expressed their concerns over a damaged national 
                                                          
17 Inter-American Dialogue: http://thedialogue.org/map_list 
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industry and Chinese manufacturing imports became an issue for 
political deliberation (Urdinez & Masiero, 2015).  
On the other hand, Latin American countries found China to be 
an active buyer of  raw materials and natural resources, which 
made Beijing not only a major trading partner for the region, but 
in some cases even the main buyer. Media and public opinion be-
gan addressing this phenomenon, and China became a major 
topic when speaking about economic growth in the region. Due 
to the opposition of  Latin American domestic lobbies and the 
fear of  an “invasion” of Chinese products, Chinese exports to 
Latin America were more subject to political deliberation than the 
flow in the other direction, namely, China’s buying of  Latin Amer-
ican commodities. To measure the importance of  China as a trade 
partner, we used data from the UN Comtrade18 and Trade Map19 
to calculate the per capita quantity of  Chinese manufacturing ex-
ports and commodity imports. Now that we have defined our de-
pendent variable, I will advance our discussion to incorporate our 
main independent variable in the sext section. 
 
 
                                                          
18 UN Comtrade: http://comtrade.un.org/db/  
19 Trade Map: http:// www.trademap.org/.  
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American hegemony in Latin America 
 
Even though a uniformly accepted definition of  hegemony re-
mains elusive in the literature, it seems clear enough that a 
hegemon must combine military20, economic21 and ideological22 
elements to support its political supremacy. Among these three 
factors, historians have noticed that the economic component of 
hegemonism is key to maintain both military and ideological pri-
macy in the long-term.23 United States’ influence in Latin Amer-
ica has been studied mostly through a historiographical approach 
that has put little emphasis on measurement (Blasier, 1985: 211-
306; Connell-Smith, 1976; Schoultz, 1987). Some recent excep-
tions include Finkel et al. (2007), Levitsky and Way (2010), and 
Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán (2014), although these works focus 
on regime transitions and only tangentially discuss American in-
                                                          
20 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1981). Stephen Krasner, ‘State Power and the Structure of International 
Trade’, World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1976) pp. 317-347. 
21 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Charles Kindleberger, The World in De-
pression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). 
22 Robert Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in 
Method’, Millennium, No. 12 (1983) 162–175. 
23 See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1987). Robert Keohane defined economic hegemony as entailing, “control over 
capital, markets, and raw materials”. In other terms, economic hegemony requires a cer-
tain degree of political control over trade and financial markets in a certain region. 
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fluence per se. To contribute to this gap in the literature, I meas-
ured United States hegemonic influence through political and 
economic engagement indicators in the host countries, which I 
then used to create an index of American Hegemonic Influence 
in Latin America. The index covers the years from 2003 to 2014, 
defined by data availability. 
A major problem that researchers who build indexes face is to 
determine an appropriate aggregation strategy to combine multi-
dimensional variables into a composite index. Using five proxies 
recurrent in the literature, I created a composite index using a dy-
namic principal components analysis (PCA). PCA is a useful tech-
nique for transforming a large number of  variables into principal 
components that account for much of  the variance among the 
set of  original variables (Havre & Williams, 2010). 
The variance maximization of  the chosen indicators is obtained 
by performing an eigenvalue decomposition of  the correlation 
matrix for the chosen indicators. Because PCA is sensitive to scale 
differences in the variables, we first standardized the data. I fol-
lowed Kaiser’s rule and retained only factors with eigenvalues 
larger than unity. I examined a scree plot of  the eigenvalues to 
determine the number of  factors explaining a variation larger 
than one. I also ran a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of  sampling 
adequacy to determine the appropriateness of conducting a PCA, 
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which was successful. The resulting scores were rescaled to score 
between 0 and 1, where 1 was the highest observed proximity 
value to the United States in the period. Table 5 describes the cho-
sen proxies for American hegemony.  
 
TABLE 5: proxies for American Hegemony Influence in Latin America 
Name  Description Proxy For Source 
ECOAID Annual per capita economic aid 
received from the USA (United 
States$ million) by each Latin 
American country. 
 
Economic proximity to 
the United States 
United States Over-
seas Loans and 
Grants (Greenbook) 
INVEST Annual FDI from American com-
panies (United States$billion) rela-
tive to host’s GDP (constant 2005 
United States$ billion) as a per-
centage 
 
Economic proximity to 
the United States 
United States Bureau 
of Economic Analy-
sis and World Bank  
MILAID Annual per capita military aid re-
ceived from the USA (United 
States$ million) by each Latin 
American country. 
 
Political proximity to 
the United States 
United States Over-
seas Loans and 
Grants (Greenbook) 
UNGA Annual share of common votes 
with the United States on im-
portant issues in the UNGA 
Political proximity to 
the United States 
United States Report 
to Congress (Unclas-
sified) - Department 
of State 
XUS Annual share of exports to the 
United States relative to total. 
Economic proximity to 
the United States 
International Trade 




I measured economic proximity to the United States through (a) 
American-bound exports as a share of  total exports (XUS) and (b) 
incoming American FDI relative to the host’s country GDP (IN-
VEST). For XUS, I retrieved trade flow data from Trademap and 
population data from the World Bank. Data on American FDI in 
Latin America was obtained from the United States Department 
of  Commerce Bureau of  Economic Analysis24, which offers in-
formation on American OFDI sortable by country and industry 
from 1982 to 2014. It has previously shown that trade and invest-
ments boost political relations (Keshk et al, 2004); The United 
States has FTA agreements with 11 countries in the region, BITs 
with 9 countries and is one of the top three investors and trade 
partners for most of  the region’s nations.  
To measure a nation’s political proximity to United States, I used 
(a) the United States’s economic aid per capita (ECOAID), (b) its 
military aid per capita (MILAID), and (c) level of  convergence in 
the United Nations General Assembly on important votes 
(UNGA). The data for ECOAID and MILAID were gathered from 
the United States Overseas Loans and Grants Report, informally 
known as the “Greenbook”, which contains United States gov-
ernment foreign assistance data since 1945. The Greenbook clas-
sifies foreign assistance on either “economic” or “military” 
                                                          
24Accessed at http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm, December 2014. 
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grounds and organizes the data by the recipient country and geo-
graphic region. I believe the United States has used economic and 
military aid as a foreign policy tool, of  which Plan Colombia is 
probably the most visible example. The specialized literature on 
the political determinants of aid is vast and well-developed 
enough to show that the political alliances between the donor and 
the receiver are sizable factors in the distribution of aid (Alesina 
& Dollar, 2000). 
For data on UNGA, I used data from the United States Depart-
ment of  State’s Bureau of  International Organizations Affairs. 
This source distinguishes between overall votes and important 
votes; we consider the latter, which are more politically driven. If  
the United States records a “yes” vote on an issue while another 
country votes “no,” that country is identified as having cast an 
opposing vote to the U.S, and vice versa. For countries’ annual 
totals, UN Opposite Vote = (number of  opposite votes + absten-
tions + absences) / total votes, where total votes = (number of 
opposite votes + number of  identical votes + abstentions + ab-
sences). Recent empirical evidence on Latin American countries’ 
alignment with the United States in the United Nations General 
Assembly shows that voting patterns reflect political alignments 
(Mouron & Urdinez, 2014; Neto & Malamud, 2015). Table 6 of-
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fers mean values for all five indicators at the beginning of  the pe-
riod of study and at the end of it, showing that during this period 
all five indicators decreased. 
TABLE 6: proxies for American influence over time 
 ECOAID INVEST MILAID UNGA XUS 
2003 5.46 6.4% 0.65 45% 34% 
2014 5.24 0.23% 0.39 26% 23% 
 
The advantages of working with a composite index are numer-
ous. First, it allows for a single variable that condenses several var-
iables of interest that are all proxies for a broader concept. Sec-
ond, the PCA technique does not subjectively weigh the compo-
nents, but rather works with the common correlation among 
them. Finally, the index contains a replicability factor that can be 
used by other researchers in hypotheses within and outside the 




FIGURE 17: Chromatic Map of  American Hegemonic Influence in 
Latin America. 
Note: Equal intervals map elaborated using GeoDa. Shapefile elaborated 
using ArcGIS. Countries that are not in the sample are not included in 
the map.  
 
According to the index, Mexico and Colombia are the two coun-
tries most influenced by the United States, while Cuba the least. 
The following table displays the values of  each component of the 
77 
 
index per country, and they are sorted from largest to smallest 
values in the index. 
TABLE 7: United States Influence Index Score (2003-2014) 
  Components 




Colombia 31.01 581.1 198.94 2.96 0.4 
Mexico 41.6 205.8 42.9 8.84 0.82 
Haiti 33.48 468.3 1.27 1.31 0.82 
Peru 47.95 167.8 10.14 66.9 0.33 
Brazil 30.95 78.6 1.17 5.03 0.15 
El Salvador 30.06 104.7 10.22 10.4 0.41 
Guatemala 45.27 109.7 5.64 2.49 0.39 
Honduras 46.37 91 5.1 7.03 0.43 
Ecuador 30.37 47.64 17.58 2.03 0.43 
Bolivia 30.06 136.2 3.15 3.68 0.11 
Trinidad-Tobago 27.01 0.55 0.43 24.38 0.56 
Panama 45.48 19.9 5.63 27.98 0.25 
Nicaragua 31.94 68.1 3.48 3.36 0.36 
Costa Rica 41.36 6.29 2.05 7.89 0.4 
Chile 41.51 4.6 2.05 15.03 0.13 
Venezuela 20.45 9.65 1.11 6.81 0.29 
Argentina 41.22 4.81 1.55 4.73 0.08 
Paraguay 40.5 25.4 1.35 0.84 0.02 
Uruguay 40.65 0.56 0.66 4.66 0.09 
Suriname 26.2 1.2 0.71 6.16 0.03 






Empirical findings  
 
Each model was defined with controls for variables previously 
tested in the literature to limit omitted variable bias (see Table 8). 
The models include a lagged dependent variable as control and a 
panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure25.  
TABLE 8: Control Variables 
Name  Description Source 
TAIWAN(*) =1 if host country has diplomatic rela-
tions with Taiwan. 
 
Elaborated by the authors 
STRATEGIC 
PARTNERSHIP 
=1 if country has a Strategic Partner-
ship with China. 





All Commodity Price Index, 2005 = 
100, includes both Fuel and Non-Fuel 
Price Indices. 
 
IMF Primary Commodity 
Prices Index 
AGRICULTURE Cereal yield land under production – 
thousand kg per hectare. 
 
World Bank 
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty in force be-
tween China and the host country. 
 
UNCTAD - International In-
vestment Agreements Naviga-
tor 
CORRU Freedom from corruption score (0-
100). 
Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation) 
 
DEBTSERV Debt service (long-term public and World Bank 
                                                          
25We made sure our models did not suffer from multicollinearity testing it through corre-
lation matrices and also through VIF. The replication files offer these tests.  
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publicly guaranteed debt and repay-
ments to the IMF, % of exports of 
goods, services and primary income). 
 
EDUCATION Government expenditure on education, 
total (% of GDP). 
 
World Bank 
EXCHRATE Official exchange rate (LCU per United 
States$, period average). 
 
World Bank 
FINFREEDOM Financial freedom index (0-100) Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation) 
 
FTA FTA with China, in force. Elaborated by the authors 
 
GDP  Annual GDP (United States$ billion). World Bank 
 




IMPORTS China’s imports from Latin American 
partner as a share of total imports. 
 
International Trade Centre – 
Trade Map 
INFLATION Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %). 
 
World Bank 
INVFREEDOM Investment freedom index (0-100). Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation) 
 














MANUFTAX Tariff rate, applied, simple mean, manu-
factured products (%). 
 
World Bank 




OIL Energy production – million kilotons of 
oil or equivalent. 
 
World Bank 
OPENFDI Ratio of inward FDI stock to host 
GDP. 
 
UNCTAD FDI database 
PROPERTY Property rights respect index (0-100). Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation) 
 




TIMETAX Time to prepare and pay taxes (hours). 
 
World Bank 
TERMSTRADE Terms of trade per capita. 
 
World Bank 
TRADEFREEDOM Trade freedom index (0-100). 
 
Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation) 
TRADEOPEN Trade (% of GDP).  World Bank 
Note: (*) The countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the sample are: El 




The main challenge comes in the presentation of  n and t. I fol-
lowed Beck and Katz, which argued that many of  the data sets 
used in political science are characterized by both a t and n, and 
thus the generalized least squares (GLS) estimates derived from 
this set cannot be trusted (Beck & Katz, 1995; Wilson & Butler, 
2007). The authors’ recommendation consists of  three essential 
steps: (a) pool the data from different countries into one dataset 
and apply ordinary least squares (OLS); (b) adjust for autocorre-
lation by either adding a lagged dependent variable to the model 
or transforming the data based on an estimate of  autocorrelation 
of  the error terms, assumed to be common across panels; and (c) 
calculate panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). The estimates 
are based on these suggestions. 
In order to test the hypothesis I compare model (1) to (2), (3) to 
(4) and (5) to (6). The baseline models of  this chapter are defined 
as follows: 
𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡








Where the controls for (1) are: TAIWAN, STRATEGIC PARTNSE-
HIP, COMMODITYBOOM, AGRIBUSINESS, BIT, EDUCATION, EX-
CHRATE, GAS, GDP, GDP PC, MCOMM, INVFREEDOM, LEGALSTR, 
MINERAL, OIL, OPENFDI and PROPERTY.  
𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡





Where the controls for (2) are the same as for (1). 
Secondly, 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐴 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡





Where the controls for (3) are: TAIWAN, STRATEGICPARTNSEHIP, 
COMMODITYBOOM, AGRIBUSINESS, DEBTSERV, DEBTSTOCK, 
ENERGYMATRIX, FINFREEDOM, GAS, GDP, GDP PC, INFLATION, 







=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡





Where the controls for (4) are the same as for (3). Finally, 
𝑋𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡





Where the controls for (5) are: TAIWAN, STRATEGICPARTNSEHIP, 
COMMODITYBOOM, EXCHRATE, FTA, GDP PC, INDUEMP, INFLA-
TION, TRADEOPEN, MANUFTAX, TAXWEIGHT, TERMSTRADE 
and TRADEFREEDOM.  
𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡





Where the controls for (6) are: TAIWAN, STRATEGIC PARTNER-
SHIP, COMMODITYBOOM, AGRIBUSINESS, EXCHRATE, FTA, GAS, 
GDP PC, INDUEMP, MINERAL, OIL, TRADEOPEN, TERMSTRADE 






The results are presented in Tables 9, 10 and 11: In line with the 
first hypothesis, the American hegemony was negatively related 
to increasing Chinese investment, trade, and credit penetration 
during the period of study.  On the other hand, my control 
groups show they were not affected by it, which give robustness 
to the findings. In line with the second hypothesis, by analyzing 
US INFLUENCE, TAIWAN and STRATEGIC PARNERSHIP I observe 
that entities closely related to the Chinese government targeted 
countries with strategic partnerships and low US INFLUENCE and 
avoided countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan and high 
US INFLUENCE. The interpretation of  these findings tells us that 
China applied either an accommodation or a contestation strat-
egy.  
In order to visualize the expected values of the dependent varia-
bles in each model, I employed statistical simulations to convert 
the raw output of  statistical procedures into results that are sim-
pler to understand, independent of one’s statistical training (King 







The Effect on State-Owned Enterprises 
The main finding of  model (1) confirms the hypothesis for 
SOEs. Holding all variables constant, increasing the influence in-
dex by one unit translates into a decrease in SOE Chinese FDI of  
$81 USD per capita. This effect is considerably large. In standard-
ized beta coefficients, it represents a decrease of  0.72 standard 
deviations from the dependent variable. 
 
TABLE 9: Regression results for Chinese investment 
 Model 1: Investments 
  FDISOEs FDIPOEs 
Lagged DV −0.187 −0.181 
 −0.157 −0.0923 
US INFLUENCE −80.84*** −4.815* 
  −25.95 −2.175 
TAIWAN  −15.47* −2.102* 
  −6.384 −0.872 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP  52.97*** −5.147* 
  15.45 −2.228 
COMMODITYBOOM −0.106* −0.0124** 
 −0.052 −0.0039 
AGRIBUSINESS 0.00002* −0.00006 
 0.000009 −0.12 
BIT 36.88* 5.3 
 18.12 2.13 
CORRU −0.468 0.079 
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 −0.391 −1.25 
EDUCATION 1.777 0.914*** 
 2.987 0.238 
GDP  −0.0621** 0.00299 
 −0.02 0.00226 
GDP PC 0.00406 0.000376 
 0.00346 0.00039 
MCOMM −0.0768 0.0605*** 
 −0.0633 0.018 
INVFREEDOM −0.147 −0.0137 
 −0.217 −0.0266 
LEGALSTR 4.135*** −0.398 
 1.102 −0.29 
MINERAL 0.0545 −0.629* 
 0.848 −0.252 
OIL −2.048 0.109 
 −1.105 0.0809 
OPENFDI 0.206 11.66*** 
 22.77 2.32 
PROPERTY −0.654 −0.0963** 
 −0.339 −0.0334 
MANUFTAX 1.72 −0.253 
 1.633 −0.174 
Constant 59.44* 2.526 
  23.6 −2.42 
Observations 156 156 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.21 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Notes: The table contains coefficients and standard errors. For a ro-
bustness check we used the System Arellano-Bond (AB) dynamic 
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data method of moments (GMM) estimator (Blundell and Bond 
1998), which allows for consistent coefficient estimation based on 
the lagged dependent variable. The basic idea of this figure is to cal-
culate the dynamic equation’s first difference in order to eliminate 
individual-specific heterogeneity, which is the source of autocorrela-
tion within the lagged dependent variable. 
 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the expected effect on investments as the 
American influence index increases at 95% confidence interval. 
Keeping all other variables constant, when American influence is 
low, yearly investments are expected to reach as much as $60 USD 
per capita a year. The expected investments remain positive as the 
index increases despite the fact that the confidence interval nar-
rows.  
 




Together with US INFLUENCE, I have highlighted  TAIWAN, since 
I believe the latter’s effect to be complimentary to the former as 
it reflects the One China Policy, which is politically driven, and 
also STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP showing that these status is not 
merely ‘cheap talk’. During the period studied, Chinese SOEs in-
vested on average $15 USD less per person in countries that 
maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and 53 more in countries 
with Strategic Partnerships, ceteris paribus. This is not a minor 
detail considering that this indicator also denotes a political deter-
minant behind the investments.  
I controlled for three motives for why companies engage in for-
eign markets: natural resource seeking, market seeking, and effi-
ciency seeking (Dunning, 1999). Natural resource seeking FDI is 
justified by the fact that these resources––e.g. minerals, raw mate-
rials and agricultural products––tend to be location specific. Re-
source endowments (GAS, OIL, MINERAL, and AGRIBUSINESS) 
and the existing trade relations for these goods (MCOMM) are the 
main reasons behind these types of FDI. Investment-friendly 
government policy (BIT, CORRU, INVFREEDOM, PROPERTY, LE-
GALSTR and OPENFDI) and market size (GDP) are the main rea-
sons behind market seeking FDI.  
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Within the statistically significant controls, AGRIBUSINESS is posi-
tively related to SOE FDI. The coefficient’s size is small, but still 
statistically significant. Chinese firms have faced several obstacles 
to investment in Latin American agricultural sectors. Some of the 
region’s domestic legislation has limited Chinese investment in 
land acquisition26. Despite these obstacles, however, China has 
continued to invest in land, mainly with infrastructure projects to 
improve the transportation of  commodities. COMMODITY BOOM 
has been introduced in the model to control for the effect de-
scribed by Ferchen (2011), and the findings show that SOEs FDI 
were higher during periods in which commodity prices were ac-
tually going low.   
Part of the literature on Chinese investments predicts that the 
larger the domestic market (captured by GDP and GDP per cap-
ita) and better the business environment (CORRU and LEGAL), the 
larger the amount of  investment (Cheung & Qian, 2009). Other 
authors, however, have found that Chinese investments are posi-
tively related to political and economic risk (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). This chapter is in line with Cheung & 
Qian (2009), since LEGALSTR denote that SOEs have been sensi-
tive to expropriation and bribery risks, and also have been boosted 
                                                          
26 For a good example of such failed investment, one should look at soy production in 
Patagonia, Argentina in 2010. 
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by BITs. In the absence of  an international investment oversight 
vehicle, BITs constitute the most important mechanism for the 
protection and regulation of  OFDI, and China has signed more 
BITs than any other country in the world, save for Germany 
(Wang & French, 2014). When analyzing host-country determi-
nants of  Chinese OFDI between 2003 and 2008, Amighini et al. 
(2013) test the BIT variable and report a positive effect. I found it 
to be significant only for SOEs. 
GAS is also negatively related to the dependent variable. Bolivia 
and Trinidad and Tobago are the two countries with largest gas 
expenditures and have not received high levels of  investment 
from SOEs. While most of Chinese energy investments have 
gone to oil (of  the $20.8 billion USD invested, over 50% has gone 
to Brazil, followed by Venezuela, and Argentina), only $3.4 billion 
USD has been invested in gas. Again, Brazil received 50% of 
those investments, followed by Argentina and Venezuela.  
Model 2 treats POEs as a control group for SOE investments 
and gives robustness to the findings since they were subject to 
American influence in Latin America in an almost null way (see 
Figure 18). Even when POEs were negatively affected by the 
One-China Policy, investing less in countries that maintain formal 
relations with Taiwan, POEs paid more attention to countries 
with no Strategic Partnerships with China.   
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The controls also highlight differences between POEs and SOEs. 
POEs are positively associated to GDP -measured market size, 
and are negatively related to GDP per capita of  each country. This 
means that POEs are targeting large, but not necessarily the rich-
est markets. They are also positively explained by Chinese com-
modity imports per capita, itself  an FDI control related to two-
way feedbacks between trade and investment between two coun-
tries.  
In contrast to SOE FDI, EDUCATION is positively associated with 
POE FDI, a sign of  Chinese FDI seeking competitive markets 
with a skilled labor force. This is a pattern found in investment 
coming from telecommunications companies and private bank-
ing. Furthermore, OPENFDI is statistically significant, showing 
that private companies’ behaviour is highly sensitive to the do-
mestic policies of  the host countries. 
 
The Effect on Chinese Bank Loans 
Model 3 gives support to the hypothesis, namely that Chinese 
bank loans were negatively related to American influence within 
host countries. An increase of  one unit in the index translates to 
a decrease of  $63 USD per capita in loans. Such a change is high. 
In standardized beta coefficients, this decrease accounts for 0.4 
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standard deviations from the dependent variable. Figure 20 illus-
trates the American influence index’s anticipated effect on loans 
as the index increases at a 95% confidence interval.  
 
TABLE 10: Regression results for Chinese loans 
 Model 2:  Loans 
  LOANSCHINA LOANSWEST 
Lagged DV 0.169 0.000933 
 −0.168 −0.0993 
US INFLUENCE −63.38*** −37.94 
  −18.1 −25.92 
TAIWAN −20.78*** 1.681 
  −6.055 −7.529 
STRATEGIC PARNERSHIP 14.92 −13.75 
  −8.091 −7.974 
COMMODITYBOOM 0.195*** 0.042 
 −0.0184 −0.0857 
AGRIBUSINESS 0.000019*** 0.000021* 
 −0.000005 −0.000009 
DEBTSERV 0.477* −0.153 
 −0.227 −0.262 
DEBTSTOCK 0.302* −0.42 
 −0.126 −0.246 
ENERGYMATRIX 0.0874 −0.0415 
 −0.0625 −0.0724 
FINFREEDOM 0.17 −0.428** 
 −0.204 −0.143 
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GAS −1.812* −0.861 
 −0.753 −0.896 
GDP 0.00325 −0.00104 
 −0.00778 −0.0125 
GDP PC −0.00104 0.00388 
 −0.000726 −0.00256 
INFLATION 1.574* −1.199 
 −0.718 −0.64 
INTEREST −0.878 −0.115 
 −0.525 −0.478 
M2 0.177 −0.231 
 −0.0992 −0.161 
MINERAL −0.789* −0.568 
 −0.388 −0.83 
OIL 0.147 −0.103 
 −1.091 −0.32 
Constant −26.83 −59.57 
  −19.53 −38 
Observations 138 120 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.75 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Notes: The table contains coefficients and standard errors. For a ro-
bustness check we used the System Arellano-Bond (AB) dynamic 
data method of moments (GMM) estimator (Blundell and Bond 
1998), which allows for consistent coefficient estimation based on 
the lagged dependent variable. The basic idea of this figure is to cal-
culate the dynamic equation’s first difference in order to eliminate 
individual-specific heterogeneity, which is the source of autocorrela-




Keeping all other variables constant, when the United States’s in-
fluence is low, loans were expected to be $15 to $35 USD larger 
per capita a year. The American influence index expected effect 
on loans remains positive as the index increases despite the fact 
that the confidence interval narrows, which can be observed with 
SOE investment. When one increases above 0.5 in the index, in-
vestments no longer maintain this positive relationship as the 
lower bound crosses the threshold of zero loans.  
 
FIGURE 19: Expected Loans Activity by Chinese Banks. 
 
The control set is different from the tools used to test FDI.  As 
suggested by Gallagher et al., Chinese loans are likely an alterna-
tive source of  capital for countries unable to obtain loans from 
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Western agencies (Gallagher, 2012: 5). Thus, I set DEBTSERV and 
DEBTSTOCK as the controls. Furthermore, I controlled for varia-
bles commonly referenced in the literature such as M2, INTEREST 
and FINFREEDOM.  
As in Chinese FDI, the One China Policy has a negative effect on 
loans, as countries diplomatically friendly with Taiwan are ex-
pected to lose $21 USD per capita more per loan, ceteris paribus. 
However, Chinese bank seem to have lended indistinctly to coun-
tries independently of  them having or not Strategic Partnership 
status. Furthermore, lending from the IMF and the WB has com-
paratively lower inflation rates and greater financial freedom (FIN-
FREEDOM) (Easterly, 2005). Chinese loans seem to exhibit higher 
tolerance to these variables. The coefficients indicate that loans 
are directed to countries with significant natural resources, such as 
energy matrices operating on sufficient quantities of  oil and gas, 
as well as countries with agribusiness resources. Furthermore, the 
commodity boom enhanced loans by Chinese banks.  
Per the Inter-American Dialogue database, a large share of Chi-
nese loans was directed to infrastructure projects such as ports or 
railroads to specifically improve the movement of  grains, or for 
oil-related projects. Finally, loans are subjected to the foreign debt 
holdings of host countries. If  one look at IRDB loans, they are–
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–as expected—immune to both United States influence and the 
One China policy.  
 
The Effect on Chinese Exports 
The fifth model confirms the second hypothesis, once again. 
Manufacturing exports per capita are negatively affected by 
American influence. Keeping all other variables constant, one unit 
increase in the index translates into an export loss of  $15 USD 
per capita. Translated into standard deviations this increase repre-
sents a change of 0.06. This finding is in line with the results of 
Flores-Macias and Kreps who argue that the effects of  bilateral 
trade on vote convergence in human rights issues at the UNGA 
was larger for Africa vis-à-vis Latin America, probably because 
“Latin America has historically resided in the United States’ 
sphere of  influence, hindering realignment toward China” (2013: 
368). 
TABLE 11: Regression results for trading relations 
 Model 3: Trade 
  XMANUF MCOMM 
Lagged DV 1.205*** 0.885*** 
 −0.0377 −0.136 
US INFLUENCE −15.03*** −18.59 
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  −4.335 −12.73 
TAIWAN 2.964 −0.216 
  −2.064 −5.339 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP −8.508*** 19.48 
  −1.918 −16.57 
COMMODITYBOOM 0.164*** 0.0231 
 −0.0135 −0.0592 
AGRIBUSINESS − 0.000013* 
 − −0.00005 
EXCHRATE −0.00156*** −0.000478 
 −0.000309 −0.00191 
FTA 7.706*** 1.874 
 −1.412 −7.807 
GAS − 0.0494 
 − −0.43 
GDP PC 0.00323*** 0.00256*** 
 −0.000918 −0.000394 
INDUEMP −0.692** −0.25 
 −0.215 −0.333 
INFLATION −0.032 − 
 −0.0695 − 





OIL − −1.186*   
 − −0.565 
TRADEOPEN 0.151*** −0.106 
 −0.0417 −0.0671 
MANUFTAX −0.000012* − 
 −0.000005 − 
TERMSTRADE 0.00009 0.00047 
 −0.000051 −0.0004 
TRADEFREEDOM −0.406*** 0.279 
 −0.0812 −0.249 
Constant 2.63 −10.3 
  −9.93 −14.54 
Observations 143 143 
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.93 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Notes: The table contains coefficients and standard errors. For a robust-
ness check we used the System Arellano-Bond (AB) dynamic data 
method of moments (GMM) estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998), 
which allows for consistent coefficient estimation based on the lagged 
dependent variable. The basic idea of this figure is to calculate the dy-
namic equation’s first difference in order to eliminate individual-spe-
cific heterogeneity, which is the source of autocorrelation within the 
lagged dependent variable. 
 
When compared with the American influence held on FDI and 
Chinese loans, Washington’s effect on trade is considerably 
smaller. Figure 20 visualizes this effect. Between countries with 
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weak and strong American influence there is a difference of  ap-
proximately $10 USD per capita. Here too, Chinese manufac-
tured exports were indifferent to the One China policy, but Stra-
tegic Partnerships affect them negatively. The negative relation be-
tween Strategic Partnerships and Chinese manufacturing exports 
could indicate the interest of  Beijing in negotiating these agree-
ments with markets that were relatively close to their manufac-
tured goods. Alternatively, the Strategic Partnerships may have 
served as an opportunity for Latin American countries to negoti-
ate some protection for their own manufacturers.   
 




In addition to common indicators for market size and economic 
performance, I also include an openness to trade proxy (TRADE-
OPEN) because I wish to control for bilateral memorandums that 
establish that any Chinese export increase is contingent on less-
stringent protectionism towards Beijing’s products in domestic 
markets. I further control for the existence of  active FTAs be-
tween China and the host country, which is statistically significant 
and has a substantive effect on exports.  
I included a control for the importance of  industry in the econ-
omy (INDUEMP), which is negatively associated with the level of  
Chinese exports. This suggests a potential competition between 
Chinese products and Latin America’s domestic ones, ceteris pa-
ribus. I also controlled for macroeconomic variables affecting bi-
lateral trade, such as exchange rates and terms of  trade. The for-
mer is negatively associated with exports, which is consistent with 
the expectations since currency devaluations make imports more 
expensive. Terms of  trade are positively associated with increased 
exports. This is consistent with the expected, since favorable trade 
terms increase the purchase capacity of  a country. Indeed, I also 
controlled a country’s tax structure, which can act as a deterrent 
for imports. Two variables controlled for this structure, MAN-
UFTAX and TAXWEIGHT. While it is true that TAXWEIGHT re-
sulted in no effect, MANUFTAX is positively related to Chinese 
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manufacturing exports, which is intuitive. Countries which tax 
their local industries at a greater rate have a smaller risk of  cost 
negatively affecting Chinese manufactured goods.  
As a control group, I used Latin American countries’ commodity 
exports to China. While this variable captures an important por-
tion of  bilateral trade relations between Latin America and China, 
it avoids the larger question of  Chinese penetration into Latin 
America in favor of  the region’s access to the Chinese market. 
While it captures the economic incentives for the trading relation-
ship, I was able to isolate the political motivator of  Chinese ex-
ports. Latin American commodity exports are not subject to the 
United States’ influence or to the One China Policy. In sum, this 
information gives credence to the argument that China has been 
buying commodities from a pure economic standpoint.  
Regarding the controls, both AGRIBUSINESS and MINERAL reflect 
positive coefficients, while OIL shows a negative coefficient, giving 
a signal that Latin American soybeans, meat, iron ore, and copper 
have been the main products of Chinese interest. While it is true 
that the region’s open countries were more receptive to Chinese 
manufacturing, they were not the ones driving the commodity 





Concluding remarks  
 
The presented empirical evidence indicates that Beijing’s penetra-
tion into Latin American countries has been negatively related 
with American influence when the Chinese government was in-
volved in the decision-making process. These results suggest that 
China strengthened its ties with those countries where the United 
States’ influence was weak. In other words, Beijing filled the 
“void” left by a declining American presence in Washington’s own 
“backyard”. To a considerable extent, these results seem to be in 
line with the expectations of  HST, a theory that has gloomy pre-
dictions when it comes to the United States-China transition.  
The mechanisms behind this broad trend deserve to be studied 
in depth, and this chapter provides a first conceptual and theoret-
ical framework to do so. On the Latin American side, one could 
argue that governments pursuing diversification are the true 
agents behind this new pattern of  interaction with Beijing, but if  
that is the case, it is still curious why only Chinese state-influenced 
actors – as opposed to other Chinese private actors – are respond-
ing to this demand. Furthermore, the observational implications 
of  the diversification mechanism indicate that commodity trade 
with China should be negatively related with American influence, 
which is not the case. 
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Two particular stories appear to pass the statistical tests. First, it 
could be that China is contesting the United States and affecting 
the foreign policy of  Latin American by employing economic 
statecraft to empower pro-Chinese domestic constituencies – an 
argument that is already out in the literature. Second, it could be 
that China is simply accommodating to the changing strategic en-
vironment in Latin America, avoiding to engaging those countries 
where the United States has a vested interest. The empirical evi-
dence suggests by analysing United States hegemonic influence, 
One China Policy response and the effect of  Strategic Partner-
ships a contesting policy, by actively engaging with pro-Chinese 
domestic constituencies.  
Due to its large-n design, this chapter could do little to flesh out 
particular causal processes. However, it has unveiled the existence 
of  a clear trade-off  in Latin America between being under the 
wing of the American eagle and attracting the attention of the 




Chapter 3 – Understanding how Chinese firms 
are influenced by domestic factors: Exploring 
the role of State equity and SASAC1 
 
 
Chapter 2 proved that two particular stories pass the statistical 
tests. First, it could be that China is contesting the United States 
and affecting the foreign policy of  Latin American by employing 
economic statecraft to empower pro-Chinese domestic constitu-
encies – an argument that is already out in the literature. Second, 
it could be that China is simply accommodating to the changing 
strategic environment in Latin America, avoiding to engaging 
those countries where the United States has a vested interest.  
The empirical evidence suggests by analysing United States hege-
monic influence, One China Policy response and the effect of  
Strategic Partnerships a contesting policy, by actively engaging 
                                                          
1 A version of this chapter is under review at the journal Business & Politics, co-au-
thored by Jing Duanmu. 
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with pro-Chinese domestic constituencies. However, to give ro-
bustness to this finding, this chapter explores the causal mecha-
nism that affects Chinese MNEs to act the way they do. I will 
explore the two mechanisms (accommodation and contestation) 
for the allocation of  investment in the world as compared to Latin 
America.  
While earlier studies on host country determinants of  Foreign Di-
rect Investment (FDI) have mainly focused on economic varia-
bles (see Caves 1996; Blonigen 2005), recent research begins to 
take into account the effect of  political factors, such as military 
power, economic dominance, and diplomatic relations (e.g. Li and 
Vashchilko 2010; Duanmu 2014). However, one of the noticea-
ble gaps in this stream of research is that it does not consider US 
global dominance, and its impact on global FDI distribution. De-
spite the fact that US global political dominance and its advocated 
economic globalization have defined the post-Cold War interna-
tional political landscape (Layne 2009), the interactions between 
US international coercive power and Chinese economic decisions 
have been rarely examined in the literature. Given China’s emerg-
ing and unique position in the international political and eco-
nomic landscape, we theorize a strong relationship between US 
political influence and the current global distribution of Chinese’ 
outward FDI. One of the components of China’s growing 
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power, as well as its increasing integration into the global econ-
omy, rests on its outward foreign direct investment (OFDI).  
Although China only recently became a source of FDI, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) predicted that China would become the second larg-
est source investment after the US in 2015 (Yao and Wang 2014). 
The official policy, labelled as ‘Going Global’ policy, is the result 
of  strong political will from the central Chinese government that 
has shifted China from a passive receipt of inward FDI to an ac-
tive source of  outward FDI in the last decade. The period of  
study (2005-2010) of  this chapter captures the “boom” in Chi-
nese OFDI (see figure 6). 
The most widely cited literature on China’s OFDI has focused on 
the traditional economic, institutional, and geographical factors 
of  FDI (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2012; Rama-
samy, Yeung and Laforet 2012). Although the role of  bilateral po-
litical relations in bilateral trade and investment flows is consid-
ered in political economy literature (Nigh 1985; Pollins 1989; 
Morrow, Siverson and Tavares 1998; Gartzke Li and Boehmer 
2001), and in recent studies in international business literature (Li 
and Vashchilko 2010; Duanmu 2014), how the global political 
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structure, such as US hegemony, may influence bilateral invest-
ment flows between two countries remains an under-studied area 
that links Political Science and International Business theories. 
It is clear that US hegemonic power has gradually declined in re-
cent decades. In chapter 1 I have already discussed CINC and 
CNP indicators. Although China does not have the overwhelm-
ingly military means that the US has, its growing economic power 
renders it a future threat to American hegemony.  
Theoretically, in this chapter I adopt the Soft Balancing concept, 
and hypothesize –from the findings reported in the previous 
chapter—that China tends to locate less (more) investment in 
host countries which have strong (weak) political proximity with 
the US; and I also contend that this tendency is stronger the larger 
the state control within the company. China’s OFDI provides us 
with a unique opportunity to assess empirically the influence of  
the US on the trajectories of  emerging powers integration into 
the world economy, since Party–business relations increasingly in-
fluence decision-making processes and policy outcomes in the 
Chinese polity (Brødsgaard 2012; Naughton 2015). 
My finding provides empirical substance to the notion that China 
used foreign investment as an economic diplomacy tool as sug-
gested in Naughton (2008), Chan (2009), Bayne and Woolcock 
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(2011), Nolan (2014) and Naughton (2015). I have attained sup-
portive results for the hypothesis using several sources of  data 
and different model specifications. This chapter contributes to 
empirical studies on political drivers of  investment in general, and 
those on Chinese OFDI in specific. The evidence regarding the 
global strategic avoidance of  Chinese investment in countries un-
der strong US influence gives strength to the argument of accom-
modation over the argument of contestation, and could become 
more complex if  US hegemony continues to decline, paving the 
way to a multi-polar political landscape in the future.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next 
section, I outline the key literature on Chinese OFDI. I then build 
up the hypothesis integrating the soft balancing behaviour in in-
ternational relations with the relationship between Chinese state 
control and political goals of  multinational enterprises (MNEs). I 
explain the empirical strategy in the following section. The empir-
ical results are then presented and discussed. The chapter con-






Chinese FDI institutional array and hypothesis develop-
ment 
 
Political proximity between two countries is capable of  affecting 
their foreign investment, which can in turn foster political prox-
imity. According to Sauvant and Chen (2014), the Chinese gov-
ernment shifted from restricting to facilitating, supporting, and 
then encouraging OFDI. After the Going Global policy was for-
malized in March 2000 during the Third Plenum of the 9th Na-
tional People’s Congress, in December 2001, the State Planning 
Commission (SPC) released the 10th FDI Five-Year Plan.  
Furthermore, in 2003, SASAC was established during the 10th 
National People’s Congress as a primary government institution 
responsible for managing the nation’s state-owned assets and 
leading the Chinese expansion abroad (Naughton 2008; Chan, 
2009; Nolan 2014). State control over MNEs is expected to pro-
duce political outcomes. Politics driving FDI is more attainable in 
a country with 170 large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) con-
trolled by a single institution and access to public financing to ex-
pand abroad. As Naughton puts it “if  we call the distinctive Chi-
nese system that has emerged over the last three decades ‘state 
capitalism’, then SASAC is one of  the key transmission belts in 
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that system, since it is the institution through which the state man-
ages its capital” (2015: 47). 
However, the institutional array is more complex than just the cre-
ation of SASAC and includes national banks, local and provincial 
institutions and special commissions (see Chen 2009 and Pearson 
2015). As an illustrative example, in October 2004, China’s State 
Development and Reform Commission (SDRC) and the Ex-
port–Import (EXIM) Bank issued a circular to promote (1) re-
source exploration projects to mitigate the domestic shortage of  
natural resources, (2) projects that encourage the export of  do-
mestic technologies, products, equipment, and labor, (3) overseas 
R&D centers to utilize internationally advanced technologies, 
managerial skills, and professional contacts, and (4) mergers and 
acquisitions that could enhance the international competitiveness 
of  Chinese enterprises, accelerating their entry into foreign mar-
kets.  
To stimulate these selected types of OFDI, the Chinese govern-
ment offered firms preferential credit for these specifically pro-
moted FDI (Luo, Xue and Han 2010, 76). Furthermore, through 
the so-called ‘nomenklatura system’, the Party controls “the ap-
pointment of  the CEOs and presidents of  the most important 
of  these enterprises and manages a cadre transfer system which 
makes it possible to transfer/rotate business leaders to take up 
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positions in state and Party agencies” (Brødsgaard 2012, 624). As 
a result, “the Chinese political leadership, which in the 1990s 
viewed the SOEs as a problem to be fixed, now increasingly views 
the same firms as convenient instruments that can help in the 
achievement of  national goals” (Naughton 2015: 67) 
Following the existing Political Economy literature, I assume 
three reasons that can explain how political proximity may directly 
affect investment: (a) by lowering information costs (Tesar and 
Werner 1995; Coval and Moskowitz 2001), (b) by reducing expro-
priation risk (Williams 1975; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), and 
(c) by lowering bureaucratic barriers (Armstrong and Drysdale 
2009; Drysdale and Armstrong 2010). In fact, these authors in-
vestigate whether bilateral political relations can explain invest-
ment and trade flows from the United States and find that coun-
tries experiencing deteriorating political relations with the United 
States exhibit lower FDI flows into the United States and that the 
United States tends to invest less in unfriendly countries. 
It is likely that political proximity increased the ease and conven-
ience of  investing for Chinese MNEs because of  the preferential 
policies established by the central government (Duanmu 2014). 
However, could political proximity to the US work as a deterrent 
for Chinese investment? The objective of  this chapter is to build 
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on the findings of  the previous chapter to determine whether po-
litical proximity to the US may act as a host-country deterrent of  
Chinese outward investment during the initial years of  the ‘Going 
Global’ policy.   
The HST proposed by neo-realists suggests that the preponder-
ance of  power held by a state allows it to offer incentives, both 
positive and negative, to other states to agree to participation 
within a hegemonic order, thus creating international stability 
(Kindleberger 1986; Lake 1993). This stable hegemonic order dis-
appears, however, if  another state grows strong enough to chal-
lenge the hegemon. Therefore, as time passes, the “distribution 
of  power shifts, leading to conflicts and ruptures in the system, 
hegemonic war, and the eventual reorganization of order so as to 
reflect the new distribution of  power capabilities” (Blum 2003, 
247).  
As mentioned in chapter 2, China’s growth has sparked two op-
posing views on its geopolitical consequences. One view is that 
China is a growing security threat that could eventually challenge 
American geopolitical dominance, first in South East Asia, and 
later in other regions such as Africa and Latin America (Friedberg 
2005; Sutter 2010; Kissinger 2012; Paz 2012). This line of  argu-
ment sees China a new USSR, and hypothesizes a geopolitical or-
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der evolving to a proto-bipolarism and increasing Chinese busi-
ness in Africa and Latin America as direct challenges to US global 
dominance.  
On the other hand, there is a view that poses that China is still 
preoccupied with securing a more comfortable and decent life for 
its people (Ikenberry 2008; Mingjiang 2008; Buzan 2010), and 
therefore its rise will continue to be pragmatic and economical 
driven, prioritizing domestic-development ends (Buzan and Cox 
2013). From this perspective the Chinese power is seen as merely 
economic, thus scholars often compare it not with USSR but with 
the case of Japan in the 1980´s when its economic growth was 
thought to challenge US power but eventually the concern was 
vanished (Vogel 1979).  
The more recent “soft balancing” conceptualization offers an al-
ternative-and intermediate-explanation by stating that major pow-
ers, such as China, are likely to adopt actions that do not directly 
challenge US military preponderance but use non-military tools 
to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral US politics 
(see Pape 2005; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; He and Feng 2008). 
These tactics of  soft balancing are intended to distract and wear 
down a dominant power rather than out-muscle it (Chan 2007).   
Although soft balancing may be unable to prevent the United 
States from achieving specific military aims in the near term, “it 
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will increase the costs of using US power, reduce the number of 
countries likely to cooperate with future US military adventures, 
and possibly shift the balance of  economic power against the 
United States” (Pape 2005: 10).  These characterizations converge 
with other scholars’ analysis. Swaine, Daly & Greenwood  argue 
that China’s foreign policy during this period was driven by a “cal-
culative strategy”, characterized “by a non-ideological approach 
focused on market-led economic growth and the maintenance of 
amicable international political relations with all states, especially 
the major powers, to counterweigh the US dominance” (2000: 2).   
China has, in theory, two ways to pursue its foreign policy goals: 
hard balancing or soft balancing. The former implies strengthen-
ing power through domestic military buildups or through external 
alliance formation. This is the traditional means of balancing also 
called military balancing. However, when two states enjoy a close 
economic relationship, hard balancing against each other would 
prove very costly for them. “Hard balancing will increase enmity 
and hostility between two states and consequently hurt economic 
ties and social well-being. High economic interdependence thus 
reduces the incentive for two states to hard balance each other” 
(He and Feng 2008, 375). When it comes to the US, with which 
it has an enormous economic interdependence (US is the main 
trading partner of China, and China holds an enormous portion 
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of the former’s foreign debt), hard balancing may prove ex-
tremely costly.  “The other way for a state to increase its relative 
power is to undermine the power and constrain the influence of  
the threatening state without direct military confrontation” (He 
and Feng 2008: 372). This type of balancing behavior can be 
called soft balancing, and it is the object of  this chapter.  
In the same direction, Goldstein argues that China has built a 
“Grand Strategy” to engineer the country’s rise to the status of  a 
true global power that shapes, rather than simply responds to, cur-
rent international system. To do so, it has been cultivating part-
nerships in an attempt to cope with the constraints of US power 
and to hasten the advent of  an international system in which the 
US would no longer be so dominant. “Chinese spokesmen regu-
larly emphasized that these partnerships were both a reflection of  
the transition to multi-polarity” (Goldstein 2001, 864), and an at-
tempt to avoid the idea of  bipolarism.   
The political economy view proposed here is not common in 
studies of  OFDI, or specific studies on that from China, which 
have predominantly focused on economic, institutional, and geo-
graphic factors (e.g.  Liu, Buck and Shu 2005; Buckley et al., 2007; 
Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008; Cheung and Qian 2009; Cui and 
Jiang 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet 2012). Although a few 
studies have adopted a more political economy view, such as 
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Duanmu (2014), they primarily develop their analytical frame-
work in a bilateral context, namely, how the home-host country 
relationship influences investment flows, thereby ignoring how 
the global hierarchical political structure, i.e. US international 
dominance, may have influenced investment behaviour.  
This chapter contributes to this gap by hypothesising that the 
global distribution of  China’s OFDI should be such that coun-
tries under greater US political proximity will receive less invest-
ment because China uses FDI as a means for economic statecraft. 
By this, we mean the use of economic means in the service of 
both economic and foreign policy ends (Baldwin 1985; Drezner 
1999). Such a strategy also enhances China’s ability to craft its own 
model of  political and economic development, and to make itself  
“an attractive partner”, especially in a world in which the US is 
seen as an overbearing power (Zakaria 2011).  
Some examples of China’s strategy are its efforts to build “strate-
gic partnerships” with main allies that involve trade, investment 
and scientific cooperation (see Lo 2004; Muekalia 2004; Sautenet 
2007; Strüver 2014) and the soft-power approach in Africa, which 
has caught great academic attention (e.g. Alden, Large and De 
Oliveira 2008; Brautigam 2009).  
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Chinese firms remain substantially influenced by the political 
agenda of the central government (Luo, Xue and Han 2010; No-
lan 2014), although they are much more independent than they 
were forty years ago. State owned enterprises (SOEs) are particu-
larly subject to political impositions because they usually operate 
as the spearheads of  a developmental and geopolitical vision that 
emanates primarily from the central state (Gonzalez-Vicente 
2011). I have mentioned the role that SASAC plays on SOEs as 
its the primary government institution responsible for managing 
the nation’s state-owned assets and leading Chinese expansion 
abroad (Naughton 2008; Nolan 2014). Consequently, SOEs—in 
and perhaps beyond China—often carry non-economic goals in 
their overseas investment (Ellstrand, Tihanyi and Johnson 2002), 
such as securing energy to fuel domestic economic growth 
(Urdinez, Masiero and Ogasavara 2014), accessing advanced tech-
nologies, and increasing geopolitical influence (Gill and Reilly 
2007).  
The existing literature argues that the Chinese government exerts 
its influence on SOEs through both positive incentives, such as 
those delineated in the Countries and Industries for Overseas In-
vestment Guidance Catalogue, or the nomenklatura system and 
negative incentives. For instance, MOFCOM has sensitivity crite-
ria for prohibiting investment that jeopardize bilateral diplomatic 
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relations and/or violate bilateral agreements (Sauvant and Chen 
2014: 145). In addition, “MOFCOM consults Chinese embassies 
or consulates in host countries, and investment are reviewed if  the 
country was on a MOFCOM ‘blacklist’ or if  the proposed invest-
ment would affect the interests of a third country” (Sauvant and 
Chen 2014: 147).  
In terms of positive incentives, SOEs often receive extensive sup-
port from the state government in their overseas expansion, in-
cluding access to state finance and political protection for their 
operations in risky environments (Duanmu 2014). The political 
affiliation of  SOEs with the state is likely to make their investment 
abroad much more sensitive to the host country’s relation with 
the US than in cases where the state does not impose its influence.  
By contrast, Chinese privately owned enterprises (POEs), alt-
hough also under political influence, are usually driven by “insti-
tutional escapism” to avoid competitive disadvantages incurred 
by operating exclusively in the domestic market. This view sug-
gests that POEs are sometimes pushed abroad because of  a poor 
institutional environment at home, including rampant corruption, 
regulatory uncertainty, under-developed intellectual property 
rights protection, and government interference, among other fac-
tors (Luo, Xue and Han 2010; Witt and Lewin 2008). This is in 
stark contrast with their state counterparts, which enjoy a variety 
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of advantages, such as easy access to strategic resources, political 
support and finance, and monopolistic incumbent positions at 
home that can support their foreign expansion (Wei, Clegg and 
Ma 2014: 2).   
Having discussed in depth the literature, I formalize the hypothe-
sis I will test 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese companies under State control invest 
more (less) in a country the less (more) closer is politically from 
the US.   
 
Methodological design: introducing firm level data 
 
In this chapter, differently from the previous one, I use both 
country and firm level data to investigate the chapter’s hypothesis.  
This is mainly driven by the fact that the country level data has 
certain limits and potential bias, which I will discuss shortly. By 
using firm level data as complements, I wish to establish robust-
ness of  our analysis with data as well as method triangulation. An-
other difference with the previous chapter is that now I do not 
focus exclusively on Latin America, but the sample is on a global 





Measurement of independent variables 
 
In this chapter, due to limitations in the data for other regions of 
the world, I proxy “Political proximity with US” with the share of 
common votes of the host country with the US on important 
issues at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Dreher 
and Jensen 2013). The data was retrieved from the unclassified 
reports to Congress of  the Department of  State of  the United 
States, and the criteria for differencing important from non-im-
portant votes was defined by the Department of State. I believe 
that important ones are those to which the State Department 
gave more importance, thus, they better reflect political align-
ments.  
Gupta and Yu (2007) apply this proxy for political proximity and 
find a positive relationship between voting convergence and FDI 
flows from the United States and its partners. This variable has 
also been analyzed in other contexts, indicating a positive, statisti-
cally significant effect on the relationship between World Bank 
and IMF loans and countries whose voting patterns are more sim-
ilar to G7 countries (Dreher and Sturm 2012). In addition, a sta-
tistically significant relationship is observed between larger 
amounts of  financial aid from the United States and recipients 
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that voted in line with the United States at the United Nations 
General Assembly (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009). Finally, 
Duanmu (2014) tests UNGA convergence with China to test 
whether political proximity to China lead to a larger amount of 
Chinese investment. 
To measure the degree of  State control over each company, I used 
the Chinese state’s equity share, which can range from 0 to 100%. 
In the sample it has a mean of  25%. I used a dummy variable, 
which assumes the value of  “1” if  state equity is 50% or above, 
“0” otherwise. I use this dummy variable to make sure that we are 
measuring majoritarian state influence over a firm. 53% of our 
firm level observations have 50% state equity or above.    
The selection of  our control variables is primarily based on 
Duanmu (2014), who kindly shared her data. I have included 
country-level variables: geographical distance, GDP, exchange 
rate, natural resource endowments, exports to China, political 
proximity to China and size of  the Chinese diaspora in the host 
country, as well as year fixed effects. Firm level variables are age, 
profitability and total assets.  
I outline the main rationales of  these control variables in the esti-
mation. For country level controls, domestic market size is the 
most commonly considered determinant of FDI and has proven 
to be a robust determinant across studies of  Chinese FDI. A 
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country with a large market likely attracts FDI, “as such invest-
ment promotes economies of  scale in terms of production and 
distribution” (Blanton and Blanton 2007: 147). The proxy used to 
test for market size is the host-country’s GDP.   
Natural resources have been extensively discussed to be one of  
the motives of  China’s outward FDI, although a more refined 
analysis shows that natural resources only matter in some re-
source-related industries (De Beule and Duanmu 2012). Litera-
ture typically used host-country exports of ores and minerals (Liu, 
Buck and Shu 2005; Buckley et al. 2007; Ramasamy, Yeung and 
Laforet 2012). I added to the exports of  ores and minerals the 
export of oil and gas derivatives, as energy resources have proven 
to be key for Chinese FDI allocation (Urdinez, Masiero and 
Ogasavara 2014). 
 Furthermore, I control for the export dependence of  other 
countries on China, measured by the ratio of  the country’s export 
to China with its total export to the world. I draw export data 
from Trademap and Mongolia scores the highest with an average 
value of  staggering 75% of export dependence on China during 
the period. Other countries heavily relying on the Chinese market 
as their export destination include Sudan (72%), North Korea 
(54%) and the Democratic Republic of  Congo (42%). A control 
for the exchange rate of  the host country is considered because 
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strong Yuan means greater purchasing power abroad, which 
could be another incentive for outbound investment (Cushman, 
1985). I also include geographic distance as a common controller 
in FDI models, despite its ambiguous impact on FDI (Carr, 
Markusen and Maskus 2001).  
Finally, I included a control for the Chinese diasporas abroad. Lit-
erature has found that persistent ethnic networks effects can be 
explained by their functional capabilities such as promoting infor-
mation flows (Bowles and Gintis 2004). Additionally, I believe 
that the presence of  Chinese ethnic networks in a host country 
may generate natural “legitimacy” for investors, who tend to clus-
ter in countries/locations with their peers from the same home 
country, also called “country of  origin agglomeration” because of  
the rich information flows as well as fertile collaboration oppor-
tunities (Tan and Meyer 2011). It is noted that we include the con-
trol for political relations with China, proxied with the conver-
gence in votes at UNGA with China, since it is shown to be an 
important antecedent of  Chinese outward FDI in Duanmu 
(2014).  
Regarding the firm-level controls, I sought parent information 
from Global Business, GTA Information Technology, which is a 
commercial database company based in Hong Kong. I matched 
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observations for which parent information was available and in-
cluded controls for MNEs’ fixed assets, years in business and 
profit value scaled by number of  employees. Past studies have 
demonstrated that these factors influence the decision and the 
scale of  FDI (Asiedu and Esfahani 2001; Buch, Kleinert, Lip-
poner and Toubal 2005; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005). The sum-
mary of  key variables is presented in Table 12.  I find no issue of 
multi-collinearity in the datasets. 
 
TABLE 12: Descriptive statistics for the variable and their definitions 
Variables Measurement Source Mean SD. Min. Max. 








44.66 29.70 0 88.9 
Chinese diaspora Number of Chinese 




World Bank 0.1912 0.6847 0 5 
Natural resources Host-country’s ex-
ports of minerals, 
metals and oil (mil-
lion US$) 
 
Trademap 24.81 42.02 0 364.64 
Distance Air km between 






7100 3474 1091 19297 
GDP GDP in current mil-
lion US$ 
World Bank 1144 1242 2.52 5495.3 
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Exchange rate Real exchange rate 
(LCU per US$) 
 
IMF 1262 3886 0.49 18612 
Exports Percentage of ex-













Voeten et al. 
(2009) 




with Russia in 
UNGA 
Voeten et al. 
(2009) 
80.11 9.27 32.1 1 
       
Firm level       
Age MNE´s number of 
years of operation 
 
This study 11.58 8.73 0 84 
Total assets Total fixed assets 
(billion Yuan) 
 
This study 23.2 2.89 15.5 30.09 
Profitability Profit per employee 
in Yuan 
 
This study 50.04 124.98 0.0001 1040 
State equity Company with 
more than 50% of 
equity controlled by 
the State 
 
This study 0.25 0.33 0 1 










Dependent variables and model specification  
 
A. Country level data and estimation method 
 
Firstly, I retrieved country-level Chinese OFDI between 2005 and 
2010 from China’s Global Investment Tracker compiled by the 
Heritage Foundation (Scissors 2013) as I did in chapter 2. There 
are 66 countries which have received positive amounts of  Chinese 
FDI in this period, therefore I constructed a balanced panel data 
for estimations. A drawback of  this database is that it only in-
cludes investment larger than 100 million US dollars. This thresh-
old excludes hundreds of  small investment, and results in over-
representing large investment made. The amount of  investment 
is strongly right skewed, with a mean amount of  US$ 1777 million 
a year and a median amount of  US$ 980 million.  
To address the drawback, I chose to use the number of  invest-
ment per country in each year as the dependent variable, captures 
the country level extensive margin of  FDI. Thus, I use a count 
variable and construct a balanced panel based on host countries 
and the time dimension. I use a panel Poisson specification with 





𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡,𝑘 =  𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑘=66
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑡 +
 ∑ 𝜔𝑦
𝑡=2005
𝑡=2010 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + ∑ ℎ𝑘
𝑘=66
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘  +  𝜀𝑘,𝑡    
 
    The equation models the annual number of  projects in the host 
country k in the year t. The subscript k includes the following 
country-level controls: the Chinese diaspora in the host-country, 
the host-country’s GDP, the distance between Beijing and the 
host-country’s capital, the host-country exchange rate, the per-
centage of  exports of  the host-country to China and the coun-
try’s exports of minerals, metals and oil, as a proxy for natural re-
source exports. Since it is not possible to measure state equity at 
the country level, this country level model primarily focuses on 
the first hypothesis of  the chapter. Therefore, the key interest is 
𝛽1, which I expect to be statistically significant and negative to 
support the first hypothesis.  
 
B. Firm level data and estimation method 
 
To provide robustness to the results from the country-level 
model, and more importantly, to test the second hypothesis, I 
specified a firm-level model with cross sectional data of Chinese 
MNEs greenfield investment between 2005 and 2010. The firm-
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level data was drawn from fDi Markets gathered by the Financial 
Times. It is comprised of  720 firm level observations in this six 
year period. The dependent variable here is the sum of invested 
capital by each firm in a particular year. This is the most direct way 
of  capturing firm level FDI. The subscript k is comprised by the 
same controls as the country-level data model described in the 
previous paragraph. The subscript c includes the following firm-
level controls: total assets, age and the annual profit per employee. 
Our firm level model can be expressed as follows:  
 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑡 +
  𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑘=115
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑐
𝑐=720
𝑐=1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡  +  ∑ 𝜔𝑦
𝑡=2005
𝑡=2010 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘,𝑐,𝑡    
 
There are 115 host countries in the sample. In this model, our key 
interest is 𝛽3. I sought firm level control variables from Global 
Business, GTA Information Technology. I use an OLS with ro-
bust standard errors specification in the estimation.   
Due to the fact that the data are drawn from two different sources, 
this has resulted in some sample attrition (number of  observa-
tions from 875 to 261 in the full model, a reduction in 70%) that 




investigate potential bias, I used a simple t-test to check variables 
such as the amount of FDI and country-level controls. I found a 
small but systematic difference between the missing observations 
and the available observations. To correct for this bias I included 
zeroes in the database by creating a dyadic version of  it, in which 
the dependent variable is dichotomous (1 if  the MNE invested in 
the country on that year, and 0 otherwise). I now discuss this “Dy-
adic” model.  
 
C. Dyadic data and estimation method 
 
Combining both previous datasets, I created a dyadic dataset that 
assumes the value of  “1” when the Chinese MNE invests in a 
host-country, and “0” otherwise. This dataset allows us to com-
bine country-level and firm-level controls, as well as to have ze-
roes in the database to control for potential selection biases of 
previous models. The dataset is comprised of  9669 observations, 
and the model is specified as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑡 +
  𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑆𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑘=112
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑐
𝑐=609
𝑐=1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡  +  ∑ 𝜔𝑦
𝑡=2005




 The equation models the capital invested by each Chinese firm c 
in the host country k in the year t. The k term is an index for the 
host country. The subscripts c and k use the same controls as the 
models specified before. I employ a logit specification.  
It is noted that the models use greenfield investment in both 
country level and firm level dataset, because they are more sensi-
tive to political risk, official regulations, and political pressure than 
other types of  FDI, such as mergers and/or acquisitions 
(Demirbag et al. 2008). In addition, greenfield was the main mar-
ket entry choice by Chinese MNEs, approximately 60% larger 
than the money invested through M&As in our sample period 
(Wang and Lu 2016). I do not include FDI of  other market-entry 




Table 13 offers the results of  the three baseline models, country-
level, firm-level, and dyadic level data. In Model 1, the dependent 
variable is the number of  greenfield investment per year at the 
country level. On average, each host country received less than a 
greenfield project a year (0.83) and only two countries received 




Indonesia). The independent variable for political relations with 
United States is statistically significant and has a negative coeffi-
cient of  -0.020.  This means that an increase of  1% in the political 
proximity of the host-country with US translates into a decrease 
of  2% in the number of  projects, ceteris paribus (Long, 2016). 
The results in Model (1) lends support to our first hypothesis: 
Chinese investors locate more investment projects in countries 
with low political proximity with the United States.  
In Model 2, the dependent variable is the sum of capital invested 
by individual Chinese MNEs in million US dollars. I find support-
ing results for both hypotheses. The interactive variable between 
political proximity with United States and state equity is statisti-
cally significant and has a negative coefficient (-4.77).  
While the host country’s political distance with the US increases 
Chinese firms’ investment, this effect is only applicable for firms 
with majoritarian level of  state equity. In the sample 71% of the 
capital invested was under the control of  companies with majori-
tarian state control, which means that the hypotheses apply to a 
large portion of the sample. The magnitude of  the effect can be 





FIGURE 21: Effect of US’s political proximity on Chinese investment. 
 
In Model 3, the dependent variable is a dummy that assumes the 
value of  “1” when the company invested in certain country-year, 
otherwise “0”. Once again, the interaction of the political prox-
imity with US and the majoritarian State equity is statistically sig-
nificant and reports a negative coefficient (-0.0114). For each unit 
increase in the proximity with US, it is expected a 0.011 decrease 
in the log-odds of a Chinese investment, holding all other inde-
pendent variables constant. 
From the standpoint of  the literature of International Relations 
previously reviewed, these findings support the hypothesis that 
FDI is being used by the Chinese government as a soft balancing 
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tool. Models 4 and 5 test an alternative measure for state control 
over the MNE: being under the control of  SASAC (Naughton, 
2008). The correlation of both State Equity in the MNEs and 
SASAC control in the sample is of  0.35. In the sample, 45% of 
the capital invested was through companies within SASAC. 
Model 4 has the same specification as Model 2, and Model 5 has 
the same specification as Model 3. I confirm the chapter’s hypoth-
esis which gives robustness to our findings.   
This is a finding that concerns to a recently created domestic in-
stitution in China. As the literature has expressed, “SASAC might 
act as an institutional deterrent, the same way is the Countries and 
Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalogue pub-
lished by MOFCOM which has sensitivity criteria for prohibiting 
investment that jeopardize bilateral diplomatic relations” (Sauvant 
and Chen 2014: 14).  
 
TABLE 13: Political Relations with US and Chinese FDI 












Political relations with 
US -0.020* -0.165 
 
-0.0057 -2.25   -0.0076* 
 (-2.20) (-0.09)  (-1.42)    (-0.96)  (-2.03) 
State equity − 393.98***  0.320 − − 
 − (6.60)  (1.10)    − − 
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State equity × political 
relations with US − -4.77*** 
 
-0.0114* − − 
 − (-4.02)  (-2.24)    − − 
Under SASAC control − −  − 224.98* 0.74 
 − −  − (2.40) (1.49) 
SASAC × political re-
lations with US − − 
 
− -8.64** -0.032*** 
 − −  − (-2.96) (-3.15) 
Total assets − 0.129  0.00085 0.5207** 0.0012* 
 − (1.19)  (1.48)    (2.89) (2.04) 
Age − -1.88  0.0035 -0.106 0.0036 
 − (-1.49)  (0.65) (-0.07) (0.77) 
Annual profit − 5.94  0.049** 2.77 0.0511*** 
 − (1.58)  (2.95) (0.62) (3.41) 
Chinese diaspora -14.55 -545.2  -2.062***   -0.00037 -2.07*** 
 (-0.42) (-0.27)  (-3.71)    (-0.52) (-3.17) 
GDP 0.0014 -0.0005  0.00056***  0.2081 0.00056*** 
 (0.65) (-0.01)  (6.92)    (1.21) (6.27) 
Distance with China . 0.0055  -0.00005*   -0.150 -0.000047* 
 (.) (0.30)  (-2.52)    (-1.08)  (-2.43) 
Exchange rate 0.00038 -0.0008  -0.000042    0.169 -0.000043 
 (-1.65) (-0.14)  (-1.45)    (1.16) (-1.56) 
Political relations with 
China -3.21 95.82 
 
-1.20**  -364.69 -1.239** 
 (-1.20) (1.06)  (-2.49)    (-0.67) (-2.75) 
Exports -1.29 -79.51  -1.21    -1339.21 -1.191 
 (-0.66) (-0.05)  (-1.43)    (-1.07) (-1.34) 
Natural resources -0.00773 0.439  0.0044***   -0.395 0.0044*** 
 (-1.76) (0.41)  (4.62)    (0.70) (5.15) 
Constant − 38.06***  -3.22**  2427.15 -3.028** 
 − (8.08)  (-2.79)    (1.45) (-2.77) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry fixed effects − No  Yes No  
Adjusted R squared − 0.20  −                 0.17 −                 
Pseudo R squared 0.38 −  0.10    −                 0.10 
Observations 274 355  10138    376 10138 
T-tests in parentheses.  
Note regarding significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
After establishing the main results, I assess the robustness of the 
findings through two different tests. The first is to use country 
level outward FDI data from Taiwan as “counterfactual” to that 
of  China. The idea is that to establish that Chinese FDI is de-
terred by US political dominance over the host country due to 
China’s unique political and economic position in the world, I 
need to demonstrate that in a “counterfactual” world this ten-
dency would not exist if  it were not for China’s unique political 
and economic position in the world. While a perfect counterfac-
tual is difficult to find, I feel that Taiwan’s outward FDI in the 
same period might serve the purpose for two distinct reasons.  
Taiwan was separated from China in 1949 during the Chinese 
Civil War in which the Communist Party of China (CPC) took 
power of mainland China and forced loyal forces to the Kuomin-
tang to base in Taiwan, which claim the legitimate government of 
all China since then. This means that had the political event not 
happened, Taiwan and China would have been one country. Sec-
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ondly, despite inherited similarities between the two, they have dis-
tinct political regimes, and their relationship with the US follows 
very different trajectories. If  we find that Taiwan’s FDI does not 
respond in the same way as China’s FDI to the US political dom-
inance over the host country, then that would enhance our theo-
retical argument regarding the political mechanisms that explain 
the distribution of China’s FDI.  
I extracted Taiwan’s FDI data from UNCTAD. Taiwan has FDI 
in 27 countries in 2001-2012. I constructed a country level bal-
anced panel data. I find that US political dominance has no statis-
tically significant effect on Taiwan’s FDI. The coefficient is posi-
tive but not statistically significant. The results are presented in 
Table 14.  
 
TABLE 14: Robustness checks. Politi-
cal Relations with US and Taiwan 
FDI 
 (5)    
 Country level 
Political relations with US -0.0798 
 (-0.24) 







Distance from Taiwan 0.0255 
 (0.19) 
Exchange rate 0.00385 
 (1.42) 




Natural resources 0.0003 
 (0.00)    
Constant -333.04 
 (-0.23) 
Country fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
R squared 0.47 
Observations 352 
T-tests in parentheses.  
Note regarding significance: * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
The second test that I performed was to replace the independent 
variable: US political proximity with that of  Russia. Although 
Russia can be seen as a secondary actor in current global hierarchy, 
a couple of  characteristics make it a suitable setting for this falsi-
fication test. First, it is a member of  the UN Security Council, just 
like United States and China. Second, it is a former communist 
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country and a member of  the BRIC, a key ally of  China when it 
comes to confronting Western international regimes regarding 
human rights, authoritarian rule, and nuclear power. If  the results 
based on Russia’s political relations are consistent with those 
where we treat US as the “hegemon”, then our theoretical argu-
ments would be called in question. But if  the results are incon-
sistent with those based on the assumption that United States is 
the “hegemon” that would then enhance our theoretical argu-
ment that it is US dominance that Chinese investors try to avoid. 
The results are presented in Table 15. I basically replicated all es-
timations that we had in Table 13, but replaced the key independ-
ent variable, US political relations with that of  Russia. I find that 
Chinese investment does not “soft balance” towards this second-
ary (but still relevant) actor in the international arena. The political 
proximity for Russia is actually positively related to Chinese in-
vestment at a firm level. These findings enhance our confidence 
in our theoretical argument.  
 
TABLE 15: A falsification test: Political relations with Russia and Chinese 
FDI 




Firm   
level 
Dyadic       
level 
Firm      
level 









6 -2.874 -1395.64 -1.040 
 (1.14) (-1.85) (-1.22)   (-1.95) (-1.11) 
State equity −    
-
770.58
* -1.425 −    −    
 −    (-2.05) (-1.22)    −    −    
State equity × 
political rela-
tions with Rus-
sia −    
1236.7
* 1.351 −    −    
 −    (2.25) (0.94)    −    −    
Under SASAC 
control −    −    −    131.51 -4.874* 
 −    −    −    (0.11) (-2.17) 
SASAC × polit-
ical relations 
with Russia −    −    −    -69.02 5.490* 
 −    −    −    (-0.05) (2.06) 
Total assets −    0.0496 -0.0002 0.2624 0.00036 
 − (0.26) (-1.59)    (1.23) (1.29) 
Age −    -1.555 0.0044 0.1050 0.00116 
 −    (-0.94) (0.93)    (0.09) (0.23) 
Annual profit −    6.739 0.0866***     5.131 0.04844** 
 −    (1.76)  (6.08)    (1.26) (3.00) 





 (0.60) (1.71)  (5.72)    (1.39) (5.09) 
Distance with 
China . 0.647 
-
0.000079*
** 0.7207 -0.000047* 
 (.) (1.44)  (-4.01)    (1.54) (-2.59) 
Exchange rate -0.00035 0.192 0.000031 0.176  0.000021 







282.73 0.246    -292.51 -0.0292 
 (1.95) (-0.84)  (0.57)    (-0.77) (-0.08) 
Exports -1.44 
-
571.31 -0.479 -707.93 -1.285 







0.7701 0.0064***  -0.189 0.0046*** 




1 -8.921*** -6709.93 -3.44* 
 (.) (-1.29)  (-4.86)    (-1.40) (-2.71) 
Year fixed ef-
fects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed 
effects Yes Yes No Yes No 
Industry fixed 
effects − No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R 
squared − 0.37 −    0.31 −    
Pseudo R squa-
red 0.38 − 0.08 −    0.07 
Observations 274 385 11108    378 12798 
T-tests in parentheses.  
Note regarding significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Discussions and conclusions  
 
In this chapter I have provided theoretical arguments and empir-
ical evidence of  how political factors regarding the power distri-
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bution of  the international system influenced Chinese firms’ in-
vestment. I found that distant political relations between the host 
and the US serve as an incentive to Chinese firms’ under strong 
State control willingness to invest. Related to chapter 2 these find-
ings give strength to the accommodation argument. 
These results have significant implications to theory and practice. 
The political economy view has not been considered in studies of  
OFDI from China, which have predominantly focused on eco-
nomic, institutional, and geographic factors. I incorporate theo-
retical concepts from international relations theory to understand 
this under-explored phenomenon of  international business.  If  
the United States retains its economic and military primacy under 
unipolarity, maintaining the power gap with other powers, then it 
can continue to enjoy the luxury of  a unilateral policy without 
worrying about hard balancing from others. The best other pow-
ers can do under unipolarity “is to attempt soft balancing to con-
strain United States’ power rather than asserting a military chal-
lenge” (He and Feng 2008: 394) 
The empirical findings give substance to soft balancing theory by 
demonstrating that major powers are likely to adopt actions that 
do not directly challenge US military preponderance but that use 
nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive 
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unilateral US military politics. While previous studies find that po-
litical affiliation of SOEs with the central government has played 
an important role in facilitating SOEs’ overseas expansion (e.g. 
Duanmu 2014), this research demonstrates that the benefits do 
not come without expense. What is clear is that the visible hands 
of  the Chinese government exert significant influence on its 
SOEs’ OFDI. Recent large infrastructure investments projects 
have shown the political variable to be highly relevant, as the pro-
jected transoceanic canal that crosses Nicaragua which is intended 
to compete with the Panama Canal (Daley 2016). 
China, furthermore, might be interesting in “buying friends” 
through FDI, and those countries with less influence by US might 
be the easiest to seduce with large infrastructure projects. An im-
portant implication of  the results is that US global dominance has 
long been embedded in the current economic globalization com-
mencing after WWII. But if  the world political order were to 
change, i.e. US influence may decline as did United Kingdom’s 
after WWI, US influence on the distribution of FDI may dimin-
ish, which does not mean that we should not consider the political 
economy of globalization but that we should theorize how the 
new political order may replace the old regime and influence the 




Chapter 4 – Winning hearts in Latin America: 
understanding Pro-Chinese sentiments as a 




The evidence presented in Chapter 2 shows that during the first 
years of the 21st century China had become a major actor in Latin 
which posed geopolitical challenges to the region in light of the 
long-standing American presence.  Which are the effects the Chi-
nese assertiveness has had on citizen’s perception of  proto-bipo-
larism in the region? This chapter returns to Latin America, since 
there is still a gap in the literature regarding how public opinion 
perceived the trend discussed in previous chapters, something 
surprising considering that public opinion nowadays plays a rele-
vant role in the formulation of foreign policies (Sobel 2001; Foyle 
2004).   
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The China-driven commodity boom that initially caught the at-
tention of  scholars regarding China’s engagement in Latin Amer-
ica became a long-term boon (see Ferchen, 2011) during the 
Obama doctrine as relations went far beyond trade to include fi-
nancial and political components. Chapter 2 has already men-
tioned that, for example, Beijing got involved in the most ambi-
tious projects of infrastructure in the region28, and several Latin 
American countries established strategic partnerships with China 
via bilateral cooperation agreements that range from science and 
technology cooperation to cultural exchanges. This chapter exam-
ines the social consequences of  Chinese economic statecraft 
which might have worked also as a tool of soft power – i.e. “the 
ability to shape the preferences of  others through appeal and at-
traction in a non-coercive manner” (Nye, 2004; Hunter, 2009). 
These two dimensions are the result of  China’s increasing where-
withal that allowed it to pay attention to Latin America, a region 
which was, until the 90’s, an exclusive area of  US hegemonic in-
fluence (see chapter 1).  
To a significant extent, the relative capabilities of  both countries 
have followed opposite trends in the last three decades, as seen in 
                                                          
28 (a) three nuclear plants and the improvement of trains in Argentina; (b) a transconti-
nental train between Brazil and Peru; (c) one of the largest oil refineries in the region in 
Ecuador; (d) the Toromocho project administered by the Chinalco mining in Peru; (e) a 
project to create a transoceanic canal in Nicaragua, and (f) a LAC-China Infrastructure 
Fund in partnership with the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB). 
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Figure 4 and Appendix 1 of the first chapter. In the last decade, 
China found in a position of using its growing economic and dip-
lomatic resources to exert influence in areas such as Africa and 
Latin America. In the aftermath of the foreign policy shift fol-
lowed by the 9/11, the US moved towards a rollback position and 
therefore exacerbated its disengagement with Latin America. This 
context, opened the door to China to step in the region with its 
tempting economic means.   
In Chapter 2, I departed from the assumption that a hegemon 
must combine military, economic and ideological elements to 
support its political supremacy and that among these three fac-
tors, historians have noticed that the economic component of 
hegemonism is key to maintain both military and ideological pri-
macy in the long-term.29 By 2014, China was already the region´s 
second largest trade partner (Trademap, 2015) and second largest 
investor, only behind the European Union (in flows, not stock, 
where it remains far behind US, European countries and Japan) 
(ECLAC, 2015). Furthermore, between 2005 and 2015, the China 
Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank became 
important sources of  funding, which have allowed some Latin 
                                                          
29 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Lexington: Lexington Books, 
1987). Robert Keohane defined economic hegemony as entailing, “control over capital, 
markets, and raw materials”. In other terms, economic hegemony requires a certain de-
gree of political control over trade and financial markets in a certain region. 
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American countries to skirt their penalization in global capital 
markets and Western international financial institutions, such as 
the IMF and the World Bank (Gallagher et al., 2012). 
While the literature on Latin America-China relations grew expo-
nentially, to my best knowledge there is no research carried out in 
order to understand how Latin Americans perceive China’s new 
protagonist role in light of a potential US-China rivalry for influ-
ence in the region, and, if  this perception has affected their overall 
evaluation of  Chinese engagement with their countries. Research 
on this type of  issues is also very incipient for other countries (see 
Scotto and Reifler 2016). In this chapter, I use survey data from 
The Americas and the World Project (TAW) applied in 2015 on six 
Latin American countries, totaling 6829 observations, to put to 
test two hypotheses derived from the findings of previous chap-
ters: (1) the appraisal a person will do of  China’s relations with its 
home country will be more positive if  China is perceived as being 
an alternative to counterbalancing US’s influence and ; (2) the for-
mer effect will be mitigated if  the person has a negative opinion 
about the Chinese diaspora living in his/her home country. 
The next section of  this chapter presents a discussion on China’s 
presence in Latin America from the standpoint of  public opinion 
and identifies two hypotheses that flow from it. Subsequently, the 
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chapter outlines the empirical approach to evaluating the hypoth-
eses. Using the aforementioned surveys applied in six Latin Amer-
ican countries, I test empirically the two hypotheses using ordered 
logistic models. This is followed by a discussion of the results 
from the statistical analysis. The chapter concludes by highlighting 
the policy implications of  the findings and defining a research 
agenda. 
 
Why would the Chinese assertiveness in Latin America af-
fect public opinion? 
 
It has become nearly conventional wisdom that China’s rise rep-
resents a significant change in the global distribution of  power. 
Indeed, the figures are telling. For over three decades, GDP in 
China has growth nearly ten per cent a year and it has lifted over 
eight hundred million people out of  poverty. This represents the 
fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history. It also 
has the biggest banking sector and its stock market is second only 
to the United States. China is now top trade partner of  twice as 
many countries as the US and its economy and its military budget 
are the world’s second-biggest. For all its current economic con-
straints, China has definitely secured a prominent place in world 
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politics and will remain one of the few states with the potential to 
alter the strategic landscape in the years to come. 
Yet, China’s rise resists facile classifications. China may be a global 
power, but it has so far been reluctant to transform its where-
withal into a more coercive diplomacy, and it has consistently 
avoided being seen as having hegemonic pretensions. As I dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, even describing Chinese rise as assertive has 
been a matter of  great academic debate. Beijing has also em-
braced, both domestically and abroad, the logic of  capitalism, but 
it has been reluctant to endorse any kind of democratic overture. 
In the last decade or so, China has been, and will continue to be, 
an outspoken stakeholder openly discussing issues such as arms 
control, global trade, climate change or nuclear proliferation, but 
it did it so from a highly elaborated and deeply entrenched local 
standpoint, namely nationalism, autonomy, and development. 
Last, China has developed a complex, sophisticated network of  
South-South cooperation partnerships in order to play with alter-
native arrangements to those designed by the West, yet it has 
avoided direct confrontation with Northern, established democ-
racies (recall Chapter 3 findings, for example). The fundamental 
ambiguities that China exhibits today might explain why its asser-




Within the discipline of International Relations, the emergence 
of  China has followed predictable lines, but the more telling dis-
cussion is about the shifting balance of  power between China and 
the US and its implications for global stability. The literature ex-
ploring this dynamic is rich and complex, although it can be orga-
nized along two competing narratives. The first narrative is the 
pessimistic one and puts together hegemonic stability theory (Gil-
pin 1981), power transition theory (Organski 1958; Lemke 2004; 
Tammen and Kugler 2006; Lim 2015) and offensive realism 
(Mearsheimer 2001, 2010).  
These theories agree that as the Chinese economy continues to 
grow, political rivalry and confrontation between Beijing and 
Washington will only increase and such struggle for status may 
probably end up with hegemonic war. This view implies that, un-
less China’s economy is able to grow without disturbing other 
powers’ spheres of  influence – as the United States grew to the 
Pacific, the Caribbean and Latin America in the late 19th century–
the Chinese geo-economic expansion will increasingly challenge 
United States trade and financial hegemony. An agreement on 
spheres of  influences is essential for a peaceful change (Gilpin 
1981, 207), and since these agreements are hard to obtain, this 
theoretical camp draws parallels between the Chinese assertive-
ness and the bellicose ascent of  Wilhelmine Germany. 
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The second narrative has a more optimistic tone. Proponents of 
balance of power theory, power diffusion, and defensive realism 
(Schweller and Pu 2011, Zakaria 2011; Mastanduno 2009), to-
gether with most non-realist scholars (Buzan and Cox 2013; 
Ikenberry 2009) believe that the stability of  a future bi- or multi-
polar world is possible if  China decides to respect “the rules of  
the game” (Yeophantong 2013) and “not to challenge other pow-
ers in their hemispheres” (Odgaard 2013, 239). This second camp 
emphasizes the similarities with the smoother American rise in 
the 20th century and believe that the logic of  global capitalism 
and the growing interdependence between China and the United 
States are drawing these countries into a thickening web of insti-
tutional arrangements, reducing therefore the incentives for con-
flict on both sides.  
Being the backbone of  United States hegemony in the Western 
Hemisphere, Latin America provides unique conditions for those 
trying to discern whether China will undermine such hegemony 
– i.e. behaving as a challenger or ‘revolutionary revisionist’– or ac-
commodate to it, as a status quo or a ‘reformist revisionist’ (Buzan 
2010) power would do. China’s increasing relations with Latin 
America has been a game-changer for the region. It is, in 2015, 
the largest trading partner for Brazil, Chile and Peru and the sec-
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ond destination for exports from Argentina and Venezuela. Fur-
ther, China, has entered into several free trade agreements, includ-
ing Chile (2006), Perú (2010), and Costa Rica (2011). Yet, it is little 
known how the Chinese ‘going out’ strategy has been perceived 
by public opinion. From public opinion surveys carried out in the 
region we know two things: (a) that China enjoys a positive image 
in Latin America (Figures 23 and 24) and that (b) the image of  
the United States is very ambivalent, that is, it has a large variance 
(Figure 25 and 26). What we do not know, however, is if  these 
two are correlated and understanding this relation is the gap this 
chapter tries to bridge.  
 
   
FIGURE 22: How would you rate the relations between your 
country and China? (2015). Note: Elaborated by the authors 






FIGURE 23: Figure 23 disaggregated for the countries of this study. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors using data from Latinobarometer.  
 
There are two observations to make from figures 4 and 5. First, 
that the average perception towards the US has remained rela-
tively stable during the last 20 years, and that at simple view it is 
not negative as expected. Second, that the mean itself  has any 
value without also looking at its standard deviation, as perceptions 
variate enormously within the existing the sample. When we look 
at the latest available data for the countries in our sample, we ob-
serve that the dotted lines, containing 95% of the values, include 
both very positive and very negative appraisals, and they all have 




FIGURE 24: Average opinion about the US in Latin America per year.  
Source: Elaborated by the authors using data from Latinobarometer. The 




FIGURE 26: Average opinion about the US in 2015 by country.  




Taking these figures as a starting point, and before moving to test-
ing the chapter’s hypotheses, some conceptual clarifications 
should be made. Anti-Americanism is a longstanding phenome-
non that transcends borders and that can be briefly defined as a 
“psychological tendency to hold negative views of  the United 
States and of  American society in general” (Katzenstein and Keo-
hane, 2007: 16). As a way of  an example, not only in the Arab 
world (Rubin, 2002) or Russia (Shiraev, 2000), but also in regions 
in which the United States has stablished more friendly relations, 
such as Europe (Gienow-Hecht, 2006), anti-Americanism has 
been a constant in large sectors of many societies. Nevertheless, 
even when it may appear to be one of many, Latin American anti-
Americanism is unique in its case. In this regard, following Rubin-
stein and Smith (1988) theoretical framework, there can be distin-
guished among three main types of  anti-Americanisms in the re-
gion30. 
In the first place, the most extended way of anti-Americanism 
among Latin Americans is the one we can define as issue-ori-
ented, a pattern of  outbursts directed against US policies and ac-
tions itself. Since the emergence of  Monroe doctrine, Washington 
                                                          
30 In fact, the authors distinguish between four types. Nevertheless, we will not consider 
the revolutionary one – trying to take from power regimes supported by the United 
States - because with the exception of Sandinismo in Nicaragua, none revolutionary move-
ment arrived to power in Latin America through the weapons, strategy that in turn 
seems less probable in our days.  
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has explicitly declared that Latin America was part of its area of  
influence (Dent, 1999) and, consequently, has interfered in the re-
gion in many opportunities when its interests were under threat 
(Smith, 2008; Long, 2015). Hence, besides American real inten-
tions, a considerable proportion of  Latin Americans have histor-
ically perceived that United States actions reduced their countries’ 
autonomy and development (Sweig, 2006), boosting an anti-
American feeling extended equally among intellectuals and elites 
(Radu, 2004), as well as the average population (McPherson, 2004: 
147). 
Secondly, other variant of anti-Americanism is what the authors 
describe as ideological, a belief  that the United States is the villain 
in the world and that American society epitomizes decadence and 
godless materialism (Rubinstein and Smith, 1988: 39). In this case, 
the core of critics are not American policies itself, but a cultural 
imperialism that would corrupt traditions through the expansion 
of  the American way of living. Even when nowadays this type is 
much more common between radical Islamic movements, ideo-
logical anti-Americanism has fueled leftist movements all around 
Latin America, being the Cuban revolution and armed branches 




Finally, we can also see all around the region and in different peri-
ods of  time, how anti-American sentiments have been activated 
by several political movements in order to take advantage in the 
electoral domain. From the slogan “Braden o Peron” in Argen-
tina during the 40s (Dorn, 2006), up to Hugo Chavez famous dis-
course at United Nations in 2006 in which he called then  presi-
dent G.W. Bush “the devil”, anti-Americanism has been used in-
strumentally with the objective to mobilize domestic support. 
Therefore, anti-Americanism has been a site used mainly by pop-
ulist movements in order to construct a discourse of  “us-el 
pueblo” in contrast with “them-el imperio” (Laclau, 2005). 
Upon this review, and given the longstanding anti-American sen-
timent among Latin Americans and its different sources and sub-
types, I expect that for the period of  study 
 
Hypothesis 1: The appraisal a person does of  China’s relations 
with its home country will be more positive if  China is perceived 
by that person as being an alternative to counterbalancing US’s 
hegemonic influence; 
 
In addition, besides controlling for socioeconomic and political 
variables that have previously shown to affect political attitudes 
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towards domestic issues31, I believe that there might be other var-
iables that should be considered in our analysis in the case of  for-
eign affairs, due to its particularities. Since its inception, the tradi-
tional literature on public opinion and foreign affairs suggested 
that the average citizen has low interest and inconsistent percep-
tions about foreign issues (Lippmann, 1932; Almond, 1970). 
Since the 80s, however, what used to be known as the Lippmann-
Almond consensus started to be contested. More recent studies 
have shown that foreign policy problems may gain more salience 
during electoral periods (Aldrich at al., 2006) and, therefore, that 
public opinion attitudes are taken into consideration by policy-
makers while formulating foreign policy (Foyle, 2004).  
On the other hand, through a longitudinal analysis, Page and 
Shapiro, among others, have found empirical evidence that for the 
American case public opinion perceptions regarding foreign pol-
icy were more stable than was previously thought (Shapiro and 
Page, 1988; Page and Shapiro, 1992). Departing from this new 
evidence, the question moved from whether it was relevant to 
study public opinion and foreign policy, to which are the determi-
nants that explain public opinion perceptions on this topic. 
                                                          
31 As a way of an example, traditional literature on public opinion and political knowledge 
has shown that variables such as the level of education (Galston, 2001), income (Carpini 
and Keeter, 1993), gender (Mondak and Anderson, 2004) and ideology (Michaud et al., 
2009) might explain differences on political perceptions at the individual level. 
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As stated for any domestic issues, perceptions about foreign af-
fairs can be explained in part by socioeconomic and ideological 
preferences at the individual level. Notwithstanding, context also 
matters and the role mass media displays on shaping public per-
ceptions on foreign issues is outstanding (Hill, 2003). In the end, 
most citizens do not have direct contact with what happens on 
other countries and mass media is the only channel through 
which they receive information about foreign affairs (Soroka, 
2003). Without entering on the discussion about how media can 
influence public perceptions, we would like to pick an idea about 
the aforementioned argument: the average citizen has no contact 
with foreign affairs and the sources of  information it has about 
other countries are limited (Puglisi and Snyder, 2008: 3).  
However, there is a source of  contact at the domestic level with 
the foreign word, namely, the immigration diasporas. For much 
of  the average population, all the knowledge they have about a 
foreign culture is reduced to what can be accessed in their own 
cities via culinary experiences, appraisals of the level of  education 
and respect for social norms of  these diasporas, their appearance 




Hipothesis 2: The effect expected on Hipothesis 1 was mitigated 
if  the person had a negative opinion about the Chinese diaspora 
living in his/her home country.  
 
The World Bank estimates that in 2013 there were 247 million 
China migrants in the world (World Bank, 2016), and that Chinese 
migration to Latin America has increased over the past fifteen 
years. As we can see in Figure 27, the big jump in migration has 
been in recent years, with the latest data available for 2013. 
 
  
FIGURE 27: Growth of Chinese diaspora in Latin America. 
Source: World Bank Data (2016). 
 
Data from the World Bank matches with recent estimates by the 
United Nations (2016), so we can be quite confident about these 
estimates (see figure 28). It is important, though, highlighting that 
these are estimates on first-generation migrants, and not on the 
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whole diaspora, which can be much harder to estimate. If  one 
walks around Lima, Perú, the sensation is that Chinese diaspora is 
very large due to the fact that it has very deep historical roots. 
 
  
FIGURE 28: Growth of Chinese diaspora in Latin America. 
Source: United Nations (2016). 
 
According to these sources, the largest Chinese diasporas are in 
Argentina and Venezuela. However, it is in Chile, Ecuador and 
Mexico where migration has grown the most in percentage terms 
relative to the 90's. This phenomenon of strong growth in recent 
years has generated some episodes of  xenophobia in cities like 
São Paulo (Marques, 2016), Lima (El Comercio, 2012) and Santi-
ago de Chile (Novoa, 2015). Also in Chile is where Chinese dias-
pora is the largest relative to total population, followed by Vene-





TABLE 16: Chinse diaspora in comparative perspective 
 % growth since 1990 As % of total population in 2015 
Argentina 348% 0.035% 
Chile 744% 0.045% 
Colombia 94% 0.004% 
Ecuador 811% 0.022% 
Mexico 657% 0.007% 
Peru 27% 0.014% 
Venezuela 95% 0.040% 
Source: Elaborated by the authors using data from World Bank (2016) and 
United Nations (2016) 
 
The existing peer-reviewed literature on Chinese immigration var-
ies from country to country and the figures reported by these 
works on the size of  the diaspora often do not correspond with 
those estimated by the data we used. 
 In Peru, for example, where the history of Chinese immigration 
dates back to the 1850s when 100,000 Cantonese were brought 
to work on plantations– these Chinese were locally known as 
‘coolies’, nowadays used as a demeaning term for Asians in gen-
eral—and replace slave labor after abolition (Stewart & Juilland, 
1976) over the decades coolies were assimilated to local popula-
tion, and in major cities, especially Lima, Chinese communities 
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had strong economic weight in the commercial sector. Because 
many Chinese are second and third generations, official figures 
underestimate this historical Chinese migration phenomenon. In 
addition, in the social imaginary, people confuse Chinese and Jap-
anese descendants, and they tend to be seen as the same thing. A 
good example of  this is that Japanese ex-president Alberto Fu-
jimori was known as “El Chino” (“Chinaman”). 
Another difficulty comes at distinguishing migrants from main-
land China and Taiwanese. There is academic works on this topic 
coming from Argentina, mostly specific to the city of Buenos 
Aires where the Taiwanese diaspora is the largest in the country 
and probably in the region (Bogado Bordazar, 2012) 
Chinese immigration in Argentina started strong in the 80´s and 
while during this period most of  the immigrants were of Taiwan-
ese origin, during the 90´ immigrants this trend reversed and most 
immigrants arrived from the continent. In the last ten years or so, 
the Chinese community has turned toward managing small super-
markets (there are more than ten thousands now dotted through-
out the country). This economic activity is strongly rooted in the 
imaginary that Argentines have of the Chinese living in the coun-







This chapter examines Latin American perceptions regarding the 
US-China geopolitical rivalry by using data from a survey con-
ducted in 2015 in six Latin American countries, namely Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru. This survey is, at the 
time this chapter is being written, the latest conducted under 
TAW Project, an ongoing research project aimed at studying pub-
lic opinion and political culture in the Americas on key issues in 
foreign policy and International Relations. It is led by the Mexican 
Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE), which 
collaborates with selected universities in all countries relevant to 
our study32. For each of  them national representative samples 
were built, considering each country’s specificities and following 
strict methodological criteria33.  
                                                          
32 The following institutions were involved in the project: Universidad de San Andrés 
(Argentina); Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidad de São Paulo (Brazil); 
Universidad de Chile (Chile); Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); Facultad Latinoame-
ricana de Ciencias Sociales (Ecuador); Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas 
(México); Universidad Católica del Perú (Perú). We excluded Brazil from the simple 
since the question we used to create our dependent variable was not asked.  
33 The samples were geographically representative of rural and urban populations, and 
socioeconomic variables such as class and income were also taken into account. A total 
of 10 544 interviews were conducted, comprising the following: Argentina (N=1 030), 
Chile (N=1 206), Colombia (N=1 500), Ecuador (N=1 800), Mexico (N=2 400), and 
Peru (N=1 200). 
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As a dependent variable, it was used a question which captures 
the perception of  Chinese assertiveness in each country individ-
ually: “Overall, how would you rate the influence of  China in your 
country, negative or positive?” The original question was ordinal, 
ranging from very positive (1) to very negative (5). I added up the 
positive answers into one category and the negative in other and 
excluded from the analysis those who answered ‘nor negative nor 
positive’, which were originally 4.2% of the observations. 
As independent variables I considered two questions, and their 
interaction. To measure if  the person believes it is positive if  
China reaches United States, I took into consideration the ques-
tion: “In your view, if  China's economy grows to be as large as 
the United States', do you think that this would be positive for the 
world?” whose answer is “yes” or “no”. To measure the person’s 
appraisal of  the Chinese diaspora it was considered the following 
question: “What is your overall opinion on Chinese living in your 
country?” and created a dummy variable which assumes value ‘1’ 
when the opinion on the Chinese diaspora is smaller than the av-
erage of  all other nationalities being asked (American, Spanish, 
Bolivian, Peruvian, Uruguayan, Equatorial).  
As controls I used the appraisal the person did of American in-
fluence in Latin America, the person’s age, overall evaluation of  
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other diasporas to control for general xenophobic reactions, gen-
der, economic situation, political ideology (as a right left scale) and 
degree of  information on international issues. 
 
TABLE 17: Description of  variables 
Variables Detail Type Mean SD Min. Max. 
Dependent variable      
Chinese influ-
ence 
"Overall, how would you rate the 
influence of China in your coun-
try, positive (1) or negative (0)?" 
Dummy 0.78 0.4 0 1 
Independent variables 
     
Good if China 
surpasses US 
"In your view, if China's econ-
omy grows to be as large as the 
United States', do you think that 
this would be positive for the 
world?" Yes (1), No (0). 
Dummy 0.54 0.5 0 1 
Chinese dias-
pora 
=1 if opinion about Chinese di-
aspora is worse than the average 
opinion of other immigrants 
Dummy 0.25 0.43 0 1 




“on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 
means ‘very negative’ and 7 ‘very 
positive’, what’s your opinion 
about US’s actions in Latin 
America”  






Average opinion  very positive 
(1)  to very negative (5) of other 
immigrants (Spanish, American, 
Chilean, Colombian, Ecuadorian, 
Bolivian, Peruvian) 
Continuous 2.66 0.72 1 5 
       
Age Person's age in years Discrete 41.12 16.3 16 92 
Gender Male = 1, Female=0 Dummy 0.48 0.5 0 1 
Economic sit-
uation 
"With the total family income, 
would you say it enough or not 
enough to live well?" 
Dummy 0.54 0.5 0 1 
Ideology 
"Where would you locate your-
self on a scale of 0 to 10, where 
0 means 'politically leftist' and 10 
'politically rightist'?" 
Discrete 5.2 2.49 0 10 
Degree of in-
formation 
"How much are you interested in 
news about you country's rela-
tions with other countries?" Very 
interested (1) - Not interested at 
all (5) 
Ordinal 2.01 0.93 1 5 
 
Afterwards I tested for multicollinearity problems among the co-
variates and found no problematic values. Then, in order to see 
how the aforementioned perceptions affected the idea Latin 
Americans have from their relation with China, I defined a hier-




Is there a relationship in citizen’s perception? 
 
I tested two models, one with the three independent variables to 
put the hypotheses to test, and a second model which adds the 
controls. The findings show that both the hypotheses tested in 
this chapter are confirmed. Regarding the first hypothesis, Latin 
Americans have a better perception of  Chinese engagement in 
their country when they see with good eyes that US loses pre-
eminence in the international arena against China. This finding 
dialogues with a rich literature of anti-Americanism in the region. 
Overall, the chances that a person thinks China is a good partner 
increase more than nine times when the person believes that it 
would be positive if  China reached US in economic terms. These 
effects are very large in magnitude. Furthermore, for all the coun-
tries, the former effect is mitigated when the person has a negative 
perception of Chinese immigrants. Overall, the chances are re-







TABLE 18: Regression models of  public opinion 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coeff. P-value Odds Ratios  Coeff. P-value Odds Ratios 
Good if China sur-
passes USA 
 
2.21 0.000 9.12  2.13 0.000 9.42 
Negative perception 
of Chinese diaspora 
 
-0.32 0.000 0.72  -0.41 0.000 0.64 
Good if China sur-
passes USA x Chi-
nese diaspora 
 
-0.40 0.002 0.66  -0.45 0.001 0.62 
Controls:        
US's influence in 
Latin America  
 
− − −  0.11 0.000 1.09 
General opinion of 
immigrants 
 
− − −  -0.40 0.000 0.70 
Age 
 
− − −  -0.007 0.002 0.99 
Male 
 
− − −  0.07 0.942 1.00 
Income  
 
− − −  -0.001 0.451 1.00 
Ideology 
 




− − −  -0.09 0.034 0.91 
Constant 
 





6829  4455 
Number of countries 6  6 
LR test against lo-
gistic model 
0.000  0.000 
Chi-squared test 0.000   0.000 
 
 
These findings prove that the dynamics observed in chapter 2 had 
domestic effects in Latin American countries, and is shaping the 
way citizens perceive American hegemony in the region.  The fol-
lowing two chapters will explore domestic effects of the China 




Chapter 5 – The destabilizing effect of China 




In chapter 2 I discussed empirical evidence that supports the main 
hypothesis of this thesis, namely, that between 2001 and 2015 
there was a negative relationship between the Chinese assertive-
ness and the American hegemony in Latin America. Chapter 4 
explored the consequences of those findings on public opinion, 
finding that citizens were also sensitive to this dynamics. Now, in 
chapter 5, and also in chapter 6, I explore a different unit of  anal-
ysis: political decision makers. While politicians share characteris-
tics with common citizens, its role makes them an interesting unit 
of  analysis. This and the next chapter study issues that caught 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on the published article: Urdinez, F., Lopez Burian, C. & Ribeiro, 
P.F. (2016). New Global Studies: https://doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2015-0015. This chapter 
was written in July 2016, before the FTA between China and Uruguay gained public in-
terest in September, and Uruguayan president openly assumed the country’s intention of 
signing a FTA with China. 
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much media attention in 2015 and 2016 whose policy conse-
quences help to understand how China is perceived politically in 
Latin America. 
 
China and the ‘Uruexit’ 
 
Uruguay, with only 3.4 million people, is highly dependent on for-
eign markets, and trade represents 52% of its economy2 (World 
Bank, 2015). The country has long requested that the two largest 
members of the MERCOSUR, namely Argentina and Brazil, 
support access to new markets through, on the one hand, the ad-
vancement of  FTA negotiations between the block and the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) and, on the other hand, greater flexibility in 
the so-called FTA clause (clause 32/00), which would allow mem-
bers to freely negotiate bilateral treaties with other countries3. 
Currently, I argue, Uruguay is the member that is most willing to 
push the agenda of  making MERCOSUR a more flexible institu-
tion in terms of  trade integration4.  
                                                          
2 Measured through an openness index: (Xt+Mt)/GDPt 
3 An example of this is the waiver given to countries belonging to the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA) to sign trade agreements, which led to FTA negotiations 
between Mexico and Uruguay.  
4 There is a debate in the literature on the progress made by MERCOSUR in the process 
of integration among its members. Although authors cite a rigidity crisis in trade integra-
tion, they also mention the progress made in areas such as infrastructure, social issues 
and political rights (Carranza, 2003; Paiva & Gazel, 2003; Arieti, 2005; Malamud, 2005; 
Caetano, 2011; Doctor, 2013; Gómez-Mera, 2014; Baer & Elizagaray, 2014). 
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Although the United States has historically been the most attrac-
tive market for Uruguayan governments, China is also an appeal-
ing alternative. In 2006, the president of  the Chinese National As-
sembly, Wu Bangguo, visited Uruguay and began discussions to-
ward pursuing a bilateral negotiation for deeper relations. Both 
governments signed three agreements: a Chinese preferential loan 
of  220 million yuan (over US$ 27 million) and two agreements 
concerning economic and technical cooperation for 20 million 
and 10 million yuan, respectively (US$ 2.5 million and US$ 1.2 
million). During that visit, President Tabaré Vázquez said, “It is 
virtually agreed that a Joint Commission between the two coun-
tries will begin to study mechanisms to improve trade between 
Uruguay and the People’s Republic of  China”5. Since then, the 
Joint Commission has advanced trade negotiations through sev-
eral bilateral meetings in Montevideo and Beijing. 
During President Wen Jiabao’s visit to South America in 2012, he 
expressed great interest in discussing an FTA with MERCOSUR 
members6. At that time, Uruguayan president José Mujica argued 
that “[…] we all know what China means and we should not be 
                                                          
5 The declaration was taken from the Presidency website: http://archivo.presiden-
cia.gub.uy/_Web/noticias/2006/08/2006083014.htm, accessed on May 2015.  
6 By that moment China had signed three FTAs in Latin America: with Chile (in force 
since 2006), Peru (in force since 2010) and Costa Rica (signed in 2011) (Dosch & Good-
man, 2012: 9). 
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ashamed of saying it: the great big buyer and seller of  our time”7. 
What Mujica did not say is that every FTA that MERCOSUR had 
negotiated as a block with large economies had stagnated due to 
internal discussions among Member States. Would it be possible 
to negotiate an FTA with China bilaterally? All aling 2016 this 
topic gained so much attention that came to be known as 
‘Uruexit’ (Martinez, 2016).  
This chapter aims at disentangling through case-study techniques 
the effects of  the China-US emerging rivalry in Latin America in 
the domestic politics of  these countries. The structure of  this 
chapter is as follows: In the next section, I discuss the recent his-
tory of  Uruguay’s foreign policy in light of  its membership in 
MERCOSUR and its search for partners outside the region. I 
then develop our hypotheses, relying on the International Political 
Theory literature. Thereafter, I explain our empirical strategy and 
describe our dependent and independent variables. I capture leg-
islators’ perceptions through an extensive survey carried out by 
political scientist Camilo López Burian. The empirical results are 
then presented and discussed.  
 
                                                          
7 Declaration taken from La Nación (Argentina) (26/06/2012). China asks Mercosur for 
a free trade agreement. Available at: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1485264-china-
plantea-al-mercosur-un-acuerdo-de-libre-comercio (accessed 06/05/2015). 
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Trapped between “openness to the world” and “commit-
ment to the region” 
 
Although MERCOSUR has previously considered FTAs with 
the United States and EU8, China has become a major foreign 
actor due to its increasing economic relevance. In Uruguay, for 
example, in less than 15 years, between 2001 and 2015, China 
went from the country’s 4th to 1st trade partner and, as reflected 
in Figure 1, trade with China has grown at a faster pace than that 
with Argentina, Brazil, the EU or the United States in the last dec-
ade. In 2014, trade with China was 2.7 times larger than that with 
the United States and 10 times larger than that with the EU, and 
China was Uruguay’s most important trade partner for both ex-
ports and imports, followed by Brazil—its historical main mar-
ket—and this trend is expected to continue in coming years (UN 
Comtrade, 2015).  
                                                          
8 Between 1992 and 1995, progress was made in negotiating an FTA with the EU, which 
later stagnated, and in 2015—as of this writing—the negotiations continue. Further-
more, in 1991, seeking to move towards an FTA with USA, the Rose Garden Agreement 
was signed (also called the “4 + 1 agreement”) within the framework of the Enterprise 
for the Americas Initiative, a program intended to increase hemispheric trade, released 




FIGURE 25: Uruguay’s bilateral trade with its main partners. 
Note: Elaborated using Comtrade data. 
 
In 1999, the devaluation of the Brazilian currency started a crisis 
among MERCOSUR countries. In Argentina, the economic cri-
sis led to the worst political and institutional crisis in the country’s 
history, and in Uruguay, the crisis also had a marked social impact. 
The strategy developed by the Member States of  MERCOSUR 
was to re-launch the integration process with the aim of creating 
an operational common market, an objective that had been post-
poned since 1991. In this context, in June 2000, the Common 
Market Council (CMC)9 approved decision 32/00 (referred as 
“FTA clause”). Article 1 reaffirmed “[...] the commitment of  
                                                          
9 This is one of the three decision-making bodies of Mercosur. It has decision-making 
authority over important issues and is composed of the Foreign Ministers and Finance 
Ministers of the Member States. 
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Member States of MERCOSUR to jointly negotiate agreements 
of  a commercial nature with third countries (or groups of  coun-
tries) outside the zone in which tariff  preferences are granted”, 
and Article 2 stated that one year after the approval of the “FTA 
clause”, the “[...] Member States may not sign new agreements [...] 
which have not been negotiated by MERCOSUR.” 
There is a normative discussion regarding the capacity of  enforce-
ment of  Decision 32/00 because it was not incorporated into the 
domestic legal systems of any of the MERCOSUR Member 
States. In sum, those who seek greater flexibility claim that the 
“FTA Clause” is not applicable for incorporation into national 
legislation. However, those in favor of  MERCOSUR insist on the 
political importance that the clause has for the integration process. 
The debate between these different visions continues. 
In December 2001, China formally became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which had a substantial im-
pact on its integration into the world economy in the following 
years (Ianchovichina & Martin, 2001). However, it was not until 
five or six years later that China surpassed the United States as 
Uruguay’s third main trade partner, and the increasing role played 
by China in the Uruguayan domestic economy coincided with a 
declining influence exerted by the United States in the domestic 
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political debate. Before then, the United States was Uruguay’s only 
serious alternative to Brazilian leadership in the region.  
From 2000 to 2005, the Uruguayan government was in the hands 
of  the liberal Colorado Party (PC). During his tenure, President 
Jorge Batlle increased Uruguay’s openness to free trade by ap-
proaching the United States and distancing the country from 
MERCOSUR. That foreign policy failed to achieve consensus in 
the political arena. His campaign for free trade led him to take 
advantage of  a waiver granted by MERCOSUR to its members 
to sign trade agreements with member countries of LAIA. In this 
context, in 2003, Uruguay signed an FTA with Mexico10. With 
the leftist Frente Amplio (FA) occupying the presidency in Uru-
guay after President Batlle’s term, the Uruguayan government ex-
pressed its opposition to the FTAA during the Fourth Summit of 
the Americas and aligned with MERCOSUR under Brazilian 
leadership.  
However, between 2006 and 2007, Uruguayan discomfort with 
MERCOSUR increased. A bilateral dispute with Argentina over 
the installation of cellulose processing plants on the Uruguay 
River margin (the border between the two countries) was the 
main reason for this discomfort (Payne, 2011). In an attempt to 
resolve the dispute, Uruguay moved closer to Brazil by calling for 
                                                          
10 AAP CE No. 60 within the framework of LAIA. 
178 
 
greater Brazilian involvement to resolve the dispute, which did 
not occur. In a move that International Relations theory would 
characterize as a classic bandwagoning strategy (Waltz, 1979), the 
FA, counting on a parliamentary majority, evaluated the possibility 
of  signing an FTA with the United States and abandoning the 
regional block.  
The proposal came from the more centrist wing of the FA, led 
by Economy Minister Danilo Astori, who initially had the support 
of  President Vázquez and the favorable opinion of  the business 
sectors and the opposition parties. The left wing of  the FA, led 
by the Foreign Minister Reinaldo Gargano, combined trade un-
ions and a set of  neo-developmentalist intellectuals who opposed 
the proposal. Fears of  economic retaliation from Argentina and 
Brazil influenced the decision. Finally, the president ended the ne-
gotiations under the justification that the proposed terms were 
not beneficial for the country (Garcé 2014). 
As trade increased (see Figure 26), China began to be considered 
an appealing partner, particularly because efforts to strengthen 
ties with the United States had already proven to be a failure. In 
2009, Uruguay recognized China as having Market Economy Sta-
tus within the WTO during President Vázquez’ official visit to 
Beijing. Between 2013 and 2014, under the government of  José 
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Mujica, Uruguay began to discuss the possibility of  Uruguay be-
coming a full member of the Pacific Alliance, an alternative that 
would give Uruguay greater access to the Pacific, and in particular, 
to the Chinese market11. The proposal, as in the case of  the FTA 
with the United States, was promoted by then Vice President 
Danilo Astori, leader of the centrist wing of the FA. Both the 
National Party (PN) and the PC, together with the business sec-
tor, considered this a beneficial proposal. The left wing of  the FA 
objected, insisting on the importance of  respecting the rules of  
MERCOSUR and the costs of  political isolation from Argentina 
and Brazil.  
Currently, there are two opposing viewpoints within the FA. The 
left wing of  the FA, favoring regionalism, leans towards Brazilian 
leadership and encourages South-South relations. The center-
right wing of  the FA, by contrast, supports a model of  “open 
regionalism”, a euphemism that means more flexible rules within 
MERCOSUR to allow bilateral negotiations of trade agreements 
with third countries. The right-wing parties, PN and PC, advocate 
for relaxing the block’s “FTA clause”, and among its most radical 
members, leaving MERCOSUR is a tempting idea (López Burian 
2015). 
                                                          
11 Despite China being merely an Observer and not a full member. The Member States 
are all Latin American countries with coastlines on the Pacific Ocean: Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru.  
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The current political debate in Uruguay on international insertion 
focuses on “openness to the world” versus “commitment to the 
region”. In the FA government program for the period 2015 - 
2020, China is described as an actor of  great importance, both 
commercially and politically, at the international level12. Overall, it 
is described as an attractive partner, but potential asymmetries and 
the importance of  maintaining political and economic sover-
eignty during negotiations is also highlighted13. China went from 
being an insignificant partner to the main trade partner through 
its active engagement in the region in terms of trade, foreign in-
vestments and financing (Urdinez et al, 2015). 
 
Formalizing a hypothesis on Brazil-China competition in 
Mercosur 
                                                          
12 “China participates in the main international organizations—both economic and polit-
ical—on an equal footing with other powers. We regard a China growing in Africa, 
where it is the main economic partner, a China that expands its Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in Southeast Asia, and a China that is increasing the dynamism of the economies of 
Latin American countries. In this regard, the relationship with China must account for 
the principles of fairness and respect for political and economic sovereignty. China must 
understand its new role as a promoter of the global economy, as a new factor of equilib-
rium between powers and as an alternative to enable mutual growth. Commercial, cul-
tural, touristic, political and military agreements with China must be mutually advanta-
geous and recognize the asymmetries between the two "(FA, 2014: 140-141).  
13 “Any negotiation to conclude bilateral or multilateral trade agreements should ensure 
the needs and objectives of national development. The terms on which they agree to ne-
gotiate in areas such as competition rules, government procurement, intellectual prop-
erty, services or technical barriers to trade should not impair the country's sustainable 
development, its labor sources or its power to implement public policies. Particularly, it 
should not affect the strategy of integration that has been taking place, especially our pri-




This chapter will understand foreign policy decisions as a two-
level game. This implies that domestic politics condition (and are 
conditioned by) foreign policy. The actors, in both arenas, are in-
dividual or collective. These actors formulate goals that guide their 
strategy, rationally using their resources to implement it. Further-
more, they are interrelated within institutional frameworks, which 
define both formal and informal rules (Acuña and Chudnovsky, 
2013). From these definitions, countries’ preferences are ex-
pressed by an array of actors: political parties, their factions and 
their legislators, are major domestic players in the Uruguayan case. 
The reason is that in Uruguay, the Foreign Service is not an iso-
lated bureaucracy; hence, corporations, unions and business ac-
tors use political parties as the main agents for mediating and rep-
resenting their interests. 
Reviving Ikenberry’s (1996) classic definition of  leadership, a re-
gional leader must: (a) possess the aspirations and resources nec-
essary to assume such a position; and (b) enjoy recognition and 
acceptance from its neighbors, especially by other regional middle 
powers, which are the only ones that could counterbalance its 
power. Using this definition as a guide, we analyze if  Uruguayan 
policymakers recognize Brazilian leadership vis a vis the material 
goods China provides the small nation. From a constructivist 
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standpoint, the idea of leadership is not merely a title but a con-
struction that depends on both the leader’s own aspirations and 
the recognition of its followers. As Wehner (2015) puts it, to lead 
means that the leader’s initiatives are based on a symbolic legiti-
macy that exceeds its material capabilities, which in turn would 
explain why other regional nations consent to be led. When we 
apply this thinking to our own analysis, we argue that Brazil’s role 
does not exclusively depend on its self-awareness as the dominant 
material power in the region. It also depends on other nations’ 
perceptions of  itself, specifically whether or not the other regional 
actors recognize Brasilia as holding this specific status. In addition, 
Brazil’s functionality as a leader depends on whether the second-
ary powers either support or resist its desire for greater global 
power (Wehner 2015:438). 
There were reasons, at least until mid-2015, to theorize that the 
perception a legislator has of  Brazilian leadership would influence 
the likelihood of  supporting an FTA with China. Brazil emerged 
in the last two decades as the most powerful country in South 
America, economically and politically (Schenoni, 2014) which 
raised great interest among International Relations scholars14. At 
                                                          
14 The literature on Brazilian leadership peaked in 2010 but has steadily diminished since 
then which, I assume, is a sign that the idea is now being revisited by scholars.  
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the height of  its international projection during Lula’s govern-
ment (2003-2011) it attempted to promote IBSA forum (de 
Oliveira & Onuki, 2010; Schor, 2014), interfere as a mediator in 
the Iranian nuclear program (Jesus, 2012), and even get a seat in 
the Security Coucil of  United Nations (Mendes, 2015) In recent 
years, however, China has been regarded as a natural competitor 
of  Brazil in South America, the latter’s area of natural influence 
(Vadell, 2013; Jenkins, 2014; Burges, 2015) and China represents 
a potential partner for Uruguay to balance against Brazilian influ-
ence (Waltz, 1979; Genna & Hiroi, 2005; Merke, 2015). China, at 
the same time, has used trade agreements and its economic weight 
as a strategy of  Soft Power (Houlden & Schmidt, 2014).  
The role attributed to Brazil in the regional integration process 
also has normative implications. For example, Brazil has been 
identified as the leader in the South American region (Saraiva, 
2010) the exponent of a “post-liberal regionalism project” in 
South America (Sanahuja, 2010) and a country that could im-
prove the “regionness” in South America (Hettne & Söderbaum, 
2006). For all these reasons, a congressman in favor of Brazilian 
leadership could be considered less likely to support any initiative 
that could potentially hamper this leadership.  
The first hypothesis I want to test in this chapter is 
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Hypothesis 1: those Uruguayan politicians who disagree with the 
affirmation that Brazil has to be the regional leader will be more 
likely to support an FTA with China because most will regard it 
as an opportunity to balance against Brazilian power in the region. 
I assume that regional economic integration produces winners 
and losers (Venables, 2003), and such losers are willing to break 
their commitment to remain members of  an agreement if  the 
benefits of doing so exceed the costs (Milgrom and North 1990; 
Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Greif, 1993). Given the lack of  formal 
enforcement within MERCOSUR, the costs of  breaking the 
rules remain primarily political (Levy, 1997; Grossman and Help-
man, 1995; Mansfield and Milner, 2012). From an economic per-
spective, it is clear that Uruguay would largely benefit from an 
FTA with China. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) found empirical ev-
idence that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two 
members’ bilateral trade after 10 years. If  such an agreement were 
reached in our case, China would surpass Brazil as Uruguay’s main 
trade partner in a few years. From a political standpoint, leaving 
MERCOSUR would be costly for Uruguay, and Brazil would be 
seen as a weak leader in the Southern Cone. 
There are also domestic costs to be considered. Suppose that an 
opportunity arises for these two countries to sign an FTA in the 
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near future. Would such an agreement be politically viable? Gross-
man and Helpman (1995) argue that when an FTA reduces many 
or all (bilateral) tariff  rates to zero, the negotiations pit the export 
interests in a country directly against the import-competing inter-
ests in the same country. The potential exporters covet preferen-
tial access to the partner’s market, whereas the import-competing 
industries seek to preserve their protection by scuttling any agree-
ment. This argument is in line with Rogowski (1989), who argues 
that increasing exposure to trade resulting from an FTA must re-
sult in urban-rural conflicts in economies that are abundant in 
land but scarce in capital and labor, such as Uruguay. Overall, the 
negotiation of an FTA is expected to produce political conflict 
among domestic economic sectors, which is likely to affect the 
negotiation.  
Furthermore, the incumbent government is in a position to set 
trade policy, which means that it can either work toward a FTA or 
terminate the discussions. Politicians may receive contributions 
from the various interest groups hoping to influence its decision. 
Politicians value these contributions— because they improve pol-
iticians’ re-election prospects or for other reasons—but they also 
may care about the well being of the average voter (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1995). The tradeoff  between representing the in-
terests of  the average voter and benefiting particular interests is 
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key to understanding the behavior of each legislator. This means 
that, apart from a purely economic cleavage, as described by 
Rogowski (1989), we can expect to find a political cleavage be-
tween incumbent and opposition parties.  
In the same direction, according to Mansfield and Milner (2012), 
trade agreements are often motivated by domestic political con-
ditions. Political leaders focus on how trade agreements can reas-
sure the public and domestic groups about their decision-making, 
but they also worry about domestic costs involved in ratifying 
agreements. A central domestic political cost of  signing a prefer-
ential trade agreement involves the ratification process. For an 
agreement to occur, governments and certain domestic groups 
have to believe that reaching an accord is preferable to the lack of 
one. The ratification cost can be directly inferred from legislators’ 
preferences. How can we capture their perceptions of  the costs 
of  negotiating an FTA with China? 
Levy (1997) proposed a scenario in which a simple majority of  
voters is required to pass a proposal. Agents are presented first 
with a potential bilateral FTA and then with a multilateral FTA. 
Each potential agreement offers agents new equilibrium prices 
and product varieties. They will approve a bilateral agreement only 
if  it is (a) preferable to a multilateral arrangement because it leads 
to higher welfare, or (b) if  the bilateral agreement will not prevent 
187 
 
the adoption of a preferred multilateral agreement. Because the 
second condition is not possible in MERCOSUR due to Clause 
32/00, legislators will only consider a bilateral FTA if  the benefits 
for representing interest groups are sufficiently large or if  the leg-
islators expect to benefit politically when they know that the FTA 
will provide the median voter with disproportionately large gains 
with relatively small losses. By asking legislators about MER-
COSUR membership costs and the personal costs of  supporting 
FTA negotiations based on their constituency and their party, we 
can infer the political determinants of  supporting this negotia-
tion.  
Derived from the classical literature we have discussed, I pro-
pose as a second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: the worse the opinion of  a congressperson regard-
ing Uruguay’s benefits from being a MERCOSUR member, the 
more likely he/she will be to support an FTA with China. 
There is also a set of  auxiliary hypotheses that I wish to test:  
The probability of supporting a bilateral FTA with China is con-
ditioned by whether the legislator is a member of  the incumbent 
party because the incumbent party has the power to advance the 
agenda and because a legislator from the incumbent party will 
face the costs of  MERCOSUR member retaliation (H3); right-
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wing congressional representatives are more open to FTAs than 
left wing congressmen because they are aligned ideologically with 
the agribusiness export sectors, which would gain from increased 
access to Chinese buyers (H4); legislators from urban areas (in 
Uruguay, these are mainly in Montevideo, which has approxi-
mately 40% of the country’s  population) are less likely to support 
an FTA with China because they are more sensitive to pressures 
from local small industrialists who would be substantially harmed 
by Chinese imports (H5). 
 
Research Design  
 
Although foreign policy in Uruguay is a constitutional responsi-
bility of  the Executive Branch, the Congress has an important 
role in the policy-making process in foreign affairs. The latter can 
constrain the actions of  the Executive, and if  it reaches the nec-
essary majority, it can vote to censure the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs’ actions. If  this happens, the President has two institutional 
options: to remove the Minister or dissolve Congress and call new 
elections. In addition, the Congress ratifies international treaties 
signed by the executive branch; thus, it can block them by not 
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passing them. This makes party discipline a key aspect of  the suc-
cess of  foreign policy. 
In Uruguay, parties and coalitions exhibit a high degree of party 
discipline because of  the institutional resources that party leaders 
possess to control the behavior of legislators in parliament 
(Chasquetti, 2014). Although member of the FA’s centrist wing 
represent the majority in the Executive Branch, the left wing has 
a majority in both houses of Congress15. Therefore, the balances 
among the three top leaders (President Tabaré Vazquez, the Min-
ister of  Finance Danilo Astori, and Senator and former President 
Jose Mujica) are key to party discipline. The FA has an adjusted 
majority, and hence a lack of  party discipline by a single legislator 
would mean a minority in Congress. Building consensus within 
the FA in this area is complicated and has a history of  conflict. 
The attempts to sign an FTA with the United States and Uru-
guay’s entry as a full member of the Pacific Alliance did not reach 
the level of  consensus needed for approval; internal conflict was 
                                                          
15 An indicator of the fractionalization of Uruguayan parties in Congress shows that PN 
and the PC have two fractions each, whereas the FA has four, which behave, at various 
times, like two separate wings. FA has a greater fractionalization and a greater ideological 
distance, and hence the wings of FA differ in their positions concerning the international 
economy and have greater difficulty achieving consensus than other parties (López Bur-
ian, 2015). This indicator is a measure proposed by Daniel Buquet (2000), analogous to 
the effective number of parties (NEP) prepared by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera 
(1979), which makes it possible to count the number of relevant parties, in this case, 
among parliamentarians. It is calculated by dividing one by the sum of the squares of the 






intense, and it was decided not to advance these issues to preserve 
party unity. 
To answer my research question I used data provided by urugayan 
political scientist Camilo Lopez Burian, who conducted a survey 
of  Uruguayan congressional representatives. The survey was ad-
ministered between June 15 and December 27, 2013, a period 
during which there were no major external shocks that could have 
biased the answers16. During this period, he obtained responses 
from 125 of  the 130 members of congress, representing 96% of  
the universe17. As Uruguay does not record nominal votes, the 
best alternative way of  measuring their preferences on foreign 
policy issues is by directly targeting them through a survey. 
My dependent variable was operationalized using the responses 
to the following a question: “Would you be willing to strengthen 
the bilateral relationship with China, regardless of  regional con-
siderations, by signing a free trade agreement?” The response dis-
tribution for this question was 44.3% positive answers and 55.7% 
negative answers. As independent variables, I considered (a) a 
question regarding Brazil being a leader worth following; (b) two 
indicators of the legislator’s opinion about MERCOSUR: one re-
garding the importance Uruguay should accord to MERCOSUR 
                                                          
16 I hired 15 political science graduate students to administer the questionnaires.  
17 Representing 30 of the 31 senators (97%) and 95 of 99 deputies (96%). 
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and another regarding the block’s influence over Uruguay; (c) a 
question regarding each legislator’s ideology on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 10, with 1 being extremely leftist; (d) variables for the 
party each legislator belongs to; and (e) interaction terms between 
ideology and partisanship.  
Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, I estimated a lo-
gistic model. Before analyzing the results, I ensured that robust 
and non-robust standard errors did not differ substantially, tested 
for specification errors to determine whether I had omitted rele-
vant variable(s) or our link function was not correctly specified, 
and ran collinearity diagnostics. I tested our hypotheses using six 
different model specifications as will be furthered detailed in the 




The regression results are presented in Table 19. The coefficients 
are presented as marginal effects. I specified six models, presented 
such that variables are added to the baseline model to test the two 
main hypotheses and identify the model with the best fit. Apart 
from coefficients, I report Pseudo R2 and Akaike’s information 




TABLE 19: Logistic regression models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6) 
MERCOSUR is 
a priority -0.29** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.44*** -0.38*** 
-
0.41*** 
 (-2.63)    (-4.29) (-3.67) (-4.13) (-3.28) (-3.43) 
MERCOSUR's 
influence -0.062*  -0.029 -0.012 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 




0.46*** -0.32* -0.33* -0.34* -0.34* 
 (-6.92) (-3.80) (-2.12) (-2.16) (-2.11) (-2.11) 
Congressper-
son’s Ideology − 0.23*** 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.15 
 − (3.55) (0.57) (1.09) (1.93) (1.47) 
Incumbent 
party (FA) − − -0.66*** − − − 
 − − (-5.42) − − − 
Opposition 
party (NP) − − − 0.65*** 0.91*** 0.86*** 
 − − − (5.43) (8.94) (5.53) 
Opposition 
party (CP) − − − 0.46** 0.90*** 0.94*** 
 − − − (2.76) (15.79) (16.20) 
Urban area rep-
resentative − − − -0.04 -0.05 0.002 
 − − − (-0.31) (-0.37) (0.02) 
Opposition 
party 
(NP)×Ideology − − − − -0.20 -0.13 





ology − − − − -0.50** -0.67 




ment − − − − − -0.05 
  − − − − − (-0.05) 
Observations 116 114 114 114 113 97 
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.41 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.55 
AIC 127.3  101.2 87.1 94 92 81.5 
Marginal effects at the means; standard errors in parentheses. 
Note regarding significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Model 1 tests our two main hypotheses without controls. Regard-
ing the first hypothesis, of  those who believe that Uruguay should 
prioritize the region and follow Brazilian leadership, have a 59% 
likelihood of  supporting strengthening the bilateral relationship 
with China, regardless of  regional considerations, by signing an 
FTA, ceteris paribus. As shown in Figure 27, legislators consider 
China to be the second-most influential player in Uruguayan for-
eign policy, just behind Brazil and ahead of the United States and 
the EU. This is not a minor finding considering that the Uru-
guayan government could regard an FTA as a future strategy to 




FIGURE 26: Box plots of the influence per country. 
 
Regarding the second hypothesis, I considered two different in-
dependent variables. A dummy variable takes value 1 if  the legis-
lator believes that MERCOSUR should be the priority of  foreign 
policy, and a continuous variable ranges from 1 to 10 according 
to the degree of  influence that MERCOSUR should have in de-
termining Uruguayan foreign policy. Both are statistically signifi-
cant and confirm our hypothesis: if  a legislator believes that 
MERCOSUR should be the foreign policy priority, his/her prob-
ability of  supporting strengthening the bilateral relationship with 
China, regardless of  regional considerations, by signing an FTA is 
62%, whereas the more influential MERCOSUR is perceived to 
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be for Uruguayan foreign policy, the less likely a legislator is to 
regard China as a means of balancing against Brazilian leadership 
(see Figure 28). 
 
 
FIGURE 27: Predicted probability of answering positively to the depend-
ent variable. 
 
Model 2 differs from Model 1 in that it includes a control for the 
congressional representative’s ideology. This variable is positively 
associated with the dependent variable, which means that without 
controlling for party membership, the more rightist a legislator is, 
the more likely he/she is of  supporting a move towards China. 
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Consistent with Model 1, those who believe that Uruguay should 
prioritize the region and follow Brazilian leadership and those 
who believe that MERCOSUR should be the foreign policy pri-
ority are less likely to support strengthening the bilateral relation-
ship with China. 
Model 3 includes a dummy for government-opposition prefer-
ences, named “Incumbent party (FA)”, because the ruling party 
when the survey was conducted was FA. The model shows that 
this variable is highly significant and its inclusion makes ideologi-
cal positions non-significant. However, the perception of  the im-
portance of  MERCOSUR remains significant, as does the per-
ception of  Brazilian leadership. By observing the marginal effects, 
I see that the combination of belonging to the incumbent party 
and believing in MERCOSUR and Brazilian leadership reduces 
the likelihood of supporting the dependent variable to virtually 
zero.  
The purpose of  Model 4 was to open the “black box” of the op-
position parties to better understand which parties were more 
supportive of  strengthening the bilateral relationship with China 
regardless of  regional consequences. To accomplish this task, the 
dummy variable for government-opposition was replaced by 
dummies for the PC and PN, the two main opposition parties 
when the survey was conducted; furthermore, I also included a 
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dummy to control for possible differences between legislators 
from Montevideo and from the rural areas of  the country. The 
model shows that, although legislators of the two parties would 
support a strategy of  balancing Brazil with China, PN supporters 
are more likely to do so than PC supporters. However, under this 
specification, the effect of  each legislator’s attitude towards MER-
COSUR increased whereas the perception of Brazilian leadership 
remained significant and similar in magnitude to the results of  
previous models.  
To deepen the understanding of  the characteristics of  legislators 
who would be more favorable to supporting an agreement with 
China, in Model 4, I incorporated two interaction variables be-
tween belonging to opposition parties and the ideology of  the 
legislator. This model reveals that within the PC, those with a left-
ist ideology are the most likely to support the agreement. By con-
trast, within the PN, legislator ideology does not have a clear ef-
fect. To better assess the results of this model I plotted predicted 
marginal effects, as seen in Figure 2918. We see that within the FA, 
the more right-leaning the legislator, the larger his/her probability 
of  supporting an FTA with China, whereas within the PC, the 
opposite occurs. In the case of  the PN, ideology has a small and 
                                                          
18 I removed the confidence interval lines to improve the view of the figure.  
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ambiguous effect that can be ignored because the probability re-
mains high (over 75%) independent of  the legislator’s ideology. 
 
 
FIGURE 28: Marginal effect of  ideology over Pr(Y=1). 
Finally, Model 6 incorporates a dummy control variable that re-
ports the answers to the question “Compared with 10 years ago, 
do you think that Uruguay’s relations with China are better, the 
same or worse”. I wished to test whether the growing importance 
of  China in Uruguayan foreign policy could affect the answers. 
Although this variable does not show any effect on the dependent 
variable, note that after including this variable, the results re-
mained unchanged.  
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The models show consistent empirical evidence that support the 
two main hypotheses. I found that, overall, the probability of  sup-
porting an FTA with China increases (a) when a legislator’s per-
ception of  MERCOSUR is that it is costly for Uruguay’s national 
interests and (b) when Brazil is not regarded as a leader worth 
following. This effect is stronger (c) the more rightist the ideology 
of  the legislator. Furthermore, parties diverge clearly on their po-
sitions. (d) Incumbent party (FA) legislators appear to be less likely 
to support signing an FTA with China relative to opposition party 
legislators (NP and CP); however, (e) the more right-leaning the 
FA’s legislators are, the more likely they will be to support the 
agreement; this probability is over 80% when they are at the ex-
treme right of the scale. Finally, I could not find significant evi-
dence of  differences between legislators from rural areas com-
pared with legislators from urban areas.  
 
Policy Implications  
 
In Uruguay, the changes in the government following the arrival 
of  the left (FA) involved a prioritization of  the region and emerg-
ing countries, particularly Brazil, as strategic partners (López Bur-
ian, 2015). A key element to consider is that although positioning 
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on this issue is relatively homogeneous within the opposition par-
ties, this is not the case for the governing party (FA). Although 
the government of José Mujica (2010 - 2015) emphasized the re-
gion and South–South relations, the second government of  
Tabaré Vazquez, inaugurated in 2015, has begun to show a 
change in its foreign policy orientation through the prioritization 
of  the open regionalism strategy. 
In that context, President Vazquez and his Foreign Minister, 
Rodolfo Nin Novoa, have emphasized the importance of  struc-
turing foreign policy on the basis of commercial economic rela-
tions and seeking the commercial opening of  MERCOSUR by 
streamlining its external agenda through the easing of the 32/00 
clause. This orientation of the Uruguayan government was reaf-
firmed when Vazquez met with Brazilian president Rousseff, on 
May 21, 2015, when he expressed the idea of  moving into a trade 
agreement with the European Union and that MERCOSUR 
members should join this agreement at different rates and not 
simultaneously. 
These developments reflect changes in the regional situation. The 
first is the position of the government of  Dilma Rousseff  in fa-
vor of greater flexibility when negotiating with third countries. 
The idea of  “different speeds” expresses the will to make pro-
gress on the external agenda under the implicit recognition that 
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Argentina’s model of  economic development suggests that the 
country will not support joint negotiations that could affect some 
of  its protectionist policies. Brazilian economic conditions and 
changes in the cabinet after the tumultuous impeachment against 
President Rousseff  appear to be generating an even more favor-
able scenario for negotiations with third parties in MER-
COSUR19. 
I foresee two different scenarios that bode favorably for the fea-
sibility of  an FTA with China, depending on the interaction be-
tween internal and external games. First, a MERCOSUR-friendly 
scenario would depend on agreeing to conduct negotiations “at 
different speeds” within the trade bloc’s framework, which is likely 
to be supported by Tabaré Vazquez20. Brazilian support for such 
an idea would be vital, as the FA and its left wing in particular 
regard Brazil as a strategic ally. For evidence, one is encouraged to 
examine the FA’s government program of FA, which treats Brazil 
                                                          
19 In Brazil, this approach was promoted by a strong corporate actor; the Federação das 
Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP), in its position paper (Proposals for the Ex-
ternal Integration of Brazilian Industry, 2014), stated: “The agreement MERCOSUR-EU 
is an immediate priority for Brazilian foreign policy […] the agreement may also be im-
plemented at different speeds through scheduled differentiated tariff reductions [...]. 
"(FIESP, 2014: 1). 
20 Within the executive branch, the President, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of 
Finance are encouraging the easing of rules on negotiations within MERCOSUR. Carlos 
Perez del Castillo, Special Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, when asked about 
the position of the Brazilian private sector on easing negotiations with third parties, said: 
"I know they create a lot of pressure; thus, they could be a good ally”. Declaration taken 
from the interview with El País (Uruguay) (04/03/2015). Mercosur is exhausted as a 
model of integration. Available in: http://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/mercosur-
agotado-modelo-insercion.html (accessed 06/01/2015). 
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as follows: as never before in our country's foreign policy, we must 
take into account a very important change in its nearby reality: 
Uruguay is bordered by a currently emerging country that it is a 
global power, namely, Brazil. […] This partner can become our 
gateway to increased commerce, regional and global develop-
ment, and privileged political dialogue with other emerging actors 
(FA, 2014: 140-141). 
This same strategy has been suggested to address the FTA with 
the EU. The second scenario, I believe, is much less likely to be 
politically taxing. If  Uruguay enters into a bilateral agreement out-
side MERCOSUR, President Vazquez would have countless dif-
ficulties disciplining legislative representatives, due to the splin-
tered nature of  his party. These scenarios are intellectual exercises 
to think of the political disputes within MERCOSUR, and to re-
flect on how smaller countries such as Uruguay and Paraguay can 
put pressure on Brazilian leadership despite their smaller material 




Are Brazil and China viewed as competitors in South America? 
To date there is no available empirical information to answer this 
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question, so the goal of  this chapter is to operate within the exist-
ing literature to develop the question’s understanding.  
To answer our research question, I conducted a survey of  Uru-
guayan congressional representatives. I were able to obtain re-
sponses from 125 of  the 130 congressional representatives, rep-
resenting 96% of our universe. Thereafter, I specified a logistic 
model to address each of  our hypotheses. I found that the prob-
ability of  a legislator supporting an FTA with China increases (a) 
when his/her perception of MERCOSUR is that it is costly for 
Uruguay’s national interests and (b) when he/she does not con-
sider Brazil a leader worth following. Uruguayan policymakers 
perceive China as an actor of  great importance, both commer-
cially and politically, something that is clearly reflected in Figures 
26 and 27. Only Brazil is regarded as more influential than China, 
which poses the question of  whether China could be used by 
MERCOSUR members to balance against Brazilian leadership. 
In addition to the specific findings of  this work, this chapter pro-
vides a model for the study of  other cases in which researchers 
wish to explain the determinants of the acceptance or rejection 
of  FTAs in countries participating in regional integration pro-
cesses with significant levels of  coordination in their extra-bloc 
trade agendas (Yin, 2009). 
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Within the governing party, China is described as an attractive 
partner, but potential asymmetries and the importance of  main-
taining political and economic sovereignty were also highlighted. 
When the surveys were conducted, in late 2013, only 44% of con-
gressmen said that they would support an FTA with China. To 
gain political weight, this support should be at least 66%. The nec-
essary conditions for the viability of  an FTA between China and 
Uruguay would be (a) increasing bilateral trade; (b) increasing dis-
comfort towards MERCOSUR, mainly within FA; and (c) mod-
erate sectors within FA, backed by Astori and Vázquez, gaining 
greater influence within the governing party. Given these condi-
tions, we believe that there would be sufficient domestic support 
for a negotiation. 
This chapter contributes to the literature on Uruguay-China bilat-
eral relations in particular and on Brazilian leadership in South 
America and Brazil-China relations in general. To date, there has 
been little research based on empirical data, and hence this chap-
ter is an attempt to contribute to filling this gap. I believe that this 
chapter opens an agenda for studying China’s impact within 
MERCOSUR and has relevant policy implications for both Uru-
guayan policymakers and MERCOSUR’s advocates. Through the 
case of  Uruguay and China’s potential for signing an FTA, we 
have discussed other topics such as the rigidity problem within 
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MERCOSUR and the interrelation between domestic and for-
eign politics in Uruguay. Further research should deepen the study 




Chapter 6 – Evidence of US-China competi-
tion in the political elites’ perceptions: Invest-




In December of  the year 2014, the Argentinean Senate approved 
an agreement on cooperation between Argentina and China on 
the “Construction, Establishment, and Operation of  a Chinese 
Deep-Space Monitoring Station” in the Argentinean Province of  
Neuquén. It was set within the Framework of the Chinese Moon 
Exploration Program. The agreement to build this station imme-
diately generated a lot of criticism from politicians, journalists, 
and academics, who raised concerns about issues such as the pos-
sible military use of  the facilities, the magnitude of  the tax breaks 
                                                          
54 This chapter is based on the published article: Urdinez, F., Knoerich, J. & Ribeiro, 
P.F. (2016). Journal of Chinese Political Science. doi:10.1007/s11366-016-9450-y 
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granted to the Chinese, the limited access granted to Argentine 
scientists and its alleged level of  secrecy.  
Such criticisms of  Chinese investments are not new, and have 
been widespread in many parts of the world (Knoerich, 2015). 
Chinese investments have tended to shoulder a particularly heavy 
baggage of  political controversy, as the majority of  investments 
are carried out by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and govern-
ment support for outward investments is intensive (Naughton, 
2008; Luo et al., 2010; Sauvant and Chen, 2014).  
Uncertainties about China’s future role as a global economic and 
political power further exacerbate stakeholder concerns in host 
countries over issues such as national security, unfair competition, 
and state ownership. In Britain, the May administration’s summer 
2016 announcement to review Chinese participation in the con-
struction of the Hinkley Point-C nuclear power plant is just an-
other more recent example of the political consequences these 
uncertainties about China bring with them. Nevertheless, schol-
arship to date has not conclusively pinned down the reasons why 
China and Chinese investments have received such an above-av-
erage amount of  scrutiny by host country stakeholders over the 
past few years – much more than firms from the United States  
or other countries commonly receive.  
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The strong criticism of Chinese investments is even more puz-
zling when viewed against the backdrop of rapidly intensifying 
economic and investment relations with China. In Latin America, 
China has become a major external economic actor over the past 
decade – in 2014, the country was already the second largest trade 
partner and a major source of  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflows in Latin America. Several Latin American countries have 
established strategic partnerships with Beijing, which implies 
greater cooperation on FDI-related matters and a positive attitude 
towards China.  This is a significant advance, considering the fact 
that Latin America has traditionally been the backbone of  Amer-
ican hemispheric hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001).  
Within Latin America, Argentina has developed one of  the 
strongest relationships with China (Laufer, 2013). In July 2014, 
when Xi Jinping visited Argentina, both countries signed several 
multi-billion dollar agreements on infrastructure finance and cur-
rency swap arrangements, and a new framework agreement on 
cooperation in economic and investment matters was agreed. Im-
peded from accessing western financing, China’s emergence as a 
new Latin American creditor provided the country with a funding 
source that was independent of global financing markets 
(Kaplan, 2014; Campello, 2015). During Hu Jintao’s visit to South 
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America in 2004, Argentina and China had already signed a mem-
orandum on cooperation in trade and investment that defined the 
partnership as “strategic.”55  
The Argentinean approach to China is similar to that of  many 
host countries in other parts of the world that are actively attract-
ing and promoting Chinese investments. Many companies even 
happily agree to become a target of a Chinese acquiring firm 
(Knoerich, 2010). However, these very positive views and eager-
ness to court Chinese investors greatly contradict the many criti-
cisms commonly voiced about Chinese investments. Hence, there 
exist major controversies and contradictions in perceptions about 
Chinese FDI and reactions to them. In fact, these differences in 
perspective about Chinese outward FDI form one of  the biggest 
unresolved puzzles about China’s economic expansion into the 
rest of  the world.   
In this study, we seek to gain greater understanding of the origins 
of  these controversies and contradictory perceptions and exam-
ine the nature of  the discourses employed to support competing 
arguments about Chinese investments.  A detailed analysis of  the 
discourses advanced by key, elite stakeholders helps shed further 
                                                          
55 According to the Chinese media, the term strategic partnership is the ultimate defini-
tion of bilateral relations (Oviedo, 2006).   
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light on the particular nature of the concerns raised and the fa-
vorable views about China supported by others. In particular, we 
explore what type of  discourses elected politicians in Argentina 
use to argue in favour or against the project. Why do they adopt 
an overly critical view of  Chinese FDI in Argentina, or why do 
they view the issue in a positive light? Where do the differences in 
arguments lie? 
The value of  the Chinese Space-Monitoring Station project in Ar-
gentina, for the purpose of  this chapter, is twofold. First, its na-
ture—a mix of  science and high politics—makes it an interesting 
case for understanding fears over an increasing Chinese presence 
in Latin America; second, it is China’s only investment project that 
has ever been discussed in Congress in Argentina.  
I took a mixed-method approach, employing both quantitative 
text analysis and qualitative political discourse analysis to analyze 
all parliamentary speeches in the Senate and the Chamber discuss-
ing the approval of  the cooperation agreement between Argen-
tina and China. To the best of my knowledge, no one had yet 
used parliamentary speeches to study domestic political dis-
courses on the emergence of  Chinese investors in Latin America.  
The structure of  this chapter is as follows. In the next section, I 
describe the nature of the Chinese Space-Monitoring Station. 
Then, I discuss the existing literature on congressional debates in 
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Argentina as well as the state of the art of the literature on Chi-
nese engagement in Latin America to propose two hypotheses. 
Afterwards, I describe the methodology and proceed to disentan-
gle the embedded perceptions of  Chinese investments in political 
debate. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the findings and 
policy implications, and develop a future research agenda.  
 
Framing the case study: Argentina, an Appealing Country 
for Space Science  
 
As a growing global power with leadership ambitions, China 
started developing programs aimed at exploring the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, Mars in particular. To this end, China estab-
lished the so-called China Deep Space Network, a series of  mon-
itoring stations in order to support various space missions as the 
planet rotates. This project, by its very nature, enhances China’s 
global capabilities in science and military fields. China needs stra-
tegically-located stations in various parts of  the world, and the 
Patagonian region in Argentina proved to have the correct geo-
graphical conditions for the installation of  one of  them. 
In Argentina, the organization in charge of  scientific activities re-
lated to astronomy is the National Commission on Space Activi-
ties (CONAE). In 2004, after the visit of  Hu Jintao to the country, 
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a framework of cooperation agreement between CONAE and 
China’s National Space Agency (CNSA) was signed, recognizing 
the potential for joint activities between the two agencies. After a 
joint assessment, it was decided that the base would be installed 
on 200 hectares of land in the area of  Bajada Del Agrio, an iso-
lated sub region of Patagonia.  
On April 23, 2014 a provincial law was approved establishing tax 
breaks and a relaxation of immigration rules for Chinese officials 
involved in the project. This was the subject of  great debate 
among the congressional commissions, making this project mark-
edly more politicized than others. Even though the station was 
already being built, the project was submitted to the National 
Congress in July of  2014 for discussion in both houses.  
In November of 2014, after the provincial law was already en-
acted,56 the province of Neuquén approved a tax exemption for 
the China Harbour Engineering Company, the Chinese company 
in charge of  building the station, and granted VAT exemption, 
customs duties, and internal taxes to the CNSA and other com-
panies for the duration of  the concession (50 years). Further-
more, it allowed Chinese employees working in Neuquén to be 
governed under the laws of  China.  
                                                          
56 Law no. 27123 of the 6th of November.  
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Set against this Chinese deep space-monitoring station project is 
the counterfactual case of  a similar station built by the European 
Space Agency (ESA) in 2012. This station was inaugurated in Ma-
largue, in the province of  Mendoza. As with the Chinese project, 
Argentina’s CONAE was involved in the early technical assess-
ments and the first cooperation agreements in 2009. Figure 30 
shows the location of  the ESA and the CNSA’s space-monitoring 
stations. Both are located in the western part of the country, close 
to the border with Chile.  
 
 




Moreover, Table 20 shows how both agreements were very simi-
lar in content, yet exhibited a few notable differences. While Arti-
cle 1 of  the agreement with the ESA established the mandatory 
use for peaceful ends, the agreement with the CNSA only men-
tioned it in the introduction as part of the “spirit” of the project57.  
Both agreements were identical in that they established a cession 
of  land for a period of  50 years; included termination clauses and 
controversy-solving mechanisms; and incorporated an agreement 
that Argentine scientists would be allowed to use the facility for 
10% of the time. As for the differences, there were no tax exemp-
tions for the ESA, while there were for the CNSA, and European 
technicians did not receive migratory benefits as the Chinese did.  
Companies with connections to military projects constructed 
both stations. The China Harbour Engineering Company is un-
der the control of  the People's Liberation Army’s General Arma-
ments Department (GAD), while the Italian company Telespazio 
belongs to the Thales group, which works on security and defense 
projects (such as cybersecurity, drones, and defensive missiles) for 
European countries. The China Harbour Engineering Company 
then subcontracted Esuco SA for the construction of  the sta-
                                                          
57 Nevertheless, in 2004 a technical cooperation agreement for the “Peaceful Use of 
Outer Space” had already been signed between CONAE and CNSA, and included word-
ing similar to that in the introduction of the agreement with the ESA. 
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tions, and the ESA subcontracted Carlucci, Pascual Casetta, Alca-
traz, and Desarrolladora Monteverdi—all Argentine companies. 
Finally, China’s project had a budget almost five times larger than 
the ESA’s. The European base was budgeted at €45 million (ap-
proximately US$63 million), and the Chinese base was budgeted 
at US$300 million. All of these points triggered discussions 
among congressional representatives. 
 
 












The agreement is for a period of 50 years. Yes Yes 
There is territorial cession Yes Yes 
Tax exemptions No Yes 
Migratory benefits No Yes 
Agreement can be terminated Yes Yes 
Sum of time used by Argentine scientists 10% 10% 




















Subcontracted Argentine companies Yes Yes 
 
 
In Argentina’s history, other investments have also inspired do-
mestic debate. While historically the most politicized investments 
were those of  the Americans and Spanish companies58, the 
space-monitoring station was not the first deal with China to gen-
erate controversy. In 2011, the governor of the province of  Rio 
Negro, also located in the Patagonian region, signed a deal with 
an SOE from Heilongjiang province for the use of  300,000 hec-
tares of  land to grow crops for a period of  20 years. The deal 
generated so much opposition from the press, academic circles, 
                                                          
58 One example is the partial renationalization in 2012 of YPF, the nation's largest energy 
firm, in the interest of energy sovereignty. YPF was previously owned by the Spanish 
Repsol for more than ten years. 
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and public opinion in general that it ended up being cancelled.59 
This background suggests that Chinese investments might inspire 
certain concerns that Western investments do not, but what are 
these concerns specifically? 
 
Congressional position taking in Argentina 
 
Research that uses speeches and votes to study congressional po-
sition taking, oversight and signaling is vast in the American Polit-
ical Science literature (Mayhew 1974; Kingdon, 1989; Arnold, 
1992; Ripley & Lindsay, 1993; Hinckley, 1994). These works 
served as a framework for the development of  similar research in 
Latin America, although the literature employing such approaches 
is still sparse in both Latin America and Argentina. 
The Argentine congress does not ratify treaties; it merely ap-
proves or rejects the text of  a treaty. Beforehand, projects are dis-
cussed in commissions and are only subject to nominal voting if  
parties do not reach a consensus in the commissions. The fact 
that an international agreement was subject to a vote is thus proof 
                                                          
59 For example, the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences of the National University of Coma-
hue criticized this agreement since the investment could “compromise the food sover-
eignty and sustainability” (Maradona, 2011). While the main argument was land grab-
bing, at the time of the debate, the Italian textile company Benetton already owned 
900,000 hectares—about three times the area of Hong Kong—in Patagonia to raise cat-
tle. This fact was largely overlooked. 
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that it triggered considerable debate. Nominal votes are rare and 
are generally only taken on conflictual issues where party leaders 
want to use them to enforce discipline and on controversial issues 
where deputies or parties want their vote (or the votes of  others) 
to be public knowledge. A nominal vote is taken when a motion 
for a nominal vote has been made and then supported by at least 
one-fifth of  the deputies in attendance. There are no exact data 
in Argentina on what proportion of  all votes taken during a given 
year are nominal, but it is doubtful that nominal votes account for 
more than 5% of the votes (Jones, 2002:154).  
According to Saez and Rivas (2007), the image of  the US is, along 
with the amount of  state intervention in the economy, the most 
relevant dimension of political party polarization in Latin Amer-
ica, including Argentina. Foreign policy as regards the US has 
been largely determined by domestic politics in Argentina, and 
aligns with the ideology of  the party of  the president and his/her 
cabinet (Neto and Malamud 2015). Thus, we can expect a 
US/Anti-US cleavage to be used as a polarizing theme when FDI 
is discussed in congress. 
Since the return to democracy in 1983, the two dominant political 
parties in Argentina have been the Partido Justicialista (PJ, also 
known as the Peronist Party) and the Unión Cívica Radical 
(UCR). Peronism historically accused opposition parties of  being 
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functional to the interests of the US. Peronism started as a politi-
cal movement inspired in the populist government of Juan Do-
mingo Peron, who presided Argentina in three opportunities 
(1946-1952; 1952-1955; 1973-1974). The famous political cam-
paign slogan that led Peron to his first presidency in 1946 was 
“Braden or Peron”, with reference to Spruille Braden, the US am-
bassador to Argentina who had mobilized the opposition against 
Peron.  
The Kircherismo (the branch of  Peronism led by the Kirchner’s) 
made intensive use of  this rhetoric. Although less than other pop-
ulist movements during the Pink Tide such as Chavismo in Ven-
ezuela or Correismo in Ecuador, Kirchners made their opposi-
tion to the US a key theme of their foreign policy. Moreover, 
while presidents Menem’s (1989–1999) and De la Rúa’s (1999–
2001) administrations reflected an automatic alliance with the US, 
Duhalde (2002–2003), Nestor Kirchner (2003–2007), and Cris-
tina Kirchner (2007–2015) adopted a much more autonomous 
policy, with traces of  anti-Americanism, which defined a new shift 
in foreign policy. 
China as an important domestic factor in Argentina is a phenom-
enon of  the 21st century. Argentina spent most of  the 20th cen-
tury looking first at the UK and later at the US and, in a secondary 
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way, Brazil60. China remained in a second—or even third—tier 
group. During the 90s, it is worth noting, however, that the align-
ment with US did not impede Argentina from following a rela-
tively autonomous foreign policy towards China. The most nota-
ble example is the position of Argentina towards the 1989 inci-
dent on Tiananmen Square, when President Menem pursued a 
different policy than President George Bush, and was the first 
Head of  State of  a Western country to visit China in a moment 
in which Chinese government was being highly criticized for hu-
man rights violations (Oviedo, 2010). 
In Latin American countries, a fierce debate has been ongoing for 
at least a decade on the appropriate way to engage with China. 
Blázquez and Santiso (2006) bluntly ask whether China is an “an-
gel” or a “devil” for Latin America, and clear positions for both 
points of  view can be found in the literature.  
Those favorable to greater engagement with China point to win-
win scenarios in which China provides Latin American countries 
with aid (Dosch and Goodman, 2012:12), trade flows (Devlin et 
                                                          
60 Russell and Tokatlian (2006) argue that Argentina underwent three foreign policy 
stages. Before World War II, it had three main orientations: Europeanism, opposition to 
the US, and isolation from the rest of Latin America. Between the end of World War II 
and the end of the Cold War, Argentina maintained non-alignment with respect to the 
US and vowed Latin American integration without doing much to deliver (2006: 266). 
After the Cold War, Peronist president Menem steered foreign policy toward subordina-
tion to the political and strategic interests of the US. This period ended dramatically in 
2001 with the country defaulted on foreign debt and the worst economic crisis in Argen-
tine history unfolded.   
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al. 2006), FDI (Ellis, 2009) and political cooperation (Fernandez 
Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2010) in exchange for political support 
in international organizations and long-term business opportuni-
ties for Chinese companies. The Chinese government itself  
claims that the China–Latin America economic relationship re-
flects fundamental complementarities and therefore has a positive 
effect for both sides (Ferchen, 2011: 57).  
Latin American countries embraced the rhetoric of South-South 
relations, advanced to a considerable extent by China itself, as a 
way to increase their autonomy from the US. This favored China, 
which was eager to find new markets (Lechini 2009). The concept 
of  autonomy, particularly towards the US, is essential for under-
standing the foreign policies of  Latin American countries. This 
concept, which has been discussed for many decades by political 
scientists (Santana & Bustamante, 2013) refers to the ability to 
self-government and self-control a country has on a political di-
mension (Russell & Tokatlián, 2002: 165)61.  
Accordingly, Latin American countries embraced China as part 
of  a new multidirectional diplomacy aimed at diversifying their 
foreign relations (Shambaugh 2008). China was seriously looked 
                                                          
61 So important is the positioning of Latin-American countries against the US, that it is 
the linchpin of both the realism of the periphery (starting with Juan Carlos Puig, Helio 
Jaguaribe and developed by Carlos Escudé) and the utilitarianism of the periphery 
(mainly developed by Gerhard Drekonja), two of the most well-known theories regard-
ing international autonomy born in Latin America. 
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at as an “alternative diplomatic and economic partner to Wash-
ington” (Lanteigne 2015: 139). As a result of  the so-called Pink 
Tide of  leftist governments in Latin America, an interesting prag-
matic convergence with China came about: the state was granted 
an important role in the economy, and fresh money to carry out 
infrastructure projects was needed (Fernandez Jilberto and Ho-
genboom, 2010; Gallagher et al. 2012).  
From a perspective of  International Political Economy, some au-
thors have explored how economic ties leads to political close-
ness. Flores-Macias & Kreps (2013) explore how trade with China 
generates foreign policy consequences finding the more states 
trade with China, the more likely they are to converge with it on 
issues of  foreign policy. This has implications for the US, whose 
foreign policy preferences have diverged from those of  China 
during the period of  study and who may find it harder to attract 
allies in international forums. In this sense, China can be a country 
to counterbalance American influence. In the same direction, 
Urdinez et al. (2016) find that there is an inversely proportional 
relationship between the investments made by Chinese SOEs and 
Chinese bank loans and the US influence in each country of  the 
region suggesting that the former is filling a vacuum. Finally, 
Strüver (2016) argues that Beijing’s official interests in Latin 
America hardly appear still to be restricted to the economic realm, 
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but instead follow the rationale of  a ‘comprehensive cooperation’ 
that also encompasses political aspects. 
Those concerned about greater engagement with China focus 
primarily on economic and political imbalances created by China’s 
growing influence in the region. An important strand of  the liter-
ature emphasizes the detrimental effect of trading with China on 
the national economies, including trade deficits and the possibility 
of  deindustrialization and the increased “primarization” of the 
economies resulting from a specialization on primary product ex-
ports in exchange for industrial products from China (Mesquita 
Moreira, 2007; Jenkins and Dussel Peters 2009; Jenkins & Bar-
bosa, 2012; Kotschwar, 2014). This would result in a reproduction 
of  neocolonial/neo-dependent relationships, where the asym-
metric nature of  the relationship in terms of  the relative im-
portance of  bilateral trade to each partner, the composition of  
trade flows, and the balance of  FDI flows exhibits many charac-
teristics of typical center–periphery relations (Jenkins 2012). For 
Ratliff, it is even possible that a generation from now, Latin Amer-
icans will be denouncing Chinese “imperialism” and “exploita-
tion” of the Americas, just as they had denounced American and 
British, and even Spanish, “colonialisms” and “imperialisms” in 
the past (2009: 20).  
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Moreover, doubts have been raised on whether fertile ground for 
long-term mutual benefits actually exists. China’s rapidly increas-
ing imports of raw materials from Latin America was allegedly a 
consequence of  a historical commodity “boom” that saw the vol-
ume and price of  certain minerals, energy resources, and agricul-
tural commodities skyrocket. This boom which provided the 
foundation underlying China’s renewed ties to many resource-rich 
countries (Ferchen, 2011: 58) was destined to finish when com-
modity prices finally dropped. Many argue that Chinese invest-
ments have been big on promises but short on actual implemen-
tation. The problem of cultural clashes has been mentioned es-
pecially in this context. 
In view of  these positive and negative perspectives on China, I 
expect assessments of China’s increasing role in Latin America to 
be informed by previous experiences with the US as a regional 
hegemon: 
 
Hypothesis 1: When appraising relations with China, the US, the 
historical regional hegemon, is used (both positively and nega-




The relative discipline levels in the Legislative are extremely high 
for both main parties in Argentina, Peronism and Radical (Mus-
tapic & Goretti, 1992; Jones, 1997; Jones, 2002). They indicate 
that it is extremely rare for a legislator to vote against his/her 
party’s position in the Chamber. Those party members who 
strongly oppose the position taken by the party generally will leave 
the floor at the time of  the vote or less frequently will register their 
abstention (Jones, 2002:157). 
Two dimensions best capture political attitudes of  Argentine leg-
islators: the left-right cleavage and the Peronist-non-Peronist di-
vide (Saiegh, 2009). Because the two main Argentinean political 
parties—the UCR and Peronist parties—occupy quite similar po-
sitions in the right-left scale, the first and most relevant dimension 
in many countries (both parties are in the center-left spectrum), 
the second dimension (Peronist-non Peronist) becomes, at times, 
more relevant. Peronism combines two peculiar characteristics: 
high discipline and low ideological cohesion among its legislators. 
For example, most of  the Peronist politicians who had been fer-
vent advocates of  neoliberal policies under President Menem be-
came fervent advocates of  statist policies under President Kirch-
ner (Jones, Hwang and Micozzi, 2009: 68). In addition, it is com-
mon to find both right wing and left wing Peronists coexisting at 
the same time in both chambers and voting together. 
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These two characteristics, high discipline and low ideological co-
hesion, made the Peronist party a strong and enduring one. Be-
cause this partisan cleavage defines domestic politics, Garlan and 
Biglaiser (2009) argue that this limits FDI promotion strategies in 
congress. There is a lack of “incentive-based” competition 
among deputies (Oman, 2000), as there is less need for candidates 
to distinguish themselves from the party position and less im-
portance placed on individual candidates when it comes to raising 
large sums of campaign funds. From this literature, we can expect 
that strong party discipline will be expected in discussions con-
cerning FDI in congress.  
Jones (2002) explores the primary determinants of  the highly dis-
ciplined voting behavior noted by Garlan and Biglasier: First, the 
provincial-level, and to a lesser extent the national-level, party has 
a great deal of control over a legislator’s access to the ballot, and 
hence their opportunity for reelection. Second, most legislators 
pursue political career pathways that are strongly linked to the 
party. Third, legislators who consistently vote against their party 
are likely to be expelled (Jones, 2002:159). At the time that the 
Chinese motoring station was debated in congress the branch of  
the Peronist party of  the governing president (first Nestor and 
thereafter Cristina Kirchner) had 113 out of the 257 seats in the 
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Chamber of Deputies (44%) and 32 out of  72 seats in the Cham-
ber of  Senators (44%). To guarantee at least 51% of the votes to 
pass the bill, the government had to be cohesive and appeal to 
other branches of  the Peronist party to vote unanimously.  
Jones, Hwang and Micozzi (2009) argue that the main cleavage in 
the National Congress is the government-opposition division, re-
flecting the more strategic than ideological approach of  Argen-
tina’s main parties, as Saiegh (2009) pointed out. They argue that 
the Argentine Congress, while certainly much more of  a reactive 
veto player than a proactive agenda setter, is nevertheless an im-
portant actor in the policy process. They observe that during the 
1989-2007 period the party holding the majority dominated the 
legislative process through agenda control. The opposition was 
left in a very reactive position. As a result, the best way to interpret 
roll call vote behavior in Argentina is as the legislator’s position 
(for or against) on the legislation placed on the floor agenda by 
the majority party. 
Jones (2002), Saiegh (2009) and Jones, Hwang and Micozzi (2009) 
give theoretical tools to propose a second hypothesis. As the 
space-monitoring station project was discussed during an elec-
toral year and the Kirchner government had a majority in the leg-
islature, it made an effort to pass as many bills as possible. 
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Speeches by politicians in government and the opposition be-
came more polarized and aggressive, aiming to appeal to the pub-
lic in view of  the upcoming presidential elections. Historically, Pe-
ronism rhetoric employs a logic of “us vs. them” (“us” referring 
to friends or “compañeros” and “them” referring to enemies), 
places great emphasis on “loyalty” among Peronists and often ac-
cuses the opposition of  being allied with foreign interests that un-
dermine the “national interest”. In view of this institutional con-
text in which the debate on the space station occurred, the fol-
lowing hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Debates in Congress on relations with China fol-
low a clear division between the Peronists in government and 
non-Peronists forming the opposition, rather than a classic divi-
sion between left and right. 
 
Public opinion data sheds further light on the US/Anti-US cleav-
age and between Peronists and non-Peronists towards China. As 
an exploratory exercise, I analyzed Argentine public opinion data 
retrieved by the Project ‘Las Americas y el Mundo’ for 2015. The 
sample was comprised of  733 individuals, representative of  the 
country’s population. While general public does not necessarily 
229 
 
reflects cleavages in Congress, it can shed light on how repre-
sentative are the cleavages in the latter of the general population. 
Thereafter, I ran a logistic regression for the following dichoto-
mous dependent variable: “In your view, if  China's economy 
grew to be as large as the United States’, do you think that would 
be positive for the world?” I believe this question captures the 
pro-China-Anti-US cleavage. One was coded as a positive answer, 
and zero as a negative. I included as independent variables ideol-
ogy (left-right, on a scale of  1 to 10), a dummy for those who 
consider themselves Peronists (1 being Peronist), a dummy for 
those who declare admiration for the US as the main feeling to-
wards that country and the respondents’ opinion about China’s 
impact on Argentina (this is an ordinal variable based on the ques-
tion “Overall, how would you rate the influence of  China on Ar-
gentina? Very positive (1), positive (2), no opinion (3), negative (4), 
very negative (5)”).  
The findings, reported in table 19, show that Peronists are more 
favorable to the idea of  China challenging the American status 
quo. Moreover, the more leftist the person is, the more likely to 
answer positively the question of  the dependent variable. Also, 
the probability was smaller among those who thought China ex-
erted a negative influence in Argentina, ceteris paribus. This con-
firms that, among the general public, Peronists and those leaning 
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towards left-wing ideologies tend to be more critical of  the US 
and more favorable to China.  
 









Peronist 0.76 0.21 3.61 *** 
Ideology -0.06 0.02 2.52 * 
Admires US 0.13 0.20 0.70  
China in Argentina 1.77 0.17 10.23 *** 
Note: Statistical significance * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Chi2 
test = 0.0000; Pseudo R2=0.16; N=733. Data is publicly available at 
http://www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/  
 
Methodological strategy: Disentangling embedded per-
ceptions of  China in parliamentary speeches 
 
To test the hypotheses, I compiled all speeches delivered in the 
chamber of  deputies and senate that addressed the Chinese 
space-monitoring station.62 Furthermore, I followed Van Dijk 
(1993a) by enriching our quantitative analysis with qualitative 
                                                          
62 The European Space Station project was not discussed in congress, which proves how 
it was less controversial than that of China.  
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components of  political discourse analysis. This case study ulti-
mately works as a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Brady et al., 2006). 
The congressional discussions lasted for several hours, and in to-
tal 30 congressmen expressed their views on the issue so this 
source is very rich in content. The project was first discussed in 
the Senate the 17th of December 2014, where 36 legislators vote 
in favor, 27 against and none abstained. Afterwards, the project 
was debated in the Chamber of  Deputies on the 25th of  Febru-
ary 2015, where 133 legislators voted in favor, 107 against and 
none abstained. The parliamentary discussions were obtained 
from the website of  the Argentine Legal Information System 
(SAIJ), part of  the Ministry of  Justice63. Through another online 
platform, Decada Votada, I identified the vote of  each of  the leg-
islators to locate his speech in either in favor or against the invest-
ment. Decada Votada is a collaborative project coordinated by po-
litical scientist Andy Tow which provides easily-accessible infor-
mation for each nominal vote since 2004 for both chambers, with 
details on how each legislator voted and allowing for analysis by 
partisan and provincial groupings64.  
                                                          
63 Accessible at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/  
64 Accessible at http://www.decadavotada.com.ar/   
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I followed a summative technique of  content analysis which con-
sists of identifying and quantifying certain words or content in 
text with the purpose of  understanding the contextual use of  the 
words or content (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005:1284). A summative 
approach to qualitative content analysis goes beyond mere word 
counts to include latent content analysis. Latent content analysis 
refers to the process of interpretation of content in light of the 
context in which the discourse occurs. I create the discursive cat-
egories, or ‘groupings’, following an inductive logic (Mayring, 
2014), that is, departing from the word groupings created by the 
software we proceed to their interpretation in light of  the litera-
ture on Argentinian legislative behavior. 
 
Untying the Knot: What Do Legislators Say of  China? 
 
It is important to keep in mind that legislative speeches are meant 
to legitimize a political position. Legislators speak up for several 
reasons: they argue for or against legislative proposals; they scru-
tinize the executive’ and they send signals to their constituents, 
fellow party members, or other members of  parliament (Slapin & 
Proksch, 2011: 333). I created a cluster map of  the five main dis-
cursive groupings of  legislators who voted against the project, as 
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well as those who voted in favor of it (Figures 34 and 35). The 
figures for clusters were created using Wordstat which groups 
words by topics. 
The groupings are created through a function in the software 
called “topic extraction”, which is based on factor analysis. Such 
an extraction is achieved by computing a document frequency 
matrix, or alternatively by segmenting documents into smaller 
chunks and computing a segment frequency matrix. Once this 
matrix is obtained, a factor analysis with varimax rotation is com-
puted in order to extract a small number of  factors. I asked the 
software to group the legislative speeches into five main clusters. 
All words with a factor loading higher than 0.4 (the default crite-
rion in the software) were then retrieved as part of the extracted 
topic. While in hierarchical cluster analysis, a word may only ap-
pear in one cluster, topic modeling using factor analysis may result 
in a word being associated with more than one factor, a charac-
teristic that more realistically represents the polysemous nature of  
some words as well as the multiplicity of  context of  word usages.  
The order 1 to 5 in the figures represent the ranking of  im-
portance of  each topic in the speeches. I then proceeded to their 
interpretation in light of the content of  the speeches. I interpreted 
the discourse ‘groupings’ for each box, using discourse analysis 
and exemplifying with textual quotes, translated from Spanish. 
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While hypothesis 1 is present along the debates of  both legislators 
who voted in favor and against the project, the second hypothesis 
is well captured at comparing figures 34 and 35, since every vote 
in favor of the project was from Peronist legislators.  
 
   
FIGURE 30: Word clusters of  the legislators who voted against the pro-
ject. 
Note: Elaborated using Wordstat. 
 
The central discursive grouping of those voting against the pro-
ject, formed by the words in box 1, can be summarized by the 
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theme ‘asymmetry of  power.’ Oscar Aguad, deputy of the prov-
ince of  Cordoba and representative of  the non-Peronist UCR, 
argued in relation to these asymmetries:  
[Kirchner’s] government rejected, perhaps with good reason, the 
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas agreement which would 
take place with the US […] What they said then was ‘we cannot 
associate with the US because that will consolidate a primary 
goods production matrix in Argentina.’ Nevertheless, today we 
are doing with China what they rejected with the US. The differ-
ence is merely ideological. This agreement represents a short-
term strategy and is motivated by pressing economic needs.   
This quote confirms the existence of  cleavages outlined in the 
first hypothesis. First, there is a clear mention of Kirchner’s gov-
ernment as being anti-American and there is a clear comparison 
between US and China, as it is argued that the patterns of  asym-
metry that exist between Argentina and the US—which are 
rooted in the commodity specialization of Argentina’s econ-
omy—also apply to relations with China.  
In the same line of  argumentation, Pablo Javkin (Coalición Cívica, 
province of  Santa Fe) used Brazil as an example to be followed in 
handling power asymmetries with China. While Brazil is not part 
of  our first hypothesis, it is interesting to note how other major 
countries are used to mirror relations with China in Argentina. 
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Previous empirical work has found that Brazil’s image has been 
historically used in Argentina’s domestic debates as an inverted 
mirror, in which Brazil is portrayed as a rising power and Argen-
tina as a country in decline (Mouron et al, 2016). Pablo Javkin ar-
gued: “Discussing the center-periphery logic means setting a strat-
egy. Brazil did it. Let's do it as well.” Furthermore, Deputy Miguel 
Giubergia (UCR, province of  Jujuy) pointed out that “Brazil re-
fused to grant benefits to China, why should we?” We observe in 
both Javkin and Giubergia the use of Brazil as an “inverted mir-
ror” that should inspire Argentina. Both statements assume a cen-
ter-periphery logic, and they also suggest a lack of  a long-term 
strategy on the part of the Argentine government.  
The second discursive grouping among opposition legislators, in-
terpreted from box 2 in figure 31, captures fear over China’s fu-
ture military might. Laura Esper (Frente Renovador, province of  
Buenos Aires) argued: “It is a concern that CNSA reports directly 
to the Department of  Arms and the Central Military Commis-
sion of the Chinese Army, whose Director is the General of  Ar-
maments of the Red Army. Without a doubt, this fact gives a 
strong military mark to this facility.” Concerns over China con-
trolling the space-monitoring station for military purposes are 
fueled by suspicions about strong connections between China’s 
economic players and the military. While some of our findings 
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apply exclusively to the Argentinian case, the previous argument 
reflects a concern present in many countries about Chinese in-
vestments.  
Christian Gribaudo (Union PRO, province of  Buenos Aires) 
stated:  “As for geostrategic and military issues, I have no certain-
ties. It would have been enough to simply add a clause establishing 
a ban on military uses, but this has not been done. Does anyone 
know for certain if  in 2050, 2065, or even after that, China will 
have a geostrategic and military interest in our country?”  
I observe in Gribaudo’s speech a mention to the uncertainties – 
especially geopolitical ones – inherent to long-term relations with 
China, reflecting the tacit idea that China will certainly change the 
world order in the years to come.  
From box 3 in figure 31, I interpreted a discursive grouping ad-
dressing the issue of  Argentina’s geopolitical positioning vis-à-vis 
former, existing and emerging world powers. Claudio Lozano 
(Unidad Popular, province of  Buenos Aires) argued in this regard: 
“[...] In the southern region of  our country, there is a military base 
on the Malvinas Islands that is controlled by Great Britain. We 
also know that Patagonia is a territory to populate and that China 
is a country with a large population density. Knowing the im-
portance of  the southern region of  our country in terms of min-
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ing, oil, gas, and fish resources, as well as in terms of  its fresh wa-
ter, it would be extremely prudent to think a little deeper and less 
hastily about this agreement, especially when the government has 
committed for fifty years.” 
Lozano mentions colonialism from Britain as a counterfactual to 
what could end up occurring with China. There is the concern 
that, in the long term, China will take advantage of  the center-
periphery power relations, that have historically marked Argen-
tina’s foreign relations, to exploit natural resources and land in Ar-
gentina.  
The geopolitical concerns also include the reaction of  the US to 
the existence of the station. Gilberto Alegre (Frente Renovador, 
province of  Buenos Aires) argued: “The US is moving its entire 
fleet to the Pacific because of  its conflict with China and we will 
give up territory and sovereignty to the Chinese, which will create 
a new conflict [between them].” This phrase is framed in refer-
ence to the pro-American/anti-American cleavage, implicitly sug-
gesting that Argentina should choose in favor of  the US, since 
having good relations with both countries is geopolitically implau-
sible. Deputy Fabián Rogel (UCR, province of  Entre Rios) sig-
naled that “The agreement arrives late since [Kirchner’s] govern-
ment is ending soon and should have presented a strategic plan 
no less than two years ago. No one can bear the thought of, after 
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twelve years in office, having finally achieved the replacement of  
both the old European model of dependence and that of US 
domination with a new model of domination, a looming Chinese 
empire in Asia and Latin America”. 
Rogel criticizes Peronism by claiming that the country was replac-
ing one regional hegemon with another, due to the incumbent 
government lacking any long-term strategy towards China.  Again 
we perceive a strong government-opposition division and refer-
ences to US. 
The lower-left cluster, in box 4, encompasses the arguments for 
the domestic impact of  the agreement. There were concerns 
about the agreement giving permission to the Chinese govern-
ment to build through direct awards (that is, by avoiding domestic 
laws for public bidding). For instance, Patricia Bullrich (Unión 
PRO, province of  Buenos Aires) said: “[…] the constructions will 
be made without the need for a public bid, that is, without basic 
rules of  transparency which are necessary for public works not to 
be subject to corruption.”  
Following a strong government-opposition division, the opposi-
tion claimed that the lack of  transparency in the awards would 
allow Kirchner’s government to make discrete recommendations 
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to Chinese companies that have links to Kirchner’s party65. Ara-
celi Rossi (Unión por Cordoba, province of  Cordoba) stated that 
“there is no guarantee that the cheapest price will be paid. Nor 
can we guarantee the quality of  input used for the completion of 
works.” In the same line, Elisa Carrio (ARI, province of  City of  
Buenos Aires) argued that “As this agreement allows direct 
awards, it violates Article 27 of  the Constitution, which states: 
‘The federal government must strengthen its relations of  peace 
and commerce with foreign powers through treaties that are in 
conformity with the principles of  the public law established in this 
Constitution.’” This line of  discourse also means to call attention 
to the fact that the two dams to be built in the province of  Santa 
Cruz (where Kirchner hails from) were financed by China, and 
the contracts were awarded to companies owned by people with 
close ties to Kirchner’s party: “friends of the power.”  
One of  the most notorious alleged cases of  corruption in Argen-
tina during Cristina Kirchner’s presidency involves the conglom-
erate owned by Mr. Lazaro Baez, a businessman related to the 
Kirchner family. His name was mentioned four times during the 
speeches of  those legislators who opposed the space-monitoring 
                                                          
65 The companies said to be “related to the Kircher’s party” are CMEC (China Machin-
ery Engineering Corporation), China Gezhouba Group and the China National Nuclear Cor-
poration (CNNC).  
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station agreement, as part of an attempt to accuse the govern-
ment of  corruption in the bidding process.  
Finally, the lower-right cluster of  the figure shows a group of 
words criticizing economic relations with China that are based on 
the export of  primary goods, which reflects concerns of  an un-
balanced relationship. Representative Araceli Rossi (Unión por 
Cordoba, province of  Cordoba) argued that “While Argentina 
continues to sign agreements with China, the trade deficit has 
reached billions of dollars and is still growing. That is, [the Chi-
nese] get a lot and we get very little.” Claudio Lozano (Unidad 
Popular, province of  Buenos Aires) said that “96 percent of what 
we sell to China is of  primary production, of which 85 percent is 
soybean, soybean oil, and crude oil, while what we receive from 
China are manufactured goods.” These imbalances present in Ar-
gentine-Chinese trade were extended to incorporate the issue of 
economic asymmetries in the space-monitoring station agree-
ment. Mario Negri (Unión por Cordoba, province of Cordoba) 
said that “The project is financed with capital from Chinese com-
panies. It uses Chinese technology and Chinese labor. And that, 
obviously, creates an imbalance […].”   
Having analyzed the discourses employed by those criticizing the 
Chinese space-monitoring station project, I now turn to the anal-
ysis of  the speeches by legislators who supported the project. I 
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followed the same strategy as before, first creating clusters using 
Wordstat and then interpreting them (Figure 32). The main argu-
ment (see box 1) again concerns the bilateral economic relation-
ship with China, but in this case the discourse highlights  all the 
gains that Argentina experiences from a deep relationship with 
China. For example, Deputy Roberto Feletti (Frente Para la Vic-
toria, province of  Buenos Aires) defended the deal because of  
China’s economic strengths compared to those of  Brazil, the EU, 
and the US: “The truth is that when considering the economy of 
China, the European Union, Brazil and the US, one is going to 
realize that the only country which grew strongly in these years 
was China, even during the 2008/2009 crisis. Thus, signing a bi-
lateral agreement with China is not a bad idea.” This argumenta-
tion highlights China’s short-term role as the “belle of  the ball.” 
Furthermore, China is presented as an alternative to Argentina’s 
excessive dependence on Brazil, whose government is said to 
have forgotten about Argentina: 
“Among the four countries with which we engage in the most 
trade, China is the one experiencing the highest growth rates. 
Therefore, it is logical to have a privileged bilateral relationship 
with that country. […] During the third Workers Party govern-
ment—headed by Dilma Rousseff—Brazil changed its foreign 
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policy in favor of  the relationship with the BRICS at the expense 
of  Mercosur and UNASUR.” 
 
 
FIGURE 31: Word clusters of  the legislators who voted in favour the 
project. 
Note: Elaborated using Wordstat. 
 
In box 2, the upper-left corner cluster reveals a discursive group-
ing that explores the difference in scrutiny between the Chinese 
and European space-monitoring stations. The speeches of  legis-
lators who supported the agreement contained several mentions 
of  the ESA station in order to insist on the fact that both projects 
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were similar in nature. For example, Deputy Martin Rodrigo Gill 
(Frente Para la Victoria, province of  Córdoba) argued that “[…] 
there is a degree of  prejudice and paranoia about the instalation 
of  this Station in our country. The space-monitoring station in 
Neuquen has no different characteristics than that which opper-
ates in Malargüe, owned by Europe.” Deputy Alicia Comelli 
(Neuquén’s Popular Movement, province of  Neuquén) pointed 
to the fears of power asymmetries with China as proposed in hy-
pothesis one:  
“[…] As the main argument [against the project] is the fear of  
asymmetry, it is fair to signal that there were no such fears during 
the installation of Malargüe’s station, carried out by the European 
Space Agency, which is basically British, in collaboration with 
NASA. Even when [with the UK and US] we suffer worse asym-
metries!” Again, asymmetries play a central role in political dis-
courses favoring the project, and references to American hegem-
ony were always latent. No difference should exist between asym-
metries with China and previous regional hegemons.” 
The upper-right cluster of  discursive groupings echoes the idea 
that Argentine-Chinese relations were evolving into a ‘Compre-
hensive Strategic Relationship’ between the two countries and for 
that reason, the agreement needs to be understood as a big step 
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in the political approximation between both countries. For exam-
ple, Carlos Heller (Frente Nuevo Encuentro, province of  Buenos 
Aires) made the point that signing agreements with China was 
part of  a broad political alliance:  
“[…] It has been ten years since [a strategic partnership] began, 
and now, by taking this step, we are turning the strategic relation-
ship into a Comprehensive Strategic Relationship. This is a rela-
tionship that goes beyond building commercial, technological, or 
scientific bonds toward sharing common political positions in in-
ternational organizations.”  
Sharing common political positions in international organizations 
is perceived as a last stage in the process of  bringing the two coun-
tries closer, and Heller celebrates that Argentina is heading in that 
direction with China. Implicit in this may be a reduced concern 
over China’s future military might.  
Paired with the idea of strengthening bilateral relations, there were 
mentions of and praises for former president Nestor Kirchner’s 
initiative of  kicking off  a strategic relationship with China back in 
2004. Some legislators argued that voting in favor of  this agree-
ment was a matter of  being coherent with Kirchner’s foreign pol-
icy of  alignment with China.   
The lower-left cluster represents a discursive grouping that can be 
summarized as “China is the best alternative, Brazil forgot us, and 
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the US and EU are the ‘old world’ we no longer want to belong 
to.” Peronist legislators in particular hold a positive view of  closer 
ties with China, which is seen as an alternative to the neoliberal 
policies advanced by the US in the region. For instance, deputy 
Adriana Puiggros (Frente Para la Victoria, province of Buenos 
Aires) argued that  
“[The opposition] shouts fears over possible Chinese imperialism, 
against an invasion; they even argue that the antenna will serve for 
military purposes. The antenna has a dimension of  35 meters in 
diameter and 45 meters in height. These characteristics clearly 
serve only scientific purposes. It is impossible to use it militarily. 
Ultimately, this alleged Chinese imperialism is a smokescreen 
aimed at defending the hegemony of  western neoliberalism led 
by the US.”  
This combines with arguments explaining why China should be a 
preferred country to partner with. Deputy Julia Perié (Frente para 
la Victoria, province of  Misiones) argued that China is different 
from other powerful nations in that it is an “emerging” one, and 
Kirchner supported the foreign policy of “strengthening South-
South relations, which led to that historic moment when we said 
‘no’ to the FTAA and ‘yes’ to the consolidation of  other regional 
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blocs: Mercosur, UNASUR, and CELAC.” In this view, strength-
ening ties with China is framed within the foreign policy of  
South-South relations. 
Finally, the lower-right cluster (number 5) offers a discursive 
grouping addressing the positive impact of China’s FDI in Ar-
gentina. Alfredo Dato (Frente Para la Victoria, province of  Tucu-
man) mentioned:   
“Instead of  discussing the clauses [of  the project], we must dis-
cuss which role foreign capital plays in the national economy, i.e., 
if  it contributes to the development of  domestic productive 
forces or if  it plays the role of  despoiler of  these forces, widening 
the pockets of  the owners of  foreign capital. A central question 
is: By approving this agreement with China will Argentina be a 
better “nation”? Also, is this agreement limited only to a financing 
process or does it also contribute to economic and technological 
progress? In my view, the access to technology available today in 
China represents a great leap forward for our national economy.” 
Dato exposes the argument that not all FDI may be beneficial for 
Argentina, but that Chinese FDI will have a positive impact.  
This argument may dovetail with a critical view on domestic busi-
nesspeople and agribusiness producers who are considered to be 
aligned with the US. As Deputy Oscar Martinez (Movimiento 
Solidario Popular, province of  Santa Cruz) stated:  
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“A project with China might not come to meet the great needs 
the country currently faces in the areas of  science and technology, 
but neither will the petty politics of  businessmen, industrialists, 
and members of  the Rural Society who only think of  how to im-
prove business at the expense of the people.” 
This exposes a “we-against-them” dichotomy that is much 
stronger among Peronist legislators. “We” is used to refer to those 
interested in protecting national interests and economic develop-
ment, while “them” refers to agribusiness, neoliberals, specula-
tors, and those who were pro-American.  
 
 
Summary of  findings 
 
This chapter employed a mixed-method content and discourse 
analysis to investigate why members of  parliament in Argentina 
hold such varied views about Chinese investments in a host coun-
try. From the test of  two hypotheses, in table 22 we identify five 
common themes towards which those in favor and those against 
the Chinese space-monitoring station have formulated opposing 
discourses which came to the fore in the parliamentary debates. 
As becomes apparent, the themes are all related to uncertainties 
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about how to handle China as a new powerful political and eco-
nomic player in the world. 
TABLE 22: Summary of  findings for Chapter 6 
Issue Opposition block Government block 
Future economic and 
military might of China  




sive partnership   
Asymmetry of power 
and center-periphery 
logic 
Asymmetry with China 
– as with the US – puts 
Argentina at a disad-
vantage 
Asymmetries with 
China no different 
from those with 
EU/Britain and US 
Geopolitical positioning  US regional hegemony 
replaced by Chinese 
power 
Good relations with 
China a useful coun-




fied” trade relations 
with China  
China’s growth pro-
vides major eco-
nomic benefits  
View of Chinese FDI in 
Argentina 
FDI as an imposed ne-
cessity with negative 
impact  
FDI is welcome, 
with positive impact 
 
Although the broad issues are the same, both sides address them 
in fundamentally different ways, informed by partisan politics, at-
titudes toward the US as a regional power as well as ideological 
perspectives. Those voting against the space-monitoring station 
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see it is as part of a trend towards empowerment of  China, ulti-
mately at the detriment of  Argentine national interests politically, 
militarily and economically. But those in favor of  the space-mon-
itoring station see in the same issues a set of political and eco-
nomic opportunities for Argentina.  
While China may be a future threat, it could also be a strong ally; 
new asymmetries may be created, but diversification of  global 
power structures could benefit Argentina; China may have hege-
monic tendencies, but it also reins in US hegemony; economic 
relations between China and Argentina may be uneven, but 
China’s relative economic and technological strength may also 
provide major benefits to Argentina; and Chinese FDI may be 
economically harmful to Argentina, although proponents of the 
space-monitoring station see it as having a positive impact. The 
focus of  the arguments rested primarily on geopolitical interests 
and matters of  economic impact, and were not driven by other 
possible themes, such as nationalistic sentiments or cultural dis-
tance. 
To emphasize their own particular take on these same issues, both 
sides drew on narratives from Argentina’s negative historical ex-
periences, its particular regional context and its subdued position-
ing in the rest of the world. They do so by drawing on familiar 
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popular concepts such as “asymmetry of  power”, “center-periph-
ery logic”, “hegemony”, “imbalance” and “commodification”. 
Yet, they use them to support opposing views. The critics are con-
cerned that asymmetries in relations with the US and EU/Britain 
would be replicated through further engagement with China via 
FDI, while proponents of the deal – who may or may not take a 
favorable view on China overall – argue that engaging with China 
and inviting Chinese FDI creates a desirable alternative and coun-
terbalance to those asymmetries from the “old” world order. 
These differences are fueled further by the traditional rifts about 
economic ideology that are entrenched in Argentinian society, be-
tween those advocating a more open economy and open invest-
ment relations, and those concerned about the negative implica-
tions this may bring with it.  
An interesting finding from this study is thus that the discourse 
about Chinese FDI is formulated from within the particular soci-
etal and geopolitical contexts of  the host country, Argentina. The 
center-periphery logic together with the differences of  economic 
ideology are characteristic of  the Latin American context and are 
being employed to advance competing discourses about Chinese 
FDI in Argentina. That being the case, however, it is less clear 
whether the findings of  the study can provide explanations for 
perceptions and reactions to Chinese FDI in other regions of  the 
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world. Even when the nature of the Chinese project is similar, it 
is quite possible that the discourses employed to argue in favor or 
against it will differ, bringing in local aspects that carry argumen-
tative weight in the context of the particular locality. The identifi-
cation of  these discourses will, however, have to be left for future 
studies.  
The interpretation I did of the legislative speeches allows us to 
conclude that China may well be a double-edged sword for Ar-
gentina, where a mix of  threats and opportunities creates uncer-
tainties that ultimately produce very different discourses about 
Chinese FDI. Given these current differences, the question is 
whether China will gradually become a constant divisive factor in 
domestic politics and form a cleavage just as the US has done in 
the past. This new cleavage would likely overlap with other exist-
ing divides, such as government-opposition and Peronists-anti-
Peronists. Without regard of the potential depth of any such 
cleavage, the political discourse about China in Argentina will cer-









Chapter 7 – Concluding remarks  
 
 
The first chapter of  this thesis discussed the best way to opera-
tionalize our dependent variable and opted to operationalize the 
conceptualization of  Johnston (2014) who, while critical of this 
concept, provides a definition of assertiveness that serves the pur-
pose of my work. Assertiveness was defined as the form of di-
plomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor 
that is clearly higher than before. To measure costs in an empirical 
way we have assumed that China's tool of  assertiveness is its eco-
nomic statecraft, which is defined as the use of  economic means 
in the service of  both economic and foreign policy ends. As noted 
in chapters 2-6, it is clear that Chinese action in the region during 
the period studied (2001-2015) entails tangible costs for the 
United States: (a) China has become a competitor in the field of  
foreign investments , (b) China is a competitor in terms of large 
infrastructure loans, (c) Latin American society is beginning to 
welcome the rivalry between the United States and China and (d) 
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the political class is aware of the geopolitical consequences of  
strengthening ties with China. 
If we were to locate China, from what we have observed in the 
previous chapters, in one of the boxes in Table 2 of Chapter 1, 
I would say that it is a constructive-offensive assertiveness, 
since China did not present itself as an actor disruptive of the 
rule of the game, as if the USSR did during the Cold War, but 
it is from the rules of the game itself that it assumes a role of 
leadership. 
The causal mechanisms to explain China's assertiveness 
throughout this thesis can be organized into a 2 × 2 matrix in 
which we have on the one hand the foreign policy strategy of 
China, and on the other the reaction of the Latin American 
countries. In Chapter 2, I said that evidence suggests that 
China may be pursuing a strategy of both accommodation and 
response. Chapter 3, while focusing only on investment and 
neglecting trade and bank lending, provides evidence to sug-
gest that China opts for accommodation and that it is pursued 
through the guidelines that Chinese political institutions exert 
over companies with majority state control and under the su-
pervision of SASAC. 
On the other hand, looking at Latin America, chapters 4, 5 and 
6 explore the reaction of individuals, both ordinary citizens and 
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policy makers, to China's accommodation strategy in the re-
gion. It can be said that the Chinese promotion can be seen as 
an alternative for the diversification of the international rela-
tions of the countries and to decompress the American hegem-
ony in the region, or as a way of opting to maintain the ties 
with the United States, taking advantage of the benevolent ap-
proach that the doctrine Obama manifested toward the region 
and which has been called a post-hegemonic approach. The 
empirical evidence from the three chapters suggests that China 
is seen as an alternative for diversification. 
Therefore, this thesis is able to describe the Chinese assertive-
ness in Latin America between 2001 and 2016 as a process in 
which China opted for accommodation and in which the Latin 
American countries saw in China an opportunity to diversify. 
This conclusion discards, if we look at Figure 32, three other 
plausible scenarios. In this sense, the empirical contribution is 
twofold, from one side of China to Latin America and the 





FIGURE 32: Summary of the findings.  
 
Under no circumstances is the empirical evidence found in this 
thesis incontestable. Case studies may have little external valid-
ity, so it is difficult to generalize the diversification argument in 
countries that we have not studied in detail, such as Mexico or 
Colombia for example, which are the countries with the high-
est values in the North American Hegemonic Influence Index. 
In turn, in rejecting the alternative answer, we have only stud-
ied foreign direct investment and not trade and loans, and I 
have done so using a database on a global scale. For all this, 
this evidence is nothing more than a first step in the deepening 




The merit of the thesis is to study a highly relevant topic in the 
Latin American academy with a novel approach. It also 
demonstrates with conviction that during the period under 
study, Chinese assertiveness has been negatively conditioned 
by the hegemonic influence of the United States. The empirical 
implications for the HST theory are large and also relevant to 
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